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Abstract
This study is about drought. At the same time, it is about a community of nomadic livestock 
producers in the drylands of eastern Morocco. Drought is connected to these Arab pastoral-
ists  in  numerous ways.  In  fact,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the  social  and  economic 
dynamics currently unfolding in the high plateaus without understanding what drought is 
and does. Even though defining drought may seem straightforward, it turns out that vastly 
different notions coexist within the study area, each related to a specific constellation (or 
assemblage) of actors. In this dissertation, I explore those notions of drought and the assem-
blages they are entangled with, focusing on key elements of the livestock economy and the 
tribal community.
I hope this study will contribute to knowledge on three levels. First and foremost, empir-
ically: I collect and connect knowledge on an under-studied and marginalized pastoral com-
munity  in  rural  Morocco.  My insights  stem from qualitative  and quantitative  fieldwork, 
including a household survey. The second level is methodological:  by deploying actor-net-
work theory and assemblage thinking, I tap into theories that have largely been absent from 
studies of the Middle East and North Africa. As my assemblage approach to drought in east-
ern Morocco demonstrates, this can generate innovative insights into processes of socio-eco-
nomic  transformation.  And third, on a conceptual level,  I propose a new way of thinking 
about drought – a phenomenon of pressing global concern far beyond the high plateaus of 
eastern Morocco.
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Transcription and Terminology
The interviews quoted in this study were mostly conducted in colloquial Arabic and some-
times in French; all English translations are mine. In the variants of Arabic spoken in eastern 
Morocco, pronunciation and vocabulary can differ markedly from Modern Standard Arabic 
and even from western Moroccan vernacular (darija). My transcription is nevertheless often 
based on the Standard Arabic forms of words in order to increase comprehensibility and 
because straightforward transcription systems exist. I adhere to the rules established for the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, without indicating diacritics or the length of 
vowels (the latter is often irrelevant in local dialects anyway, cf. Maas and Procházka 2012). 
This system is practiced by several authors (e.g.,  Mitchell 2002; Holden 2009) and should 
make Arabic terms easily legible to readers without knowledge of the language, but equally 
clear to those who do speak Arabic.
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For names of people and bigger cities, I rely on the French-based transcription that is 
routinely used in Moroccan official contexts and everyday situations. Competing spelling 
variants may exist,  however,  since this transcription is  not  standardized. I  have changed 
some, but not all individual names in order to protect my informants’ privacy. The time lag 
between my research in the field (2008-12) and the final drafting of this manuscript adds 
another cushioning layer between personal concerns at the time and my description of them 
in this thesis.
Parts of my economic analysis rely on monetary values, expressed in the national cur-
rency. One Moroccan dirham (short: dh) consists of 100 santim (French centime). Exchange 
rates in the early 2010s saw the value of one euro oscillating around 11 dirhams, while one 
US dollar was worth between 8 and 10 dirhams. There are various colloquial ways of count-
ing money: one dirham equals, for instance, 20 riyal (from Spanish  real, mostly in western 
Morocco), 20 doro (Spanish  duro, mostly in northern Morocco), or 100 frank (French  franc, 
mostly in eastern Morocco). Larger amounts are commonly quoted in santim/frank, so that 
10,000 dh will be referred to as ‘one million.’
Photographs, tables, charts, and illustrations stem from my own fieldwork, unless other-
wise noted. They are meant to enhance and complement the textual information by provid-
ing additional perspectives on the matters I discuss.
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 1 Introduction: Exploring Drought
Drought, in the arid highland plains of eastern Morocco, appears to be responsible for many 
things. As I traveled in the region and talked to locals, the topic of drought would almost 
inevitably come up at some point in every conversation – no matter whether my interlocu-
tors were nomadic pastoralists or settled merchants.
Asked about his definition of drought, a senior figure from the tribe of Awlad Sidi Abdʿ  
al-Hakim summarized the key narrative in just a few words:
‘Drought means: there is a lack of rain, so the soil gets dry, so the plants don’t grow, so  
the animals don’t find anything to eat.’  (Conversation with tribal elder,  Awlad Sidi 
Abd al-Hakim, November 1, 2011)ʿ
Implicitly, this causal chain extends at least one step further to the pastoralists who raise 
these animals: they become obliged to buy extra fodder to feed their herd. To obtain cash for 
the fodder purchase, they usually need to sell some animals. This tends to become a vicious 
circle where more and more animals are sold to feed the remaining ones; eventually, people 
start quitting the livestock business altogether.
They also quit the steppe, as it offers no alternative livelihoods, and end up moving to 
towns and cities. This has led to the establishment of entire new neighborhoods. Just on the 
outskirts of Ayn Bani Mathar, the market town at the heart of my study area, is the growingʿ  
community of Hayy al-Ziyani. It basically owes its existence to drought – this was explained 
to me by a young police officer who had grown up in the area.
A related consequence of drought, in such narratives, is poverty. There may no longer be 
any money to be made out of raising sheep and goats for some families as a consequence of  
drought damage, but this does not mean that they easily find alternative income sources in 
their new urban environments. Nor do they typically have any professional experience that 
would make the transition to a job in trade or services easier.
Adding another element to the story as it is told by locals, drought in the Moroccan high-
lands has pushed increasing numbers of people to emigrate to Spain and other European 
countries. Whenever they return to their homeland, whether on vacation or permanently, 
they do not only import fresh capital, but also new ideas. One example is a wedding hall that 
has recently opened in Ayn Bani Mathar,  accompanied by a new demand for wedding-ʿ
related  beauty.  Thus,  a  women’s  hairdresser  first  appeared in  the  steppe around 2007 – 
another surprising effect of the massive transforming force named ‘drought.’
If drought has the power to create entire neighborhoods, drive families into poverty, and 
bring into existence new economic fields, one should assume that it is a well-studied phe-
nomenon. And there are indeed numerous studies from different academic fields devoted to 
drought. However, they tend to assume rather narrow perspectives on a complex reality, and 
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thus overlook numerous aspects that drought is just as intimately connected to. To present 
some evidence for this claim, I give a brief overview of the current state of drought literature 
below (chapter 1.4, p. 38).
In part due to this widespread lack of perceptiveness, I argue, drought has been allowed 
to continue having serious harmful effects. Hence, a core goal of this thesis is to propose a 
new way of exploring drought. The key theoretical tools I enroll in this endeavor – and this 
has not been done before – are actor-network theory and assemblage thinking, two related, 
comparatively novel approaches which I will introduce early on (in chapters 1.2 and 1.3, p. 
20). But first, I will further establish the significance of this topic by addressing global aspects  
of drought and then zooming in on my study region.
Defining drought may seem trivial. Evidently, drought regularly happens all over the 
world,  from the Horn of  Africa to California  and Australia.  Development  programs and 
agencies are devoted to dealing with it, such as the National Drought Management Authority 
in Kenya; Morocco does not currently have a similar institution. Despite this manifest rele-
vance and visibility, a standard definition of drought has not been agreed upon; the word 
‘means different things to different people’ (Heathcote 1969, 176). As with many complex 
real-life phenomena, there are various competing notions rather than one single definition 
that is widely accepted. In a first approach, each notion should be taken seriously in its own 
right and should only be judged by its usefulness in dealing with a specific question.
If you search for ‘drought’ images on an internet search engine, you will be presented 
with countless variations of the same stereotypical photograph: a dried-up riverbed or water-
hole with cracks in the ground, sometimes featuring a dead animal or a desperate farmer. 
Enter corresponding terms in different languages and you will obtain the same outcome: 
فافج (or the synonymous طحق) in Arabic, 干旱 in Chinese, sécheresse in French, засуха in Rus-
sian, or sequía in Spanish, to name just the official languages of the United Nations. Such pic-
tures have been ‘the standard photographs of drought’ for many decades (Heathcote 1969, 
191). Apparently, a powerful imagery is operative on a global scale. Development and disas-
ter relief programs tap into this imagery. As a pragmatic consequence, I will treat the non-
English terms encountered in the field (in my case, mostly Arabic jafaf) and in the literature 
(often French  sécheresse) as equivalent to English  drought; there are some language-specific 
connotations, however, which I address in the next paragraph.
This thesis sets out to go several steps beyond the cracked earth cliché. Mud cracks are  
seen in places where there used to be water until recently. In zones that are arid to begin 
with, drought can be much more subtle and take very different shapes. In many languages 
spoken in arid regions, there is no clear distinction between the words used for dry condi-
tions in general and for drought in particular (e.g., Swahili: Slegers 2008, Maasai: Goldman, 
Daly, and Lovell 2016, and various Berber languages: Chiche 2003). Even Arabic-speaking 
nomads in Morocco used to employ more general terms like jadb (drought, dearth, scarcity) 
or  shidda (hardship, misfortune) to describe drought conditions before the term  jafaf (dry-
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ness) gained currency (Chiche 2003, 246; Wehr and Cowan 1994). Compared to more local 
terms, jafaf has been popularized through media channels and by administrative personnel, 
and can thus be seen as a ‘national’ concept (Skounti 2012, 189) – or rather a global one, fol-
lowing the above observations.
Figure 1: Mud cracks in the High Atlas, Morocco, October 2008
Generally speaking,  drought is  not  imagined as  something material  that  can be touched, 
heard, seen, smelled, or tasted. However, drought seems to have numerous effects and con-
sequences. Drought  does things to soils, plants, animals, and people. Table  1 gives a list of 
things that various people attribute to drought in eastern Morocco and that are indeed per-
ceivable through the senses; this list is by no means complete.
Drought does… (according to…)
…reduce vegetation (tribe elder)
…make people move (student Ahmad)
…create neighborhoods (young policeman)
…drive people into poverty and mendicancy (Al- Arabi’s wife)ʿ
…promote migration and thus bring new ideas (adolescent Muhammad)
…reduce livestock numbers (nomadic herder Ali)ʿ
…put an end to camel breeding (Ramadan’s wife)
…make herders buy fodder (former nomad Al-Husayn)
…make things complicated (Farraji’s wife)
…reduce the number of weddings (meteorologist Bilal)
Table 1: What drought does
Most, but not all of these drought effects are unequivocally negative. At the same time, they 
hint at the vast range of different areas that can be touched by drought. Being able to do all 
these things, what is the essence of drought itself, then? This is one way of formulating my 
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key research question (further discussed in ch. 1.3 below). A number of conceptual and prac-
tical questions arise: Is the notion of ‘drought’ merely a shortcut for a collection of things  
which might as well be examined individually, or is it more than the sum of its parts? What 
other things is drought entangled with, and in what ways do they reinforce its destructive 
capacities? Can we humans learn to handle the consequences of drought better if we modify 
our  general  understanding of  drought?  To  broach  such problems,  I  present  and discuss 
insights from my fieldwork in the Moroccan high plateaus (Figure 2 below) in this thesis. The 
manifold actors that populate this study area serve as my empirical foundation and hence as 
the key example that I will refer to throughout the text.
In an earlier publication, my colleague Ingo Breuer and I have characterized the high 
plateaus of eastern Morocco as a ‘globalizing periphery.’1 This notion refers to unequal eco-
nomic ties and asymmetrical power relations, paralleled by the region’s physical distance 
from the political and economic core it depends on. Geographically, the steppes lie at the 
margins of Morocco; and yet, contemporary globalization has touched and transformed the 
region just like any other.
As the Kingdom of Morocco is characterized by a wide range of semi-arid and arid land-
scapes, a variety of pastoral production systems can be found ranging from vertical transhu-
mance to horizontal  steppe pastoralism, and from semi-intensive agropastoral systems to 
more extensive forms relying almost entirely on natural rangelands. These systems differ 
widely with regards to natural diversity, the degree of market integration, and state interven-
tion. However, the main pastoral areas share several commonalities: they are prone to high 
inter-annual variability in precipitation; they are at the periphery of the country, for example 
1 The following paragraphs are modified passages from that chapter (Breuer and Kreuer 2011).
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Figure 2: Location of the study area in eastern Morocco
Map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0; data by OpenStreetMap, under CC BY SA
in mountain, steppe, and desert regions far away from the major cities; and the prevalence of 
poverty and illiteracy is exceptionally high (Gertel and Breuer 2007).
The eastern Moroccan high plateaus, with over 5 million hectares of arid rangeland, are 
one of these pastoral areas. They are home to about 100,000 people and 2 million small rumi-
nants (Mahdi 2007; USAID 2006) and fall almost entirely within the administrative Eastern 
Region (jihat al-Sharq in Arabic, région de l’Oriental in French). Historically, the area was char-
acterized by extensive,  nomadic  livestock breeding where  people  and their  herds  would 
move along routes of water points and forage availability (Guessous et al. 1989). Rangelands 
were in general collectively owned and used by tribal groups. A number of parallel develop-
ments  –  technical,  political,  socio-economic,  and ecological  –  meant  these  old  ways  had 
mostly disappeared by the 1990s (Rachik 2000). Tenets of former times, the nomadic mobility 
of livestock and people as well as the collective access to land, have been widely modified or 
abandoned altogether.
The region’s peripheral position has not precluded regular interventions by government 
institutions and development agencies  that  have affected local  pastoral  livelihoods,  often 
inducing processes of social and spatial restructuring (Chiche 2007; Gertel and Breuer 2007). 
Pastoral cooperatives were established top-down throughout the high plateaus in the 1990s 
as a response to the perceived dysfunctional state of tribal institutions and to the administra-
tion’s  demand for  solid governance  structures,  framed within a  global  development dis-
course. Their main function was to regulate the usage of rangelands and to declare temporar-
ily protected areas in the fight against degradation. Where enforced, this has affected land 
use patterns; access to the pastures now has to be paid for (Mahdi 2007). Yet, many coopera-
tives have failed to create the desired level of coordination (see chapter 2.8, p. 98).
Such institutional change has been paralleled by technological manifestations of global-
ization. From the mid-twentieth century onward, trucks have been used to transport people, 
animals, water, and fodder rapidly over long distances, replacing the dromedary in this func-
tion and making new pasture grounds accessible for those who can afford to buy or rent a 
vehicle. In combination with other technical innovations and the growing tendency to per-
manently  settle  in  one  of  the  towns,  this  had  contributed  to  an  increased  polarization 
between wealthy pastoral entrepreneurs on the one hand and impoverished ex-nomads on 
the other (Rachik 2000).
Another important aspect of globalization concerns the opening up of international labor 
markets. Since the 1990s, labor migration from the eastern Moroccan highlands has reached a 
large scale. According to data published by sociologist Mohamed Mahdi (2007), thousands of 
locals have either become international migrants working in Spain as agricultural laborers or 
are employed in bigger cities neighboring the high plateaus. This concerns about one in two 
families in Mahdi’s sample. Both forms of migration are temporary, and emigrants do not 
generally  cut  their  ties  with  their  home communities;  many of  them go  back  and forth 
between Spain and Morocco several times a year. The flow of people and capital between the 
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two countries is asymmetrical, however, and has therefore not fundamentally affected the 
peripheral status of the steppes.
It is thus in a double sense that the notion of a globalizing periphery can be read: a domes-
tically marginalized area that takes part in globalizing processes; and, in turn, an unprece-
dented integration that does not automatically establish a more balanced power structure or 
a more advantageous economic position for the region.
In spite of these changes, the region has remained mainly pastoral, producing sheep and 
–  to  a  lesser  extent  –  goats.  On the  whole,  it  maintains  an  important  role  in  supplying 
Morocco’s urban centers with meat. But are things really staying the same, as this macro per-
spective might suggest, or are they changing? What can be said beyond the statement that 
globalization is an uneven process? And what is the role of drought in this story?
 1.1 The Ubiquity of Drought in Eastern Morocco
The first time I was introduced to the topic of drought in the high plateaus was during the 
presentation of a film at the French Cultural Center in Oujda, the regional capital of the Ori-
ental  (Eastern  Morocco),  in  November  2008.  The  movie  addressed  the  current  state  of 
nomadism in the region. It asked the question what could be done to improve the situation 
of the livestock breeders in a challenging environment of increasing drought and degrada-
tion of  rangelands.  In  the  subsequent  panel  discussion,  local  teacher  and artist  Lakhdar 
Hamzaoui presented a narrative that appeared somewhat folkloristic, romanticizing an ideal 
society  that  is  under  threat  and  needs  to  be  protected.  His  pessimistic  view  was  that 
‘nomadism will  disappear.’  In contrast,  Abderrahmane Mejdoubi,  a  livestock functionary 
whose  organization  had produced the  film,  was  convinced that  ‘nomadism will  change’ 
rather than go away. Both men thus shared a basic premise – that change is happening – but 
disagreed about the opportunities and threats inherent in this process.
More  specifically,  Hamzaoui  singled  out  two  reasons  for  the  decline:  ‘trucks  and 
drought.’ To him, the combination of technological and climatic factors seems particularly 
dangerous, not just for the nomadic families, but also for the environment they live in. On his 
personal website, he states that the principal problems faced by this society come from the 
outside, those ‘that threaten the very existence of the nomadic way of life, fauna, and flora in 
a region that is afflicted by numerous exogenous factors (drought, poaching...). These prob-
lems push tribes toward rural exodus and emigration’ (Hamzaoui 2010, 4, my translation). 
The key elements of this drought narrative were going to become very familiar to me over 
the course of the following years, but I gradually came to the conclusion that things were not  
that simple and one-sided.
The next year, in the summer of 2009, I traveled to the high plateaus on another field trip 
with two Moroccan researchers to interview sheep producers in the steppe; we were aiming 
at a more detailed picture of the ongoing disappearance – or transformation – of nomadism. 
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We conducted brief, semi-structured interviews with 16 families who lived in woolen tents 
near the main roads connecting Ayn Bani Mathar to Murayja in my study area (Figure ʿ 5, p. 
46)  and Tendrara to  Ma tarka further south.  Seven interviewees brought  up the  topic  ofʿ  
drought although we never asked for it;  their names and tribes do not have explanatory 
value, but are given for illustrative purpose at this stage:
1. Ali  and his wife from the tribe of  Awlad Sidi Ali  stated that  drought had beenʿ ʿ  
present for a few years now. Only in the current year, it had attenuated to ‘just a little’ 
drought. In case of drought, the family would move westward. Some of their kin had 
moved up all the way to Jurf al-Milha (400 km away) two or three years ago. Due to 
drought, livestock numbers had gone down. However, the current year (2008-9) was 
considered the best since 1985 thanks to plentiful precipitation, so vegetation had 
become abundant.
2. Al-Shadhili from tribe of Awlad Ahmad mentioned that the municipality had given 
them some fodder in times of drought.
3. Al-Husayn, Awlad Jabir tribe: ‘Most herders buy fodder for their livestock because of 
the long years of drought.’
4. The  wife  of  Al- Arabi  from  the  Jababira  tribe  said  that  her  household  had  notʿ  
migrated to the west of the country for three years. They used to go there in drought 
years to herd for other people or to graze their own livestock. When drought made it 
necessary, they would even resort to si ayaʿ , asking help from others, in places such as 
Sidi Sulayman or Suq al-Arbi a  in the west.ʿ ʾ
5. Ahmad from the Bani Gil tribal confederation: ‘We relocate our tent according to 
drought.’
6. Ramadan’s wife from the tribe of Awlad Ali ibn Yasin: ‘We do not use supplemenʿ -
tary  fodder  unless  there  is  a  drought  and  vegetation  becomes  scarce.  Because  of 
drought, camel breeding has ceased to exist in the area.’
7. The wife of Farraji, Awlad Ali ibn Yasin: ‘Life used to be better than it is now. Thingsʿ  
have become complicated with drought.’
Common themes across these and other accounts are nostalgia for the past, a description of 
mobility strategies, and a wide range of changes ascribed to the force of drought. The obser-
vation about the demise of camel breeding is surprising and sadly ironic: fundamentally, 
camels are more drought resistant than cattle or small livestock (Fratkin and Roth 1990). So 
there must be other explanatory factors involved. This pattern, that drought alone cannot 
possibly be responsible for all the negative change, kept repeating. It also became clear from 
these encounters that drought is not necessarily a matter of one single dry season, but can 
continue for years.
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During another visit  to  the  region,  I  met  Bilal,  the  local  meteorologist  in  Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar, who shared with me the daily precipitation data he had meticulously recorded for 
the past eight years, aggregated into monthly totals. Presumably, years with exceptionally 
low precipitation levels are drought years. To verify this commonsensical assumption, I com-
pared Bilal’s data to the experience of major drought-induced livestock losses among respon-
dents to my 2009 household survey (cf. chapter 1.5, p. 45). Although this survey covered an 
area much larger than the tiny surfaces of the measuring instruments of this one particular 
meteorological station, weather trends can be extrapolated for the region. Table 2 juxtaposes 
annual precipitation measurements and the number of households that reported a massive 
livestock loss, caused by drought, for the respective year. Each household was restricted to 
naming one year only, so the list only includes particularly dramatic losses. This analysis is 
based on agricultural years. My questionnaire simply asked for ‘years,’ but farmers and pas-
toralists  in this region typically calculate in agricultural  years  (that  start  and end in fall)  
rather than calendar years. I followed a classical study of the same region as well as a more 
recent project  report  in assuming periods from September to August  (Paskoff 1957;  DPA 
Figuig 2006) and aggregated the meteorological data accordingly.
Agricultural year Precipitation (mm) Households reporting major 
drought-related livestock loss
2002-3 217 7
2003-4 266 15
2004-5 125 14
2005-6 280 9
2006-7 210 12
2007-8 257 8
2008-9 345 3
Table 2: Precipitation and drought years (from my 2009 survey)
What stands out is, first, the large variability of rainfall (snowfall does also occur in these 
areas, but is the exception and will never last for more than a few days). The wettest year in 
this period received almost three times as much precipitation as the driest one. The seven-
year mean of 243 mm is somewhat above long-term observations for this region, which aver-
age 210 mm (FIDA 2002).  For  better comparison,  the same figures can be displayed in a 
graph (Figure 3). I reversed the left scale (precipitation) to bring both curves into the same 
logic:  thus, ‘less rain’  can be interpreted as ‘more drought’  and results in a higher curve 
point. The interpolation lines between the dots are merely a visual aid and have no deeper 
meaning.
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Figure 3: Precipitation and drought years
As assumed, the two curves follow the same general  trend:  years  with little  overall  rain 
account for more producers losing their animals than wetter years do. There seems to be no 
time lag; deficient winter rains immediately affect plants and animals in the following sum-
mer, thus within the same agricultural year. A striking exception is 2003-4 which was quite 
wet (266 mm overall) but is the year quoted by 15 families as the worst in terms of drought-
related livestock loss. How could this be? One possible explanation is that the precipitation 
occurred in an uneven way throughout the year. In this case, a more detailed look is neces-
sary.  While  overall  annual  precipitation gives  a rough idea,  it  is  no reliable  indicator  of 
drought;  rather,  the distribution of rainfall  events  across and within seasons needs to be 
taken into account. A drought year, therefore, is not necessarily a dry year (Yacoubi et al. 
1998).
In  fact,  the  irregular  character  of  precipitations  ‘weighs  heavily  on  the  strategies  of 
nomadic livestock keepers’ (Kamil 1993, 4, my translation) and they pay more importance to 
the distribution of rainfall than to its overall amount. During some periods of the year, rain is 
decisive for plant growth, while in others, it hardly makes a difference. In the region of Mis-
sour at the western edge of the high plateaus, for instance, a good year is characterized by  
ample rainfall in both fall and spring: ‘October rains permit the survival of seeds, those of 
March the emergence of seedlings’ (Kamil 1993, 5, my translation). On the other hand, rain in 
May and early summer is not seen as very useful for the vegetation (Kamil 1993, 5). This 
partly explains why 2004 was a bad year for my interviewees despite good overall precipita-
tion levels: one fifth of the annual precipitation occurred in May alone and therefore did not  
have much effect.
A second part of the explanation is a high occurrence of animal disease in 2004 and par-
ticularly 2005 that combined with the drought to produce disastrous effects. According to my 
informants, an additional difficulty in those very years was demographic in nature: many 
families had to distribute their estates to their children after the decease of the head of house-
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hold, resulting in smaller herds. This would be pure coincidence, as demographic events 
such as births and deaths, when aggregated, are expected to be distributed evenly over time.
The 2008-9 agricultural year, in turn, was a good one with plentiful rain at the right time. 
People did not have to buy large amounts of supplemental feed for their animals; and given 
the economic crisis in Spain, many eastern Moroccans who used to work there as seasonal  
laborers preferred to stay home and live off their livestock that year.
Apart from the high variability of rainfall, another crucial finding emerges from my data. 
For every single year since 1992, at least one respondent reported major drought-induced 
losses,  meaning that  in  18  out  of  18  years,  someone was  stricken exceptionally  hard by 
drought.  Rather than being a discrete event that only recurs once every couple of years,  
drought appears to be deeply entrenched as a permanently looming threat for members of 
the pastoral community in the Moroccan steppe. Therefore, I prefer speaking of ‘drought’ in 
the abstract rather than clearly distinguishable ‘droughts’ in the plural. Different households 
will be affected at different points in time, however, depending on a bundle of related cir -
cumstances. What could those be?
In large countries or on the scale of continents, drought will typically affect some, but not 
all regions in any given year due to the spatial distribution of precipitation deficits (Wilhite 
2000). In a study area as small as mine (about 4,000 km²), which features a rather uniform 
and flat landscape and a homogeneous climate (Müller-Hohenstein 1978a, 38), such an expla-
nation can be ruled out. As many authors have pointed out before, it  becomes clear that 
drought cannot be properly understood in isolation from social, political, ecological, or eco-
nomic  circumstances;  it  ‘can  occur  even when meteorological  conditions  remain  normal’ 
(Swearingen 1992, 401; see also Goldman, Daly, and Lovell 2016). To unfold its full devastat-
ing potential even in years with ample precipitation, then, drought must combine forces with 
other actors. How this happens is one of the key questions addressed by this thesis.
Meteorological  conditions  should  be  the  starting  point,  nevertheless.  A  recent  study 
states that about one in three years can be considered a drought year in the Bani Mathar 
municipality in my study area. This figure is similar to that of the 1930s; dry years had grad-
ually become less frequent until the 1970s, when the trend reversed (Bechchari et al. 2014a).  
Depending on the scope of one’s historical perspective, the current annual rainfall rates that 
‘have  prevailed  since  about  the  mid-1970s’  may  therefore  appear  well  below  average 
(Schilling et al. 2012, 13). For Moroccan agriculture in general, one in three years was consid-
ered exceptionally dry during the 20th century (Yacoubi et al. 1998), and one in two during 
the 1990s (Chaarani and Mahi 2008, 49).
Drought seems to be located on a level somewhere between the day-to-day temperature, 
precipitation, cloud cover, wind, or humidity conditions of weather and the long-run, cyclical 
patterns  of  climate.  Generally,  however,  ‘drought  is  recognized to  be  part  of  the  climate 
process’ (Heathcote 2013, 228). In consequence, contemporary scientific studies are mostly 
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concerned with drought in the context of longer-term climate change (chapter 1.4, p. 38). As a 
complement to these studies, I tried to tap into local knowledge. One instance of such knowl-
edge is documented in the neatly written notes of Bilal, the meteorologist responsible for the 
weather station on the main road north of Ayn Bani Mathar. He sums up his decades-longʿ  
experience observing weather patterns in the high plateaus as follows:
‘The climate of the Ayn Bani Mathar zone is a Saharan climate. Locals refer to it asʿ  
“the four seasons:” i.e., sometimes during summer, the weather is nice in the morning; 
from 12 to 3 pm it is very hot with a sand storm and very strong wind; then from 3 to 6 
pm there is a thunderstorm followed by torrential rain and inundation of roads; the 
night is calm and cold.’ (Bilal’s notes, my translation)
Indeed, what sets the arid climate of the high plateaus apart from other regions at this lati-
tude is ‘their relative “openness” to Saharan influences on the one hand and their comparatively 
strong shelteredness from Atlantic and Mediterranean influences on the other’ (Müller-Hohenstein 
1978a, 26, my translation). This circumstance is linked to the existence of mountain chains 
west and north of the plains and their absence in the south and east.  Nearly constant air 
movements  are  another  distinct  climatic  feature  of  the  high plateaus  (Müller-Hohenstein 
1978a, 34). Bilal, in his notes, goes on to describe the four winds and what they typically her-
ald for this region:
‘Winds: (1) Northern wind: cold and sometimes icy, 50 to 60 kph. (2) Eastern wind 
(shargi): dry and hot, dusty, 20 to 40 kph. (3) Southern wind: very severe, Saharan, very 
hot, carries red sand and brings thunderstorms, 70 to 90 kph. (4) Western wind: very 
strong and very cold, carries rain and snow, between 30 and 80 kph.’ (Bilal’s notes, my 
translation)
This formulation is very similar to the one found in a study of the same region from the 
1950s, which shows that there has not been a fundamental change in meteorological condi-
tions, at least (Paskoff 1957, 35). The social, economic, and environmental transformation that 
everybody seems to agree about, and that seems to be so heavily influenced by drought, can-
not be found in altered wind patterns. Then and now, western winds tend to be wet and east-
ern winds dry in the high plateaus of Morocco; northern winds are usually cold and south-
ern winds hot. Such characterizations are known in practically all societies whose economic 
activity is strongly linked to weather conditions, although the specifics vary from one place 
to another. An old English adage goes: ‘Wind east or west / Is a sign of a blast; / Wind north  
or south / Is a sign of a drought’ (quoted in McCartney 1934, 18). To give another example, 
the  Ghareghani  nomads  in  Iran  know:  ‘When the  North  clouds  come the  rain  will  fall’ 
(Emadi 1995, 146).
One crucial aspect should not be forgotten when conceptualizing drought as a harmful 
lack of rain: its opposite is not necessarily desirable, either. Excessive rain may bring about  
floods and inundations, which can be as detrimental or even disastrous as drought. I have 
seen fields and bridges destroyed by floods in Morocco, and large numbers of fatalities peri-
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odically occur when homes are washed away (Johnstone 1997). In the wake of contemporary 
climate change, both drought and extreme rainfall events are expected to increase as weather 
patterns become more erratic; I will further discuss such projections below (chapter  1.4, p. 
38). A close connection between drought and flooding has been established and documented 
since Greek antiquity, at least, where drought ‘and another destructive agent, excessive rain-
fall, [were] often mentioned in one and the same breath’ (McCartney 1934, 17). It is intriguing 
to note that drought is labeled a ‘destructive agent’ in this article which was published in 
1934, decades before accounts of nonhuman agency came to be considered controversial (see 
next chapter).
Figure 4: Ayn Bani Mathar flood, 1993 (Bilal’s photo)ʿ
Given the ubiquity of drought in eastern Morocco, combined with the observation that there 
are vastly different notions involved, the elementary question I follow in this study is in what 
ways drought is able to have the negative impacts it does. Since drought acts together with 
countless other entities it is linked to, an examination of those links is an integral part of that 
task. Before  refining  my  research  question(s)  further,  I  should  introduce  the  theoretical 
approach that I found most helpful and that will serve as a conceptual anchor for my subse-
quent analysis. It also more clearly positions my work within the academic field of Middle 
East studies.
 1.2 Theoretical Positions: Actor-Networks in the Middle East and 
North Africa
Through the course of my higher education, I have come to equate my home discipline of 
Arabistik, as it is referred to within the University of Leipzig, with the Anglo-Saxon concept  
of Middle East studies (rather than Arab studies). Despite distinct institutional histories, both 
fields today combine a solid knowledge of the same world region, skills in local languages 
above all,  with methodological tools and theoretical insights from the whole spectrum of 
humanities and social science disciplines. These include anthropology, economics, geogra-
phy, history, law, linguistics, literature, political science, psychology, religious studies, soci-
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ology, and others, depending on specific research interests and questions. North Africa, itself 
a  vast  and diverse region,  is  routinely subsumed under Middle  East  studies  rather  than 
African studies, privileging ethnic and linguistic ties and a shared commercial and political 
history over geographical coincidence.
My eastern Moroccan case study is relevant to the wider field of Middle East studies for  
several  reasons.  For  one,  comparable  steppe ecosystems and pastoral  economies  exist  in 
numerous countries of the region, stretching from neighboring Algeria to distant Iraq and 
beyond. These drylands and their inhabitants are often at the margins of public perception, 
both internationally and domestically, but they hold a potential for major social unrest. The 
so-called Arab spring serves as a recent example, originating in part from protest movements 
in the Tunisian hinterland. What is more, my research touches upon multiple political, eco-
nomic, social, historical, linguistic, and environmental questions that preoccupy Middle East-
erners and North Africans as much as outsiders who study the region. I address the most 
pertinent of these points in the concluding part. And finally, I hope to connect to theoretical 
debates in the field, such as the proclaimed ‘spatial turn within Middle East studies’ (Ham-
mond 2017, 319) and what may come next.
At the 2011 annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, 
arguably  the  most  influential  professional  association in  this  research  domain,  president 
Suad Joseph summarized the state of the field, the issues that were being debated, and the  
approaches that were needed in Middle East studies. One of the challenging tasks the anthro-
pologist laid out was the questioning and undoing of dichotomies of all forms, given their 
often misleading nature and harmful potential.  Joseph argued that scholars should never 
‘appropriate such political tools as analytical tools’ (Joseph 2012, 19–20) lest they become 
complicit in the perpetuation of unbalanced power structures. Her list of problematic bina-
ries that operate in the field of Middle East studies is long:
‘Islam versus Christianity;  Middle East  versus West;  modern [versus] traditional or 
modern versus anti-modern[;] religion versus science; secularism versus religion; civi-
lized versus uncivilized; masculine versus feminine; public versus private; civil society 
versus state; youth versus elders; formal parties versus networks; informal economies 
versus formal economies.’ (Joseph 2012, 19)
Not all of these dualisms are relevant to my concerns in this thesis, but the argument holds 
when I add more pertinent examples: nomadic versus sedentary people; natural versus man-
made disasters;  the state versus the tribe; or backwardness versus development. None of  
these have proven to  be very insightful  or  even innocent  in  dividing up the world into 
opposing camps. Yet,  they remain widely in circulation. Not just in area studies,  adding 
nuance and depth to our understanding of the world is a key task of academic research.
A second important mission in our strongly interconnected world, according to Joseph, 
is to analyze the multifarious ways in which all kinds of different people and settings are 
linked together. Hence, Middle East scholars ‘need to understand the technology of connec-
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tion, the economics of connection, and the politics of connection’ (Joseph 2012, 20). Other-
wise, we risk losing track of reality, which will meanwhile keep producing more and more of 
these connections.
Working against binaries and studying connection are essential motifs for the work I am 
presenting here. In this regard, I identified actor-network theory (ANT) as a suitable and 
inspiring approach. This label is applied to a growing body of work that quintessentially 
addresses connections, and has been keen to think outside long-standing binaries. Among 
the  dichotomies  that  have  been rejected  by ANT scholars,  the  most  salient  are  perhaps: 
‘macro/micro, subject/object, human/nonhuman, nature/society, local/global, theory/method, 
and structure/agency’ (Kirsch and Mitchell 2004, 688) – all of which seem to constitute basic 
tenets of accepted sociological knowledge.
ANT emerged from the study of science, technology, and society; it has been described 
as a method to study society, but also as a meta-theory on what society is. As a two-line sum-
mary cannot adequately capture this multi-faceted worldview, I will use the next pages to 
gradually  flesh  out  those  ideas  that  matter  to  my study of  drought  and socio-economic 
change. The most influential author in the field of ANT is philosopher, anthropologist and 
sociologist of science Bruno Latour who started developing his ideas in the late 1970s while 
he was engaged in an ‘anthropological’ observation of a group of laboratory scientists in the 
United States. Alongside Latour, other authors have contributed their works to build a siz-
able corpus of ANT-inspired studies and essays.
There has been some persistent confusion as to what ANT precisely is, partly due to its 
name that lends itself to misunderstandings (Latour 1999a). First, it may not actually be a 
theory:
‘Theories usually try to explain why something happens, but actor network theory is  
descriptive rather than foundational in explanatory terms, which means that it is a dis-
appointment for those seeking strong accounts.’ (Law 2009, 141)
Second, it is neither about actors in a conventional sociological or political sense, nor about 
networks understood as topographical structures composed of clearly identifiable nodes and 
edges that can be evaluated using mathematical methods. What is more, an actor-network is 
not a network of actors – but rather an entity that acts on other entities it is connected to. And 
this characterization can apply to nonhumans just as well as humans.
ANT’s rootedness  in anthropology is  clearly  reflected in  many of  its  core principles. 
Instead of a rigid theoretical framework that predetermines its outcomes to a large extent,  
actor-network theory aspires to be ‘a toolkit for telling interesting stories’ about very con-
crete, often fragile relations and how they are held together (Law 2009, 142). Description is  
emphasized over explanation; or rather, the explanation is to be found in the description. 
This goes hand in hand with a joyful ‘willingness to be surprised by the actors and connec-
tions one is tracing’ (Felski 2016, 749). Therefore, ANT accounts should be informed by alert-
22  1.2 Theoretical Positions: Actor-Networks in the Middle East and North Africa
ness, on the part of the researcher, ‘to the messy practices of relationality and materiality of 
the world. Along with this sensibility comes a wariness of the large-scale claims common in 
social theory,’ which seem overly simplistic (Law 2009, 142).
The lofty position of some social scientists that enables them to put forward grand struc-
tural explanations is frowned upon by actor-network theorists and replaced with a more ant-
like behavior: myopic but untiring in detecting and following ever more paths and traces.  
This is based on the recognition that
‘actors know what they do and we have to learn from them not only what they do, but  
how and why they do it. It is us, the social scientists, who lack knowledge of what they 
do, and not they who are missing the explanation of why they are unwittingly manipu-
lated by forces exterior to themselves and known [only] to the social scientist’s power-
ful gaze and methods.’ (Latour 1999a, 19)
In order ‘to learn from the actors without imposing on them an  a priori definition of their 
world-building capacities’ (Latour 1999a, 20), ANT scholars have tended to use a simple and 
unrefined conceptual  vocabulary.  Crude terms like  ‘association,  translation,  alliance,  [or] 
obligatory passage point’ serve to avoid replacing an actor’s own social ontology with that of 
the social scientist (Latour 1999a, 20). This view, while it may challenge conventional wisdom 
and practice in the social sciences and humanities in some ways, is central to my own appre-
ciation of ANT.
A textbook example of ANT thinking that involves one of those primitive terms, transla-
tion, illustrates how humans and nonhumans can ‘fold into’ each other. It touches upon an 
old political debate in the United States, the question being whether ‘guns kill people’ or 
‘people  kill  people’  –  in  other  words,  should  the  number  of  firearms  be  more  heavily 
restricted in order to reduce the number of murders? Or is the problem a social one and a  
ban on certain weapons would simply push people into different methods of killing or harm-
ing  others?  The  approach  Latour  proposes  instead  acknowledges  that  the  gun  and  the 
shooter together form a new, hybrid actant, which possesses properties that neither of them 
has on its own. Actant can be used as a synonym for actor-network, and to emphasize that 
recognized and institutionalized actors are not the only ones who act (Latour 2017). In this 
example, the weapon and its user both impose their own scripts, programs of action, propen-
sities, and thus transform each other. The way a gun feels, looks, and behaves entices the  
gunman to use it. His original goals may become displaced in an act of translation: ‘You only 
wanted to injure but, with a gun now in your hand, you want to kill’ (Latour 1999b, 178–79). 
The basic ANT answer to the ideologically fraught binary question is, therefore: ‘It is neither 
people  nor  guns  that  kill.  Responsibility  for  action  must  be  shared  among  the  various 
actants’ (Latour 1999b, 180). A successful policy should hence aim at a lower number not of 
guns  per se, but of harmful people-gun hybrids – which can be achieved in more than one 
way. This perspective can hence open up new avenues, I contend, for political decision mak-
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ing. In the same way, a new, ANT-inspired appreciation of drought could help establish bet-
ter policies for the nomads of Morocco (ch. 4.3, p. 169).
Understood in  this  broad sense,  translation  is  an integral  part  of  life  whenever  two 
things interact  in the pursuit of their  respective interests. My somewhat casual  declaration 
that I will treat the notions of  jafaf – drought –  sécheresse etc. as equivalent can be justified 
from this angle: everything is translated all the time (Felski 2016), and the transfer of a con-
cept from one language to another is  just one more link in a long chain of transmission, 
where the involved items are slightly modified at most steps. Translation between languages 
is not, in itself, more meaningful than any translation that happens when a word (with its 
attached notions) travels within a single linguistic community.
With  this  concept  in  mind,  the  following  quote  by  political  ecologist  Giorgos  Kallis 
seems to capture the multiple translations that drought is involved in at all times, even if the 
vocabulary used is different. It is from his seminal 2008 review of the academic literature on 
drought:
‘Droughts combine with other stressors to affect unevenly, either directly or indirectly,  
a multitude of social and ecological functions […].’ (Kallis 2008, 109)
This combined influence of actants (i.e., actor-networks) on yet other actants is the essence of 
translation. For eastern Morocco, the coincidence of drought and animal disease in 2004 and 
2005, as mentioned above, is a typical example. In the face of vast and complex webs of trans-
lation, one task of social science, as seen by actor-network theorists, could be to account for 
all these connections and interactions. They can be made visible because their establishment 
and maintenance require energy, effort, labor, often against resistances and challenges by 
other actants. Latour therefore proposes thinking of every actor-network as a ‘worknet’ or 
‘action net’ (Latour 2005, 132). By tracing the effort that other actors invest into stabilizing it,  
any connection can be documented. Conversely,  something that is  not connected to any-
thing, has no effect whatsoever on anything, is of no interest – and arguably not even real. 
This may change anytime, however, when a hitherto unknown actant jumps onto the stage, 
causing trouble and confusion, from the vast uncharted territory Latour calls ‘plasma’ – ‘that 
which is not yet formatted, not yet measured, not yet socialized, not yet engaged in metro-
logical chains, and not yet covered, surveyed, mobilized, or subjectified’ (Latour 2005, 244).
The  statement  that  ‘to  be  real  is  to  have causal  powers’  is  known in  philosophy as 
Alexander’s dictum (Kim 1993, 348). Things ‘become real by amassing allies, expanding ties, 
and thereby sustaining their existence’ (Felski 2016, 760). An actant, hence, is ‘a source of  
action […]; it is that which has efficacy, can do things, has sufficient coherence to make a dif-
ference, produce effects, alter the course of events’ (Bennett 2010, viii). In consequence, every-
thing that  is  real  can be  analyzed as  an actant;  and ‘since for  ANT everything is  social, 
including non-humans and nature, the entire world appears as a “collective” of actor-net-
works’ (Krieger and Belliger 2014, 8).
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What sociology refers to as a society, then, is usually a collective of humans; but it cannot 
be understood without all the nonhuman materials that are an integral part of it. For ‘mate-
rial-semiotic’  approaches  (Law  2009,  141)  such  as  ANT,  where  all  actions  are  relational 
effects, ‘the social is nothing other than patterned networks of heterogeneous materials’ (Law 1992, 
381). Allegories used in everyday speech or expert jargon actually hint at this fundamental 
sameness. Thus, a geographer may write about ‘North African arid steppe societies’ (Müller-
Hohenstein 1978b) and refer almost exclusively to plants.
In sum, actor-network theory provides a fundamental, minimal ontology, where  every-
thing (barring the yet unknown ‘plasma’) is an actant or actor-network. Similarly to Marxism 
in a sense, ANT is based on ‘a radical shift to a relational ontology, a world of relations and 
processes and not things-in-themselves’  (Kirsch and Mitchell  2004,  689).  In contemporary 
philosophy, research into the ramifications of quantum physics has led in comparable direc-
tions, where some scholars argue in favor of ‘a metaphysics of relations in contrast to a meta-
physics of individual things’ (Esfeld 2004, 601).
In the field of Middle East studies, Timothy Mitchell provides a rare example of ANT-
like thinking (although he does not use this label) when he asks: ‘Can the Mosquito Speak?’  
(Mitchell 2002, 19–53). One of the important arguments he makes is that history, when being 
recorded and retold, tends to focus on political actors – the British, national elites, and occa-
sionally certain subaltern communities. Nonhumans such as the anopheles mosquitoes that 
brought malaria to Egypt, on the other hand, are ‘said to belong to nature. [They] cannot 
speak’ (Mitchell 2002, 50). But studying the complex interactions between humans and mos-
quitoes,  tanks and parasites,  dams and synthetic  nitrates  makes it  possible to more fully 
appreciate  certain  political  and  social  transformations,  as  Mitchell  convincingly  demon-
strates.
Another early study from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that deploys 
elements of actor-network theory is Gil Eyal’s account of Israeli military intelligence (Eyal 
2002). More recently, several authors in the field have begun to show an increasing aware-
ness and interest in analyses of connectivity, translation, nonhuman agency, or assemblages 
(El-Kazaz 2017),  even if  their texts do not necessarily discuss actor-network theory. Such 
insightful work notwithstanding, I argue that ANT approaches remain largely underutilized 
in Middle East studies today, which may also be due to some controversies surrounding this 
line of thinking.
The controversial status of ANT has several reasons. Since its inception, actor-network 
theory has been critiqued by other scholars, with varying arguments and degrees of harsh-
ness.  Their  criticism  has  regularly  been  responded  to  in  subsequent  publications  by 
ANTians,  who often used such opportunities to further elaborate their viewpoints. Three 
related arguments are commonly associated with such critique.  First,  the pledge to treat 
humans and nonhumans symmetrically purportedly runs into a dead end. In the view of 
some critics, ‘stable and distinctive differences inevitably emerge between humans and non-
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humans; [and] the denial of these differences leads to a failure to understand the social and 
ethical dimensions of the ‘nature-cultures’ under study’ (Murdoch 2001, 128). Second, ANT 
has been accused of being ‘politically inert’ (Kirsch and Mitchell 2004, 694) with its supposed 
use of a technocratic vocabulary, leveling of hierarchies, relativism, and blindness to power 
issues.  Third, and quite polemically, the approach has been associated with objectionable 
neoliberal and even fascist ways of thinking for much the same reasons (Fuller 2000).
On all  three accounts,  I  agree with defenders of actor-network theory. Why would a 
sharp,  ANT-informed observation of  how the  world  works  (including the  production  of 
power,  inequality,  suffering, etc.)  preclude taking moral stances,  making normative judg-
ments, or engaging for political aims? In my perception, there is no such inherent tendency. 
Quite to the contrary, once we ‘understand how size and power are manufactured then we 
can understand how they can be transformed’ (Murdoch 1997, 335). Accounting for the mul-
titude of materials that lend stability to configurations of domination will provide a fuller 
picture of those, and stories about unintended consequences and surprising resistance by 
actants that are difficult to control, such as the mosquitoes in Egypt, may inspire alternative 
social, political, and economic scenarios. In a related debate,  feminist scholar Donna Har-
away has argued in favor of ‘partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility 
of webs of connections called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology’ 
(Haraway 1988, 584) as a third alternative to relativism and totalization,  two forms of mis-
guidedly laying claim to scientific objectivity. This multiplication of partial standpoints and 
perspectives is very much in the spirit of ANT. What is more, the goal has never been to abol-
ish other forms of scholarly inquiry or of conceptualizing and categorizing the world, when 
ANT merely questions some of  their hidden assumptions.  Instead, ‘the stress lies on the 
making of ties rather than the breaking of ties’ (Felski 2016, 760) for ANT analysts.
For Middle  East  scholars,  I  therefore claim,  these approaches  represent  a useful  and 
innovative way of generating knowledge about many issues of regional and global concern, 
including climate  change and socioeconomic  transformations  in  the  highlands  of  eastern 
Morocco. By writing this thesis, I make an attempt at demonstrating this usefulness. I could 
have  tried  to  play  it  safe  by  sticking  with  an  uncontroversial  theory  and  simply  going 
through the motions. Choosing a less conventional take instead made the analytical process 
more meaningful to me, and my aspiration is that it will result in a more interesting and rele-
vant study in the end.
To be sure, my explicit reference to actor-network thinking will be selective rather than 
exhaustive throughout most parts of this text, given its role as an ontological foundation 
rather than an artisanal method that must be rigorously applied to every observation one 
makes. The bulk of my empirical findings are meaningful and understandable on their own 
terms, without recourse to this particular perspective and vocabulary. For data generation 
and analysis, likewise, I have relied on time-tested methods of quantitative social research 
and descriptive statistics. But the anchoring in actor-network theory and assemblage think-
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ing (see next chapter) adds coherence and depth that could not have been achieved other-
wise to the material  I  present,  and opens up new ways of  conceptualizing drought  in a 
nomadic community. This is decisive.
I am not a proponent of conceptual monoculture,  nota bene; a diversity of perspectives 
will always help collect and connect pieces of information and forge them into a more solid 
knowledge structure. Therefore, I do engage with other bodies of theory where they seem 
helpful to obtain a more wholesome picture of what is going on in eastern Morocco. Numer-
ous non-ANT texts have influenced my thinking and fundamentally informed my fieldwork. 
In a way, the ANT perspective is able to accommodate other theories: a household’s access to  
resources, for example, which is seen as a key explanatory element by my project directors 
(Gertel 2007), can fundamentally be expressed in terms of this household’s connections to the 
actor-networks that are those resources. My impression is that ANT thinking is less rigid in 
prematurely defining limits between categories, and is thus able to capture nuances that are 
easily overlooked otherwise.
Theoretical concepts should generally serve as guidelines that open up new perspectives, 
not to prematurely shut down possible alternative accounts of reality. Admittedly, this comes 
with a certain degree of vagueness, which may be unsatisfactory when dealing with very 
precise practical questions. I will of course use very specific concepts and analytical terms 
when discussing concrete actor-network constellations. But for some of the broader ques-
tions behind this study, a more generic approach seems most appropriate.
Some of the theoretical directions I draw on do not explicitly refer to one another, but 
seem to fall into a similar category of ideas. In a way, they reflect the observation that the  
currently dominant ways of doing things in our late modern world, with their emphasis on 
free market capitalism, are coming to a dead end. They have not been able to bring about 
democracy, justice, peace, or prosperity on a global scale, nor have they been able to prevent 
or attenuate disasters of various kinds, including natural calamities like drought. And while 
alternative, Marxism-inspired views have contributed important critical insights into histo-
ries of power and exploitation, they have also failed to make a lasting impact with statements 
of the following type: ‘natural disasters are not physical phenomena. They are a social phe-
nomenon induced by physical events’ (García 1981, xiii). Proponents of such views might 
claim, in the example above, that only people kill people and guns play no special role, being 
a completely ‘neutral carrier of human will’ (Latour 1999b, 177). The lines of reasoning that I 
subscribe to, by contrast, maintain that drought is both physical and social. Three core ideas I 
adopt from non-ANT or loosely ANT-related thinkers will be outlined in the remainder of 
this chapter: silent transformations, propensities, and smooth spaces. They help make more 
sense of drought and of the related socio-economic dynamics that I will describe and analyze 
later on.
Man-made climate change and similar risks may have been allowed to reach such critical 
levels because they are omnipresent and subtle at the same time, which makes them imper-
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ceptible on a day-to-day basis. This is an explanation forwarded by philosopher and sinolo-
gist François Jullien, who has become well-known with his project of putting elements of 
ancient Chinese philosophy into a dialog with occidental ways of thinking. One of his essays, 
‘The Silent Transformations’ (Jullien 2009), starts from the observation that many of life’s 
most fundamental processes – the seasons of the year, growing up or growing old, processes 
of maturation and decay, friends and lovers growing apart, snow in the process of melting – 
tend to go unnoticed even though they happen in front of our eyes. The sudden realization 
that one has grown old, which entails much more than a few anecdotal gray hairs and only 
works through comparison with a much earlier state of affairs, may then come as a shock 
and surprise.
Chinese philosophy appears to perceive and conceptualize these silent transformations 
better than Western traditions. A key difference, in Jullien’s interpretation, is the conception 
of  change.  Transformation  (and,  in  fact,  life)  was  viewed like  movement  by  the  ancient 
Greeks: it starts from a point and ends at a point (telos). Chinese philosophers, in contrast, 
were  not  concerned with beginnings  and endings,  with the  enigma of  Creation and the 
drama of Apocalypse. For them, every beginning growth phase carries within it the decline 
that will inevitably follow, and every decline already prepares the next ascent; ‘the world 
dies every day, the world is born every day’ (Jullien 2009, 73, my translation). Hence, conti-
nuity and change are in a dialectic relation. They are opposed, yet depend on each other. In a  
somewhat similar fashion, actor-network theorists have concentrated on movement or circu-
lation as  a way to bypass sterile  dichotomies such as  the agency-versus-structure debate 
(Latour 1999a).
A recently popular author, political theorist Jane Bennett, expands on these ideas. She 
focuses on vital materiality as ‘the capacity of things–edibles, commodities, storms, metals–
not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or  
forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own’ (Bennett 2010, vii–viii). Since 
droughts belong to roughly the same category as storms, analyzing them in similar ways 
should be possible. To delineate these quasi-agents or forces, Bennett borrows the notion of 
shi (勢) from Jullien’s translation work. Shi is described as ‘the style, energy, propensity, tra-
jectory, or élan inherent to a specific arrangement of things’ (Bennett 2010, 35). This idea of 
shi may play a similar role as ANT’s plasma, the uncharted territory of yet unknown actants 
and their future connections; but I think it does a better job at conceptualizing the virtual as 
an ‘ever-present potential’ (Müller and Schurr 2016, 222). The concept of  shi also resonates 
with the late work of Karl Popper, the renowned philosopher of science. His view of propen-
sities,  corroborated by quantum physics  and chaos  theory,  implies  that  the ‘world is  no 
longer a causal machine’ (Popper 1990, 18), but rather a world brimming with possibilities 
that try ‘to realize themselves’ in time (Popper 1990, 22). The figure of the assemblage (see 
next chapter) allows fusing this notion of propensities with actor-network theory.
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The assumption that ‘arrangements of entities’ are the fundamental building blocks of 
social life, according to one analyst (Schatzki 2002, XIII), constitutes a common basis not just  
for the theories elaborated by Latour and his ANT colleagues, but also the highly influential 
writings of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and others. The latter pair’s notion of a minor sci-
ence, in fact, opens up questions akin to those asked by actor-network theory and has been 
an inspiration to its development from early on. Both approaches centrally deal with innova-
tion, improvisation, and surprise – after all, ‘the slight surprise of action’ (Latour 1999b, 266) 
is a recurrent theme in ANT texts.
Crucially for my study of a nomadic community in Morocco, actor-network theory has 
been categorized as  ‘an empirical  version of  Gilles  Deleuze’s  nomadic philosophy’  (Law 
2009, 145). What is meant by nomadic philosophy? Since Deleuze and Guattari’s dense prose 
is not easy to summarize or even to fully understand, I will limit my account to a few key 
words. Building on notions elaborated earlier by Michel Serres, the idea is that there is a 
‘minor’  or  ‘nomadic’  science  as  opposed to  the  ‘royal’  science.  It  has  a  hydraulic  model 
instead of a theory of solids; a model of becoming and heterogeneity which is opposed to the 
stable, the eternal, the identical, the constant; a model which is problem-oriented rather than 
theorem-oriented.  In  this  model,  ‘each figure  designates  an “event”  much more  than an 
essence’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 362). While royal science is related to the ‘stri-
ated’ space of agriculture, central administration, and standardization, the open rangelands 
of the nomads serve as an image for ‘smooth’ space where other things are possible.
‘Of course, smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed 
or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents 
new paces, switches adversaries.’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 500)
Another fruit of Deleuze and Guattari’s work is the notion of ‘assemblage’ and a blossoming 
academic literature inspired by ‘assemblage thinking’ in a broader sense (Müller and Schurr 
2016). It is akin to actor-network thinking in many ways and will help me in my analysis of 
what drought is. If drought is indeed ‘a combined hydroclimatic, environmental, and socioe-
conomic  product’  (Kallis  2008,  87),  theories  that  are  able  to  reach  across  these  different 
spheres are needed. Latour’s often-cited characterization of cross-cutting, hybrid networks 
holds equally true for drought (Downing and Bakker 2000, 87):
‘The ozone hole is too social and too narrated to be truly natural; the strategy of indus-
trial firms and heads of state is too full of chemical reactions to be reduced to power 
and interest; the discourse of the ecosphere is too real and too social to boil down to 
meaning effects. Is it our fault if the networks are  simultaneously real, like nature, nar-
rated, like discourse, and collective, like society?’ (Latour 1993, 6)
This realization seems to call for a maximal open-mindedness on the part of any researcher 
or team of scholars who study drought. I take assemblage thinking, vital materiality, and 
Chinese philosophy to be helpful extensions of ANT in this sense.
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 1.3 Conceptual Focus: Drought as a Punctualization and Assemblage
After this delineation of an epistemological and theoretical background, I now come back to 
my embryonal research question: What is drought? Rather than defining drought in its pre-
sumed essence or trying to catalog all the components it can be broken down into, I endeavor 
to describe its relations and connections to other actants. These connections are inherently 
unstable  and open  to  modification.  I  will  explore  a  multitude  of  existing  actor-network 
assemblages (more on this term below) that involve drought, from fairly obvious to rather 
unexpected ones. This will result in an enhanced, relational understanding that might even 
help stakeholders and analysts better deal with future drought events. My study can provide 
a contribution to a number of ongoing debates in political and academic communities as well 
as the wider public. Taking the high plateaus as a case study also promises some opportunity 
for  knowledge  construction  through extrapolation  and generalization:  Morocco has  been 
portrayed,  after  all,  as  ‘a  representative  drought-prone  developing country’  (Swearingen 
1992, 401) similar to other places across the world.
Importantly, my goal is not to elaborate an authoritative definition of what kind of thing 
drought is – to settle its ontological status once and for all. Such a general consensus does not 
exist and a ‘universal definition of drought is an unrealistic expectation’ (Wilhite 2000, 10), as 
generations of scholars have realized. To give a few examples, drought has been character-
ized by various analysts as being:
an exogenous factor that threatens nomadic communities (Hamzaoui 2010)
‘a recurring extreme climate event over land’ (Dai 2011, 45)
a process rather than an event (Al-Madhari and Elberier 1996)
a natural hazard (Wilhite 2000)
‘a relative concept, defined as a departure from the historical record’ (Kallis 2008, 88)
‘a  complex  process,’  brought  about  by  changes  in  animal  and  plant  appearance  and  behavior 
(Castillo and Ladio 2017, 9)
‘the social perception of a water deficiency with reference to a normal condition socially defined’  
(García 1981, xii)
‘covariate shocks’ that affect many families at the same time (Devereux 2007, 56)
Table 3: What drought is
Although such definitions are not by necessity mutually exclusive, they focus on very differ-
ent qualities of drought and emanate from quite specific standpoints: that of an artist and 
activist  in Oujda,  an atmospheric  scientist  in the United States,  a  pastoral  community in 
Argentina, a development economist in Sussex, and so on. In this study, I will propose addi-
tional designations,  relating and thus ‘translating’ the insights that pastoralists in eastern 
Morocco shared with me and my fieldwork team.
30  1.3 Conceptual Focus: Drought as a Punctualization and Assemblage
One way of dealing with this great diversity of drought definitions has recently been 
proposed in the field of geography. According to an ‘ontological strategy’ (Goldman, Daly, 
and Lovell 2016, 28) that builds upon work done by Annemarie Mol and colleagues, there are 
not just different epistemologies (ways of knowing) or explanations of the one stable onto-
logical entity that is drought. Rather, multiple ontologies and thus realities exist at the same 
time, which are constantly being ‘enacted’ (Goldman, Daly, and Lovell 2016, 28) by different 
communities. To me, the term enactment sounds as if the script has already been written else-
where and individuals can do nothing but follow it with a small margin of interpretation, 
even though this is probably not what the authors mean. Moreover, their introduction of a  
new academic metaphor, fluid space (Goldman, Daly, and Lovell 2016, 31), to explain how an 
object can gradually change appearances without losing its identity while  moving across 
different networks, raises more questions than it answers. But the idea of acknowledging and 
exploring multiple ontologies of drought that are stabilized through daily practices is helpful 
in assembling my own approach.
Another perspective can be gained from ancient Chinese Taoism, once more, which is 
primarily concerned with transition, as a complementary alternative to ancient Greek ontol-
ogy which focuses on determined forms of being and tends to neglect the in-between (Jullien 
2009). As I argue below, the concept of assemblage is able to capture this idea.
To come up with a working definition of drought for this study, I will follow ‘traditional 
ANT scholarship’ (Goldman, Daly, and Lovell 2016, 31) and assume that any entity that is 
connected to others can be analyzed, ontologically, as an  actor-network or  actant (provided 
that it has some effect, however tiny this effect may be). In the most fundamental sense,  
every social thing is an actor-network. This statement is similar to the claim, I would argue,  
that every physical material is made up of elementary particles. Both statements should be 
uncontroversial, even though this fundamental level tends to be neglected whenever we deal 
with aggregations at higher scales. In the social realm, those could be large collectives or shift-
ing assemblages that involve many actors, hybrid objects that are composed of both human and 
nonhuman actants, or punctualizations (black boxes) that are so routinely used as shortcuts that 
it is hard to disassemble and rethink them in terms of actor-networks. In this context, the 
twin notions of punctualization and assemblage appear particularly apt to capture the character 
of drought in eastern Morocco. Following from the arguments presented so far, I claim that 
drought is both of these things.
The common metaphor of a ‘black box’ has a specific history within the ANT field. It is 
related to ubiquitous processes of ‘summing up’ (Latour 1999a, 17); blackboxing or punctual-
ization
‘refers to the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. 
When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only 
on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity.’ (Latour 1999b, 304)
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As smooth as a technical device may operate in everyday life, however, this punctualization 
‘is always precarious’ (Law 1992, 385). When the device fails, the different parts it is com-
posed of become visible as possible sources of the error, and its user must invest energy to 
diagnose, intervene, and possibly enroll replacement pieces into the network to restore its 
previous state. Changing social conditions, technical developments, economic calculations, 
or preferences of other actors may also make the device obsolete and any repair attempt 
futile. The same can be said of punctualizations that are not machines but political institu-
tions, legal conventions, or entirely abstract concepts.
Opening such a ‘black box’ to reexamine what is inside can be useful when it is widely  
used as a shortcut to explain all sorts of things, but there seems to be little agreement on its 
actual contents. As contradictions appear and multiply, a continued use of the routinized, 
abbreviated punctualization or ‘package’ (Law 2004, 33) becomes dangerous or at least mis-
leading; it stops being useful. To give an example, I generally try to avoid using the blanket 
notion of ‘culture’ because, despite its universal use, the exact meaning of this term is quite 
unclear. Geographer Don Mitchell has convincingly argued that ‘there is no such thing as 
culture’ (Mitchell 1995). The same may be true for drought in the eastern Moroccan steppes. 
This is not to say that people misunderstand one another all the time because they mean 
vastly different things when they say ‘drought’ (or ‘jafaf’). They would quickly realize this 
and try to align their respective understandings in any given dialog. But if a concept is com-
plex and vague enough, different communities that do not regularly interact will develop 
their own distinct webs of association and meaning over time, with a quite restricted overlap.  
One of my goals in carrying out this research is to explore these different webs, beyond the 
narrow consensus – to figure out what people talk about when we talk about drought.
Of  course,  there  are  tremendous  benefits  to  using  punctualizations.  Contemporary 
human life would be completely impractical without them. In the words of John Law, ‘punc-
tualized resources offer a way of drawing quickly on the networks of the social without hav-
ing to deal with endless complexity’ (Law 1992, 385). Accordingly, while I set out to unpack 
one  such  bundle  –  drought  –  in  this  text,  I  leave  other  questionable  punctualizations 
untouched because they are merely at the margin of my interest.  The Middle East, a notion 
that carries ‘a complicated inheritance of imperialism, Orientalism, and Cold War area stud-
ies scholarship’ (Hammond 2017, 319) and often does not even relate to Morocco, is just one 
example. A complete deconstruction of all notions is not the goal of this study.
To refine my blunt research question about what drought is  from this perspective,  a 
more precise wording would be: When the black box of ‘drought’ is opened, what connec-
tions can be found between drought and other actants? As stated before,  I  refer to the 
Moroccan plateaus in the early 21st century as a concrete starting point for my inquiry.
 The second key concept for my analysis of drought, assemblage, is not exclusive to actor-
network theory, either. This term was once chosen as the English translation of Deleuze & 
Guattari’s agencement (Law 2004), and ‘assemblage thinking’ has since been advanced in vari-
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ous fields of the social sciences and humanities. There is no standardized terminology, as 
different authors have focused on different aspects and examples. Notions such as assemblage, 
network, cyborg, capillary, the body multiple, or rhizome refer to a similar idea, nevertheless: they 
denote ‘complex systems that refuse encapsulation’ within boundaries (Roosth and Silbey 
2009, 459).
In an emphatically ANT-like outlook, assemblage ‘flags agency, the hard work required 
to draw heterogeneous elements together, forge connections between them and sustain these 
connections  in  the  face  of  tension’  (Li  2007,  264).  In  this  sense,  assemblage  denotes  the 
process as much as the resulting structure, namely ‘a process of bundling, of assembling, or 
better of recursive self-assembling in which the elements put together are not fixed in shape, 
do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in part as they are entan-
gled together’ (Law 2004, 42). Rather than guided by a singular master plan, assemblages are 
often the contingent results of countless distributed mundane practices, ‘a matter of habit, 
accretion, and bricolage’ (Li 2007, 265).
Two geographers, summarizing the use of the term assemblage in their field, present it as 
an alternative to ANT’s ‘notions of network’ (Anderson and McFarlane 2011, 126) but do not 
support this claim with a clear argument. They also outline an ethical dimension of assem-
blage thinking, which resonates better with my own ideas about social science research. Ide-
ally, studying something as an assemblage
‘opens the  researcher up to risk,  embraces  uncertainty,  expresses  something of the 
fragility of composition, and strives to listen to what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘the 
sound  of  a  cont[igu]ous  future,  the  murmur  (rumeur)  of  new  assemblages  […].’’ 
(Anderson and McFarlane 2011, 126)
It is crucial to resist any urge to draw premature conclusions, force the world into a prede-
fined grid, and look for ultimate explanations and answers. Even though such an approach 
may work in some areas of the natural sciences, and may be what we all do in our daily lives 
to cope with the complexities of our world, research in the social sciences should be allowed 
to play a different role, to be flexible in its methods, to rejoice in little discoveries of the unex-
pected, the overflowing, the improvised. In this regard, the notion of assemblage is close to 
ANT, which ‘leaves ample room for surprise’ thanks to its awareness of the ‘contingency and 
variability of associations’ (Felski 2016, 763).
Assemblage thinking seems to distinguish itself clearly, in the social sciences, from the 
influential  analytical  perspective  of  Pierre  Bourdieu,  Anthony  Giddens,  and  others  who 
strongly focus on practices. By contrast and complement, the notions of network, assemblage, 
and apparatus can all be characterized as focusing on arrangements (Schatzki 2002). Transla-
tion scholar Hélène Buzelin uses a different categorization: Bourdieu’s analytical apparatus is 
more concerned with  structures and Latour’s with  agency.  She agrees that both schools of 
thought have often been seen as antagonistic (Buzelin 2005). Combining these appraisals, 
both approaches appear to resolve the old structure-agency debate in different ways: Bour-
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dieusian sociology pays close attention to structures and practices, whereas assemblage and 
actor-network thinking looks at  arrangements and agency.  The former seems,  simply by 
choice of words, to focus more on stability and the latter on fragility. Many assumptions are 
shared between both currents, nevertheless.
But is assemblage thinking only a different shade of actor-network theory? John Law 
would essentially say so. He sees little difference between the terms of assemblage and actor-
network: both ‘refer to the provisional assembly of productive, heterogeneous, and (this is 
the crucial point) quite limited forms of ordering located in no larger overall order’ (Law 
2009, 146). Further obvious similarities between actor-network and assemblage approaches 
include their shared assumption of emergent properties, meaning that drought, for instance, 
is more than the sum of its parts; and a ‘topological view of space, in which distance is a 
function of the intensity of a relation’ (Müller and Schurr 2016, 217). On the other hand, there 
have also been claims that assemblage thinking and ANT are incompatible. In their review of 
this relationship, however, Müller and Schurr argue in favor of synthesis and cross-fertiliza-
tion as the best way forward (Müller and Schurr 2016), a call which I heed here.
Accordingly,  they identify  several  important  differences  between both conceptualiza-
tions. These informed my decision to employ the assemblage term, as I feel it adds valuable 
facets to basic actor-network theory. Where ANT focuses on actuality and presence, assem-
blage thinking is more about virtuality and potentials (Müller and Schurr 2016). A further 
difference is, purportedly, that ‘ANT is better attuned to fluidity, meaning change without 
rupture, whereas assemblage thinking shows a greater openness towards the aleatory and 
unpredictable, towards the event’ (Müller and Schurr 2016, 226). In a study of drought, both 
aspects can be addressed: the slow and gradual development of a drought and its shifting 
network links from an ANT angle, and its unexpected, event-like character which may estab-
lish surprising new connections and disrupt others from an assemblage perspective.
There  have been attempts  at  characterizing assemblages on an abstract  level  beyond 
descriptive  accounts  of  single case  studies.  One crucial  question is  how assemblages are 
forged, and how all the elements are then held together in them. Anthropologist Tania Li lists 
six common practices within this process, namely: ‘forging alignments, rendering technical, 
authorizing knowledge, managing failures, re-posing political questions and reassembling as 
the ground shifts’ (Li 2007, 286). I will occasionally refer to these six steps in my text. The 
sequence is reminiscent of the ‘due process’ Latour proposes for the democratic elaboration 
of the collective (or society, or assemblage) in the Parliament of Things (Latour 2004). A new 
potential member of the collective (a ‘proposition’) first causes perplexity, which then leads 
to consultation about admitting it in. If successful, the third stage is hierarchization (negotiat-
ing its exact place in the collective), which may then be followed by institution: the new ele-
ment is fully integrated into the collective and its presence henceforth taken for granted –  
nevertheless, this cycle may start over at any time. Rejected propositions (outdated concepts,  
for example) that have been excluded from the collective during a previous cycle may file for 
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readmission and thus shake up the current configuration just as hitherto unknown actants 
will.
A further crucial  question addressed by assemblage scholars  fills  a  perceived gap in 
actor-network theory. We may well be able to describe what the process looks like, but what 
kind of forces are responsible for the emergence of an assemblage? What drives actors and 
makes them do the required work? For assemblage thinkers, the answer would be: a combi-
nation of desires/wishes (Deleuze’s désir) in multiple forms (Müller and Schurr 2016). Desire/
wish and assemblage emerge together, are ‘co-constitutive‘ in this view (Müller and Schurr 
2016, 226). My attempt to combine the ideas of silent transformation and shi or propensity 
with actor-network thinking stem from a similar feeling that there are driving forces inherent 
to any configuration that need to be acknowledged, even if it is hard to precisely pin them 
down.
For these reasons, I specifically conceptualize drought as an assemblage and not just  a 
generic actor-network. While ANT provides the underlying ontology and theoretical founda-
tion of my study, the particular figure of the assemblage increases its explanatory scope and 
makes a more perceptive analysis possible.
In light of this discussion, a second specification of the research question has guided my 
inquiry: What other assemblages is drought being enrolled into, and how are these stabi-
lized within changing economic and societal configurations? The continual transformations 
undergone  by  the  nomadic  economy and  the  tribal  community  in  the  high  plateaus  of 
Morocco provide a theater or even ‘a living laboratory’ (Vidal-González and Nahhass 2018, 
1079) where the assemblage process of drought becomes visible.
Moreover, I focus on unexpected assemblages in order to produce genuinely new insights. 
But why are some connections unexpected? Is it because I found them on the ground in  
Morocco, but not in the literature? This would make them unexpected for the academic com-
munity only. Conversely, some assemblage relations may be evident to trained scientists but 
unheard of by livestock owners. But first and foremost, this label is a testimony to my own 
initial ignorance and the subsequent learning process as my personal ‘drought network’ was 
continually enriched and modified.
Drought is a highly complex matter that supports different viewpoints. When people use 
the word ‘drought’ (or ‘jafaf’) in a specific setting, they implicitly emphasize certain aspects of 
drought  while  neglecting others.  As all  aspects  equally contribute to characterizations of 
drought, however, I will not prematurely limit myself to a narrow definition. Instead, by 
gradually increasing the possible perspectives on drought, I try to capture the entire range of  
notions that exist in my study area. Rather than proposing a limited number of mutually 
exclusive and clearly distinguishable academic definitions of drought, which would have lit-
tle basis in reality, I essentially need the full length of my thesis to answer the question what 
drought is. There is no shortcut.  Moving through viewpoints in this way, I will assemble a 
 1.3 Conceptual Focus: Drought as a Punctualization and Assemblage 35
renewed description of drought. ANT scholars recognize ‘that actors themselves make every-
thing, including their own frames, their own theories, their own contexts, their own meta-
physics, even their own ontologies’ (Latour 2005, 147). Instead of discarding conceptualiza-
tions that  do not conform to my assumptions,  I  try  to document them as extensively as 
necessary. Each additional notion of drought in this catalog then represents a slightly differ-
ent assemblage of elements.
ANT encourages researchers to trace associations (Latour 2005) by following the actors 
wherever they go. You should therefore not expect to encounter the word drought on every 
page of this thesis. Rather,  I will  venture out and explore many of the other actants and 
assemblages that surround notions of drought. In the end, these accumulated descriptions 
are expected to contribute to a richer understanding of drought itself. Practically, this investi-
gation often entails looking at what drought does (the effects that are attributed to it) in order 
to better understand what it is.
This approach leads to a practical challenge: where does the network end? Or, if it does 
not actually end anywhere,  where is  its  description allowed to end? There is  no general 
recipe to determine this point. Ultimately, one should ‘try to understand reality in terms of 
the most limited number of ingredients possible, while also making sure that one does not 
forget any’ (Tiercelin 2011, 248, my translation). Latour gives a pragmatic recommendation: 
‘You stop when you have written your 50,000 words or whatever is the format’ (Latour 2005, 
148). In his view, an account can never be truly complete anyway: a researcher will inevitably 
miss important things and misunderstand others. Moreover, things keep changing after she 
leaves. And yet, carrying out studies and producing texts is probably the best shot we have at 
understanding the social world. According to Haraway, ‘it is precisely in the politics and 
epistemology  of  partial  perspectives  that  the  possibility  of  sustained,  rational,  objective 
inquiry rests’ (Haraway 1988, 584)
In addition to the strong empirical focus of this work, which offers detailed quantitative 
and qualitative insights into an under-studied and marginalized pastoral community in rural 
Morocco, the main contribution to knowledge I hope to make is of a conceptual nature. By 
deploying a range of theoretical and methodological tools from ANT and assemblage think-
ing, which have largely been absent from studies of the Middle East and North Africa, I hope 
to build a bridge between ANT-inspired researchers and the existing communities of Middle 
East scholars. As my assemblage perspective of drought in eastern Morocco demonstrates, a 
disciplinary toolkit thus expanded can generate innovative insights into important social and 
economic dynamics unfolding in the region. And beyond the confines of a single discipline 
or geographic region, I propose a new way of thinking about drought – a phenomenon of 
pressing global concern. In the final chapters of this thesis, I outline some political and philo-
sophical ramifications of this approach.
Through my work, hence, I also aim to contribute to drought studies in a broad sense. 
The accumulation and comparison of case studies could eventually produce ‘integrated theo-
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ries of drought’ one day (Kallis 2008, 109). While interdisciplinary, synthesized, integrated 
theories are beyond the scope of a single doctoral thesis, my case study may provide a build-
ing block for future endeavors in this direction. An enhanced understanding of notions and 
assemblages, which pays particular attention to nonhuman actants, can inform subsequent 
drought  analyses  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  Existing  approaches  in  policymaking and 
research may then become better able to curb the disastrous outcomes droughts too often 
have.
One crucial point should be emphasized: as network links are not unidirectional,  the 
expanded understanding of drought that I propose here works in reverse, too. If an apprecia-
tion of social and economic constellations is essential to a fuller understanding of drought, as 
I claim, this improved notion of drought will equally contribute to a more adequate analysis  
of the pastoral economy and the tribal community themselves. There is, hence, a decidedly 
sociological contribution my thesis offers to readers interested in human collectives.
My findings are based on several sources. Most importantly, my research team and I 
conducted fieldwork:  a  standardized survey questionnaire  was  completed,  in  Arabic,  by 
hundreds of households in the high plateaus. Although none of the questions mentioned the 
term ‘drought,’ many of the answers did – drought silently forced its way into my research. 
This quantitative survey was complemented by over a dozen in-depth qualitative interviews 
that we prepared, conducted and recorded in Ayn Bani Mathar and surroundings, most ofʿ  
them in June 2010. Moroccan colleagues subsequently transcribed them and I translated rele-
vant sections from Moroccan Arabic to English. In addition, I had numerous more or less 
informal conversations with experts, official representatives, and practitioners in the admin-
istration over the course of multiple visits to the region from 2008 to 2012. In the ANT spirit, I  
do not only consider people who have achieved high levels of formal education to be experts; 
quite to the contrary, all human beings are superior experts on matters that concern their 
daily lives.
Apart  from my own fieldwork, I  draw on written documents in different languages. 
They include project reports, newspaper articles, and of course scholarly literature from the 
natural as well as the social sciences and humanities. My academic training in diverse fields 
of study, ranging from linguistics to social geography and computer science, has probably 
nudged me toward multi- and interdisciplinary thinking over the years.
I  carried out the bulk of my empirical investigation and started preparing this thesis 
within a large research project: Collaborative Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich) 586, 
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and based at the universities of Halle-
Wittenberg  and  Leipzig,  Germany.  It  was  titled  ‘Difference  and  Integration:  Interaction 
Between Nomadic  and Settled Forms of  Life  in  the  Civilizations  of  the  Old  World’  and 
brought together disciplines as diverse as anthropology, archaeology, ecological-economic 
modeling, geography, history, Islamic and oriental studies. A number of insightful doctoral 
dissertations have come out  of  this  collaborative project  (e.g.,  Calkins  2016;  Bretan 2010; 
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Breuer 2007a; Gruschke 2012; Büssow-Schmitz 2016). My own endeavor started out with the 
intention to investigate the political ecology of rangeland – more specifically, to analyze pas-
ture management and conflicts. I was a member of sub-projects A4 ‘Nomads Without Pas-
ture? Key Issues of Sustainable Development: Political Ecology and Human Security’ and 
E10 ‘Sustainability of (Post-)Nomadic Resource Utilization Under Global Change – Concep-
tual  Understanding Through Ecological-Economic  Modeling.’  My focus gradually  shifted 
toward drought and actor-networks due to my accumulating insights from both literature 
review and empirical fieldwork. In other words, drought turned out to be such a powerful 
actor that it imposed its presence in the fragile assemblage that is my research project while I 
was trying to piece it together, and even ended up occupying a central position.
In the next chapter, I review some of the academic literature that has been produced on 
drought in general, not least on drought in Morocco. After a discussion, in the subsequent 
chapter, of my research methods and specifically the survey questionnaire I used, the main 
body of this study is divided up into two large parts. The first of them (part two) takes on a 
broadly economic perspective of drought in eastern Morocco with attention paid to pastoral-
nomadic  production,  exchange,  and consumption  processes  in  this  landscape.  Part  three 
focuses on the human (and more-than-human) society as the setting in which the assemblage 
of drought takes place. Each part consists of multiple chapters that take a closer look at spe-
cific issues and themes.
 1.4 A Brief History of Drought Studies
Drought is by no means a new phenomenon. Its huge practical relevance for many human 
communities has, over the centuries, resulted in a considerable body of scientific literature. 
And yet, humanity seems to be very far from a point where everything will have been said 
about drought, as this statement from Giorgos Kallis’s comprehensive review of drought lit-
erature suggests:
‘A  lot  has  been  written  about  droughts,  but  our  understanding  remains,  at  best, 
patchy.’ (Kallis 2008, 86)
Adding another study to this corpus thus seems like a worthwhile enterprise. In order to 
avoid lengthy repetitions of work that others  have done before me, I  will  keep my own 
review brief and illustrative here,  tracing the  most important approaches and  findings of 
drought research. Even so, this immense body of work constitutes one of the foundations 
that I build on.
Concerning the notion of ‘water crisis,’ political scientist Julie Trottier observes that dif-
ferent disciplines have come up with a range of understandings based on ‘a great disparity of 
methodologies and fundamental hypotheses’ (Trottier 2008, 197). I would put forward a sim-
ilar  claim regarding drought,  although the  term may seem less  contested and politically 
laden  in  comparison.  Trottier,  who  is  extremely  critical  of  water  crisis  discourses,  sees 
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drought as a simple ‘natural phenomenon’ (2008, 208) by contrast. As outlined above, I prefer 
treating drought as an assemblage or a hybrid object just like a water crisis, since its physical 
reality ‘is inextricably entangled with social and political aspects’ (Trottier 2008, 198) and 
cannot be considered in isolation. To my knowledge, an explicitly ANT-inspired analysis of 
drought has not been undertaken so far.
Some droughts are responsible for massive suffering and starvation. Even though not 
every  drought  leads  to  famine  and  not  every  famine  actually  kills  people  (Waal  1989), 
drought and famine are often related. Australian drought expert Ronald Heathcote argues 
that ‘while the significance of drought as a factor in human loss of life through famine is 
clearly debateable, a link cannot be denied’ (Heathcote 2013, 92). Another author shows that 
famine can be analyzed as a ‘complex disaster’ which may emerge, for instance, out of a com-
bination of drought, crop failure, food hoarding, and poverty (Hewitt 1997, 58). He suggests 
that ‘natural’ catastrophes, in fact, can no longer be separated from ‘other types and causes of 
disaster’ (Hewitt 2013, 10) in today’s closely interconnected world.
The global  significance  of  droughts,  thus,  cannot  be  underestimated.  Drought  events 
even exceed all  other natural  hazards in the number of  people affected across the globe 
(Hewitt 1997). They have not only contributed to famines now and again, but have likely 
played decisive roles in the decline and collapse of entire civilizations (Heathcote 2013; Dia-
mond 2005). This is not the scale of my investigation in this thesis, however. Instead, I take a 
look at more mundane notions of drought as they unfold in a small community of a few 
thousand families in the early 21st century. In Morocco today, drought does not kill people.
Drought never comes as a sudden shock, either. In a satirical guidebook for future visi-
tors to planet Earth after humanity has annihilated itself, there is a section on Hollywood 
action movies about natural catastrophes. The authors muse on why drought never made it 
into one of them: ‘Alas, droughts were slow-motion disasters, and thus unsuited as the sub-
jects for summer blockbusters’ (Stewart et al. 2010, 15). This characterization dovetails with 
Jullien’s notion of silent transformations – they may not produce spectacular events, but still  
are extremely powerful agents by virtue of their persistence. Due to this cumulative nature, a 
drought ‘is not recognised or declared until a dry spell has gone on for a long time, though 
each preceding day without rain has actually contributed to its severity’ (Hewitt 1997, 87).  
Another  corollary  of  this  silent  accumulation  is  that  droughts,  once  established,  always 
‘embrace extensive regions’  (Hewitt 1997,  88).  If  sufficient water (or food) were available 
nearby, their drought-induced lack could simply be offset through small-scale relief efforts 
and there would be no disaster. From an actor-network perspective, topographical space is 
less important than the reliability and strength of links in a network. Hence, droughts may 
erode  and  interrupt  fragile  links  of  food  provision;  and  they  always  interact  with  (or 
‘embrace’) extensive actor-networks. I will therefore address, in this study, quite disparate 
aspects of drought that may at first seem unrelated.
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Early discussions of drought have been preserved from ancient Greece, where drought 
was seen as intimately connected to earthquakes, comet sightings, winds, preceding blood-
shed, or demons (McCartney 1934). It was often attributed to divine agency and seen as a  
punishment for objectionable behavior by groups or individuals. The motif of punishment 
was and still is connected to drought in many communities around the globe (McCartney 
1934; Heathcote 2013; Slegers 2008). It causes farmers to pray, dance, make sacrifices, or hold 
processions in order to appease the higher powers. Prayers for rain were not uncommon in 
the United States of the early 20th century (McCartney 1934) or in present-day Israel (O'Con-
nor  2017)  or  Australia,  and  processions  still  take  place  in  Sicily  (Heathcote  2013).  Rain 
prayers and sacrifices can also be observed in eastern Morocco today, although such prac-
tices are controversial from an orthodox Islamic point of view (see ch. 3.3, p. 129).
In the contemporary academic literature,  four types of drought are commonly distin-
guished according to the ways in which they can be recognized. The shortest possible defini-
tion is given by Kallis in this sentence:
‘There  are  meteorological  droughts  (abnormal  precipitation  deficits),  agricultural 
droughts (abnormal soil moisture deficits), hydrological droughts (abnormal stream-
flow, groundwater, reservoir, or lake deficits), and water supply droughts (abnormal, 
temporary failures of supply to meet demands).’ (Kallis 2008, 87)
Most authors routinely refer to the fourth type as socioeconomic drought; however, this label 
may speak to the causes rather than the visible consequences of drought (Heathcote 2013) 
and hence operates within a different logic. While the exact meaning of ‘abnormal’ in each of 
these definitions leaves much room for debate (Heathcote 2013), an important feature of the 
four types is that they may, but do not necessarily, coincide. It is also worth noting that mete-
orological or hydrological drought alone hardly seem a matter of concern – they only become 
one when they lead (or threaten to lead) to a water supply drought that negatively affects a 
community. Water shortages do not exist independently of their being identified as such; 
water ‘is short only when social actors have decided it is so for a variety of reasons’ (Trottier 
2008, 198). Reports of drought are unlikely to ever emerge from the middle of the Sahara or 
from the Antarctic desert, as there are hardly any living beings who depend on precipitation 
in these places.
As a social scientist, I am not trained to analyze the metrics of meteorological, hydrologi-
cal, or agricultural drought in detail. But even such studies are ultimately motivated by social 
requirements; ‘all droughts that we humans care about are socioeconomic’ in their effects 
(Kallis 2008, 87). The structure of my thesis reflects this key concern insofar as its two main 
parts are devoted to economic and social entanglements of drought, respectively.
It may be useful to distinguish conceptual definitions of drought, such as the four types 
presented above, from operational definitions. The former seek to capture general character-
istics of drought but remain vague, whereas the latter aim to define exact measurements and 
thresholds but risk a loss in generality (Wilhite 2000). By and large, scholarly publications 
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about drought in Morocco are of the second, technical type: preoccupied with standardized 
measurements, the construction of indices, early warning systems, and mechanisms to miti-
gate the effect of a drought on agriculturalists (e.g., Yacoubi et al. 1998; Chaarani and Mahi 
2008; Ezzine, Bouziane, and Ouazar 2014). They focus on numbers and statistics in the vein 
of late modernity’s overall emphasis on commensuration, countability, calculability, and pre-
dictability. One quite sophisticated drought measure is the Palmer Drought Severity Index; it 
is tailored to the Great Plains of the United States and thus typically requires adaptation in 
order to be useful for other regions. This index takes into account precipitation, temperature, 
evapotranspiration, soil moisture, and runoff (Kallis 2008, 91) and has provided a basis for 
comparing different drought events across geography and history. Such comparisons are by 
necessity quite technical in nature. Even on this level, a universal standard for measuring 
and comparing droughts seems elusive, as ‘the extreme complexity of drought confounds 
single metrics and assessments’ (Kallis 2008, 88).
New actors have found their way into the academic and administrative assemblages that 
study drought and produce knowledge about it – notably,  remote sensing and computer 
technologies. They have by now firmly embedded themselves in these institutionalized cen-
ters of calculation, as they are often called in the ANT literature. Technologies have set new 
agendas and created new hopes, especially in the development of early warning systems 
since the late 1970s. Two critical observers describe this process in the following terms, high-
lighting  the  agential  power  of  technological  devices  and  procedures  and  the  way  they 
became connected, via the calculation centers, to livestock producers in drylands:
‘As rich, multi- (false)-coloured satellite images of desert areas began to appear, the 
illusion of omniscience appeared with them. Looking down onto the plain like the 
Nazca deities, the pattern of vegetation seemed evident. The [institutions and systems] 
could tell pastoralists that vegetation was going to be in short supply through the mys-
terious agency of the ‘normalised difference vegetation index’ […].’ (Blench and Mar-
riage 1999, 24)
In parallel, there has been immense progress in global climate modeling, also facilitated by 
continuous technological innovation. One important purpose of such complex models is to 
better  understand and then  predict  the  emergence  of  meteorological  droughts.  Scientists 
have been investigating causal links between El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenom-
ena over the central Pacific and droughts in Africa, for instance. But there remains a great 
deal of uncertainty ‘in simulating ENSO and other tropical variability’ (Dai 2011, 56), which 
also  concerns  the  question  about  the  extent  of  man-made  climate  change.  A  recently 
observed ENSO shift connected to drying over land might have anthropogenic causes, but 
might also be explained by natural variance (Dai 2011). At any rate, it is likely that anthro-
pogenic  greenhouse  gases  have contributed,  via  surface  warming and thus  an increased 
evaporative demand as well as a warming of oceans, to a trend of drying over land observed 
in the early 21st century (Dai 2011).
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There were indications back in the 1990s that drought phenomena in Morocco are linked 
to global climate change and particularly the North Atlantic Oscillation, but the interplay of 
factors is very complex (Bahou 1996). Studies have since found that Morocco receives most of 
its precipitation from ‘extratropical synoptic [i.e., large-scale] disturbances’ in the winter, the 
frequency of which ‘strongly depends on the phase and strength of the North Atlantic Oscil-
lation’ (Knippertz et al. 2003, 116). Rainfall during late summer and early fall, in turn, seems 
to obey a different mechanism. Moisture is picked up in the tropics, transported into the sub-
tropics, and then, under certain conditions, comes down as precipitation in Morocco. Con-
vection above the Atlas mountains seems to play an important role in this precipitation gen-
eration (Knippertz et al.  2003).  Volcanic eruptions have been studied as another cause of 
climate irregularities including droughts (Heathcote 2013), although there seems to be no 
indication that this is relevant to the Moroccan study region.
For the time being, no completely certain explanation can be given and no reliable pre-
diction made about the emergence of meteorological droughts in Morocco. As climate mod-
els become more diverse and more powerful, the accumulating bits and pieces of evidence 
will  eventually converge and form a tissue of  knowledge that is  increasingly robust  and 
dependable as a whole, even if each single factor remains somewhat uncertain (Latour 2017). 
But still,  heavy ‘reliance upon technology, to the virtual exclusion of other strategies, has 
rarely insulated society against the threat from droughts’ (Heathcote 2013, 252). A diversified 
mix of drought policies and risk-management strategies seems more appropriate, combined 
with a re-thought conceptualization as proposed in this study.
In Morocco, an observer has noted that there are no proper drought policies, but mere 
reactions to the immediate consequences of drought (Tarik 2012). This is more or less the sit-
uation a scholar described fifty years ago for Australia, writing that ‘each new drought is 
greeted with indignant surprise’ (Heathcote 1969, 194). Such an attitude, still prevalent today 
among administrative institutions, but also scholars across the globe, results in responses 
that  treat  ‘consequences,  not  causes’  (Blench and Marriage  1999,  5)  and thus  do little  to 
improve drought coping capacities in the long run. The Moroccan situation is compounded 
by  ‘a  lack  of  coordination  between the  ministerial  departments  concerned with  drought 
adaptation’ (Tarik 2012, 15, my translation). As a case in point, the National Drought Obser-
vatory (ONS), established in 2001, has since been disbanded (Tarik 2012).
Morocco’s  climate  tends  to  be  very  heterogeneous  due  to  the  country’s  sheer  size, 
diverse geography, and competing climatic influences (Yacoubi et al. 1998). A major drought 
in one area may barely be noticed by people who live a few hundred miles away. The year 
1941, for instance, is etched in the collective memory of older people in the Rif mountains in 
north-eastern Morocco as  a year of  severe drought and famine. Numerous families were 
forced to emigrate, and the region of Oran (Wahran) in Algeria became a key destination for 
them (Daoudi 2015). Other parts of Morocco remained untouched by this drought. This is  
quite typical: a tree-ring study published in 1995 identified ten recurring patterns of drought 
42  1.4 A Brief History of Drought Studies
that affect different parts of the country in specific ways. The period from the mid-1960 to the 
mid-1970s, for example, was dominated by an overly dry type of anomaly where ‘the eastern 
part  of  the country has the worst  deficits’  in terms of  moisture (Chbouki,  Stockton,  and 
Myers  1995,  200).  This  matches  the  time period generally  associated  with the  beginning 
decline of traditional nomadism in my study region. Yet, the concurrence of this decline with 
increased drought is not the full explanation. Other agents of change have consistently inter-
fered with the old ways as well, as I argue throughout this text.
Changing market conditions may be one of them. A study that seeks to identify Moroc-
can drought indicators shows how feed and animal prices have differed between dry and 
humid years, suggesting causation (drought is responsible for price trends) rather than mere 
correlation (Chaarani and Mahi 2008). The years selected for comparison vary across indica-
tors; this makes it appear as if those with the clearest effects were purposely selected to make 
the point. Drought, in this instance, is inscribed with considerable power to change markets;  
but the simple causative links proposed by the authors are not entirely convincing. Things 
are more complicated, as my discussion of price formation patterns will reveal (ch. 2.6, p. 89).
Professionals generally agree that ‘drought has become a structural natural phenomenon 
in Morocco’ (Tarik 2012, 15, my translation) since the 1980s. This phrase implies that drought 
is always looming these days. It forms part of stable networks that involve countless actors, 
and should be acknowledged as an integral part of the collective rather than an exceptional 
intruder. In contrast to this nationwide recognition of drought as a structural phenomenon, a 
project evaluation report  from 2006 states that  there is  no evidence of ‘large,  spectacular  
changes in rainfall’  in the high plateaus over the past decades (DPA Figuig 2006,  24,  my 
translation). Adding more perspective, analyses of tree ring data have produced evidence 
that drought conditions in late 20th century Morocco do appear ‘exceptional in context of the 
past  500 years,’  but are not  untypical when compared to the prevailing climatic  patterns 
before 1400 C.E. (Esper et al. 2007, 3).
In more recent historical periods, drought discourses have been politically laden since 
colonial times (Davis 2007). One important intellectual influence came from desiccation the-
ory. The once fertile Middle East and adjacent regions had, in this view, been turned into a 
barren  wasteland  through  centuries  of  neglectful  management  by  culturally  misguided 
natives. Desiccation theory is also linked to the idea that forests are able to capture and retain 
atmospheric moisture, and thus to make it rain more frequently in arid regions. Accordingly, 
deforestation must lead to a decrease in precipitation and the land dries out. Colonial author-
ities used such narratives as political tools against pastoral nomads and other local groups, in 
French colonies as much as in British-controlled parts of Africa (Endfield and Nash 2002). 
Blaming their supposedly irrational land use for the disappearance of (fictitious) vast forests 
and fields of yore often served as a pretext to deprive such groups of land ownership and 
usage rights. In North Africa, Arab pastoralists and their livestock were preferred targets of 
such accusations (Burke, III 2009).
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This theory was later replaced by the concept of desertification, which can be understood 
‘as  extreme  soil  degradation’  (Blench  and  Marriage  1999,  13)  or,  more  specifically,  as  a 
process of ‘land degradation under arid to dry sub-humid climates’ (Le Houérou 1996, 137). 
In a sense, desertification is ‘the opposite’ of drought (Le Houérou 1996, 158) in that it has 
long-term or even irreversible consequences on an ecosystem’s productivity. Drought, on the 
other hand, is seen as a short-term crisis, with production conditions returning to their nor-
mal state once a drought is over.
Notions of desertification are directly related to the so-called tragedy of the commons 
(Hardin 1968). Arguing against the human freedom to reproduce in the face of continuing 
population growth, biologist Garrett Hardin quoted the example of livestock herders on a 
freely accessible pasture. While herders benefit from each additional animal they keep, the 
costs of pasture degradation are borne by the entire community. Perfectly rational behavior 
by all individuals thus does not prevent a disaster:
‘Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit
—in a world that is limited.’ (Hardin 1968, 1244)
Hardin’s argument has extensively been criticized by researchers who showed that in prac-
tice, collective regulation mechanisms do exist and are very effective in most communities  
(Fratkin 1997). Another line of criticism has emerged from newer observations in the Sahel 
region. Here, large expanses of land had been thought to be irreversibly lost to desertification 
starting in the 1970s. But they started becoming green once again in the 2000s thanks to noth-
ing but  shifting  rainfall  patterns.  The  effects  of  a  long-lasting drought  turned out  to  be 
reversible (Behnke and Mortimore 2016a). Thus, the desertification concept may have ‘lost its 
analytical utility for science and practice’ altogether (Behnke and Mortimore 2016a, 3).
Regardless of such recent developments, the basic assumption of a complicity of human 
overexploitation  and  drought  in  producing  desertification  are  alive  and  well  in  current 
administrative practices and parts of the academic literature. In the states of the Maghreb in 
general, government policies and academic discourses have ‘tended to replicate French colo-
nial views, ascribing land degradation to overgrazing’ (Burke, III 2009, 106). Paradigmati-
cally, a recent scholarly paper on the pastoral system of eastern Morocco states that the ‘abu-
sive  use  of  resources  weakened  by  drought  has  engendered  a  sometimes  alarming 
desertification’  (Bechchari  et  al.  2014a,  2573,  my translation).  While  the  authors  mention 
drought as a contributing factor, they also complain in a second text that most pastoralists in 
the region ‘prefer blaming episodes of drought’ (Bechchari et al. 2014b, 158, my translation) 
rather than acknowledging their own role in degradation processes. Another, older analysis 
points to a more complex interplay of causes:
‘The drought hazard in Morocco has been progressively increasing during most of the 
twentieth century, largely because of the effects of European colonization, population 
pressure, the scarcity of viable new cropland, agricultural intensification, and govern-
mental policies.’ (Swearingen 1992, 402)
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For this author, climate phenomena do not seem to be a matter of primary concern in the 
study of drought. Instead, social and political processes need to be examined as drivers of  
vulnerability. There is no easily identifiable single culprit. Given the insights from assem-
blage analysis presented earlier, I assume a similar starting point for my research.
As this chapter’s discussion suggests, a diverse range of contributions have been made 
over the decades to the study of drought. They illustrate vastly different perspectives. Even if 
I attempt to synthesize them to some extent in this thesis, I will end up adding yet another  
account to this corpus – but this does not have to be futile:
‘By adding new dimensions to our knowledge, we move another step forward in tam-
ing the wickedness of droughts.’ (Wandel et al. 2016, 32)
 1.5 My ‘Method Assemblage’
At the core of my research is a household survey in the high plateaus of eastern Morocco.  
The interviews took place from October 27 to November 7, 2009 in four rural municipalities 
(jama at qarawiyyaʿ  or  communes rurales). These are, from east to west: Awlad Sidi Abd al-ʿ
Hakim, Bani Mathar, Murayja, and Awlad Ghuzayyil (Figure 5 below; typical French spell-
ing variants: Oulad Sidi Abdelhakem, Beni Mathar, Merija, Oulad Ghziyel). My fieldwork 
team  consisted  of  sixteen  interviewers  (5  female,  11  male)  from  the  south  and  west  of 
Morocco. Most were in their twenties like myself at the time, which facilitated communica-
tion and coherence, and had a social-sciences background. Some were actual or prospective 
doctoral students themselves, others were political activists or were about to start a career in  
public administration. Their motivation, therefore, included a genuine academic and civic 
interest and went far beyond the financial remuneration they received out of  my project 
funds. I had recruited them through an existing network of young researchers; they all had 
previous experience in conducting surveys in rural Morocco. For most of them, this included 
having been part  of  a  research campaign in  the  High Atlas  mountains  earlier  that  year, 
together with me and my project directors from the University of Leipzig, the findings of 
which have been published in German (Gertel and Breuer 2012).
Rather than just traveling to my study area and starting the interview process with ran-
dom people on the street or in the steppe, I chose a more cumbersome way. Thanks to the 
support of a partner organization cooperating with our research center, the National School 
of Agriculture in Meknès, I was registered as a visiting researcher with the Ministry of the 
Interior. With the help of various pieces of correspondence documenting this procedure, I  
was then able to inform the local authorities about each upcoming visit to the field. My first 
stop would always  be  the  seat  of  the  respective  local  administrative  unit  (da ira,  qiyada,ʾ  
jama a…ʿ ), where I would explain my planned research and sometimes coordinate the logisti-
cal details of the following days. Importantly, the authorities were often able to put me in 
touch with lower-level representatives (muqaddimin or shuyukh) who would act as guides for 
our team, sometimes for several days in a row.
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Approaching the population via the authorities was arguably the only viable way to conduct 
fieldwork in this region. This strategy provided at least four benefits: first, we were able to 
drive around, thanks to the guides accompanying us,  without losing our way or getting 
stuck with our cars. As an outsider, it is not easy to navigate the grassland and its features, to  
distinguish viable tracks from dangerous dead-ends, and to know which speed limit is advis-
able on a given type of underground. Second, we actually found the homes of the families we 
wanted to speak to. These were dispersed over a large area, sometimes hidden away in little 
valleys, and often consisted of mobile tents that might disappear and be found in a very dif-
ferent location from one day to the next; but our guides knew where they were. Third, being 
introduced by a well-known senior tribesman with an official function was helpful in estab-
lishing trust with the interviewees. Otherwise, being asked a series of private questions by a 
complete stranger might have provoked less accommodating and patient reactions. Fourth, 
we avoided suspicion by the various authorities  and security apparatuses present in the 
politically sensitive border zone (cf. chapter  2.5, p.  82). This included a safety aspect, as it 
prevented us from inadvertently crossing into Algerian territory.
In turn, the  muqaddimin profited from an additional opportunity of seeing their fellow 
tribespeople in remote areas. Some of the people we interviewed used one of our vehicles to 
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Figure 5: Overview of the study area
Map tiles by Stamen Design, under CC BY 3.0; data by OpenStreetMap, under CC BY SA
travel to Ayn Bani Mathar or to visit another relative. Occasionally, they would bring alongʿ  
bags of goods or a few live sheep that they loaded onto the roof of our car.
Another effect  of  our traveling with an escort  regarded the sampling of  households. 
While we had obtained lists from the DPA (Provincial Department of Agriculture) containing 
the number of households per lineage registered in pastoral cooperatives, we depended on 
the help of local officials to find and interview a sufficient number of respondents. These rep-
resentatives had the most accurate overview of the families belonging to their respective lin-
eage. The numbers of households we encountered always stayed within the range of the 
DPA lists on the cooperative level (Table 4). However, the percentage of households we were 
able to interview ranged from zero to over fifty percent of a certain cooperative. These num-
bers reflect the willingness of the respective officials who accompanied us, but also the ease 
of access to particular groups compared to others.
Municipality Cooperative HH on list HH interviewed Percent interviewed
Bani Mathar
Al-Sa adaʿ 43 – –
Al-Rahma 183 89 49%
Al-Rashad 56 24 43%
Al-Jamal 92 3 3%
Al-Mataf 75 19 25%
unknown – 29 –
Subtotal 449 164 37%
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ
Al-Hamyaniyya 134 38 28%
Al-Mustaqbal 96 24 25%
Al-Amal 318 13 4%
Al-Tayyibiyya 94 49 52%
unknown – 5 –
Subtotal 642 129 20%
Murayja
Al-Shanafiyya 226 21 9%
Al-Qadiriyya 408 47 12%
unknown – 7 –
Subtotal 634 75 12%
Awlad Ghuzayyil
Al-Wahda 374 49 13%
Al- Azzʿ 397 38 10%
unknown – 10 –
Subtotal 771 97 13%
Total 13 2,496 465 19%
Table 4: Households interviewed per cooperative
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Overall, nearly one in five of all pastoral households in the region took part in my survey. 
The image is  skewed in favor of the more accessible Bani Mathar area,  while  the fourth 
largest cooperative, Al-Amal in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, is badly under-represented. Theʿ  
cases with unknown cooperative affiliations hint at the disparate levels of functioning and 
presence displayed by the various cooperatives (cf. ch.  2.8, p.  98) – some interviewees who 
were supposed to be formally enrolled claimed that they had never heard of this institution. 
In general, the size of my sample compared to the overall population should yield statisti-
cally very solid results, assuming a near-random sampling method.
Beyond the semi-official lists on cooperative membership, official statistics give a quite 
different impression of total population numbers in the region. My survey took place half-
way between two censuses,  that of 2004 and the subsequent one of 2014. The number of 
households  living  in  each municipality,  according to  the  censuses,  developed as  follows 
within this decade: Bani Mathar grew from 1,152 to 1,469 households; Murayja increased 
from 453 to 581;  Awlad Ghuzayyil considerably grew from 819 to 1,074 households;  and 
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim shrunk slightly from 401 to 392 households (HCP 2007, 2015).ʿ  
These official population figures are significantly higher for Bani Mathar and still slightly 
higher for Awlad Ghuzayyil compared to the DPA lists. The likely reason is that they include 
many families without any livestock-related activity, a type of household that is increasingly 
common and also appeared in my sample. More strikingly, Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim andʿ  
Murayja have considerably more cooperative members than total households. This may be 
due to families  inscribing multiple  members in order to benefit from free services;  but I 
would not rule out typing errors in the cooperative membership list either.
In the obvious absence of reliable population numbers, let alone more detailed criteria to 
stratify the households into subgroups, I had no basis for defining weighting procedures. 
Hence, I use my survey data unweighted; every case counts the same.
Out of nearly five hundred completed questionnaires, I finally kept 465; some of the dis-
carded ones were incomplete, overly inconsistent, or had been filled out by families living 
outside the study area. In one case, two members of the same household had simultaneously 
given interviews to my team; this duplicate was also eliminated during an early round of 
quality checks.  The data were manually entered into an SPSS (Statistical  Package for the 
Social Sciences) data sheet by two student assistants and me back in Leipzig, which brought 
with it new challenges of deciphering and correctly interpreting small notes and remarks on 
the paper questionnaires. Moreover, we were native German speakers working with Arabic 
and French material, but we managed to find a consensus in most unclear cases and pro-
duced missing values in the data set whenever we were not sure.
An  important  question  concerning  the  reliability  of  the  survey  data  is  whether  the 
respondents could speak openly and freely. This appears to have been largely the case. In the 
first interviews, a muqaddim would sometimes try to take part in the discussion, but after a 
few repetitions, the officials tended to occupy themselves with other activities. Sometimes 
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they would gather a group of men from the neighborhood and discuss various affairs with 
them as the household heads waited for their turn to be interviewed. Thus, 39% of the 465  
interviews were conducted with no other people around, while 26% were partially and 35% 
permanently attended by others.
Conducting interviews on a market day, on October 29, 2009 in Murayja, turned out to 
be not such a good idea. We had imagined it would be an efficient way to meet a lot of poten-
tial respondents at the same time, rather than driving around to visit them one by one. And 
indeed, people at the market showed interest at first and flocked around our group of inter-
viewers, but as soon as they found out how long the questioning was going to take many of 
them became reluctant, urged the interviewers to hurry up, or in some cases abandoned the 
interview and left. They had traveled a long way and had many errands to run on this day, 
they explained. The fact that there was no material benefit in it for them also seemed to play 
a role in this particular setting; we heard anecdotes about earlier visits and surveys by devel-
opment organizations and the empty promises made by their representatives. Some locals 
were visibly fed up with interviews that produced no tangible results for them. My team 
responded in the only honest way possible: participating in the survey would not make any 
difference to the respondents, but it would to our team of young researchers. However, the 
overwhelming majority of participants were accommodating and friendly; they patiently sat 
through the interview. The interviewers noted in 63% of the cases that their interlocutors had 
been very focused throughout the interview, and for another 29% this was true for part of the 
interview.
Relying on standardized questionnaires in sociological research opens up fundamental 
methodological and epistemological questions. Why carry out quantitative research at all? 
How  to  deal  with  this  peculiar  form  of  knowledge?  After  all,  it  means  cherry-picking 
selected aspects out of an overwhelmingly complex and constantly challenged social reality, 
then subjecting them to an astounding chain of ‘mediations’ (Latour 1999b), twisting them to 
fulfill predetermined formal requirements, subjecting them to various calculations, until a 
percentage value  or  a  neat-looking curved graph appears  on my screen and,  after  more 
rounds of filtering and selection, makes it into this text which then purportedly speaks on 
behalf of all those actors (Murdoch 1997). Social relation systems are quite abruptly trans-
formed into mathematical relation systems (Gertel 2005). Can such an approach of simplifica-
tion, abstraction, and creating new facts out of the blue be useful at all – or is it a dangerous 
tool  of  manipulation  that  should  best  be  avoided  by  honest  science?  There  are  several 
responses to such doubts.
First, the development of my standardized questionnaire took many iterations of proof-
reading, testing, and readjusting, and builds on decades of accumulated fieldwork experi-
ence by Moroccan and German researchers including myself. Previous studies abound (e.g., 
Rachik 2000; Breuer 2007a; Mahdi 2007; Gertel and Breuer 2012) whose authors I consulted at 
various stages of the drafting process. My questionnaire still contains several open-ended 
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questions to capture complexities and non-standard information, and the interviewers were 
instructed to note down any observation that struck them as peculiar or surprising. During 
the fieldwork phase, the entire team met every evening to recapitulate the day, solve ambi-
guities  regarding  the  questionnaire,  learn  from  one  another,  and  harmonize  the  survey 
process as much as possible.
A second crucial aspect is contextualization. The in-depth interviews and focus-group 
discussions conducted by my team and me, as well as our everyday observations, put the 
quantitative findings into perspective and allow for an assessment of their reliability. Ideally,  
different methods complement one another in order to paint a more nuanced, more realistic 
picture of our messy world than any narrow approach could. Sociologist John Law advo-
cates, in this sense, for ‘method assemblages’ that serve to detect (and simultaneously rein-
force) ‘particular patterns of relations in the excessive and overwhelming fluxes of the real’ 
(Law 2004, 14).
Third, facts are not just there, but have to be produced (cf. Latour 1999b); the etymology 
of the Latin word hints at this (factum = something done or performed). Nor can facts and 
values be clearly separated, but tend to ‘interpenetrate’ one another (Tiercelin 2011, 121, my 
translation). Scholarly honesty means communicating this knowledge-generation process in 
a transparent way and not presenting graphs and figures, with their inherent semblance of 
authority, as more than they are. I have often chosen graphical representations over tables 
because bare numbers tend to suggest a higher degree of precision than my limited sample 
warrants. The way in which I use my survey data set throughout this study is not as some-
thing representative of any singular truth. Rather, I attempt to look at the data from different 
angles to extract many partial truths. Each of them may be valid only at certain moments or 
from  the  perspective  of  a  certain  actor.  This  process  of  exploring  a  data  set  is  a  good 
reminder of how complex the world is: more often than not, hypotheses are not confirmed 
and seemingly characteristic behavioral patterns turn out to be unrelated to location, age, or 
social status differences among interviewees, for instance. Like a story-teller, I will focus on 
those connections that I did find, and especially on the unexpected ones. This means that 
whenever my text remains silent about seemingly plausible correlations that go beyond mere 
tautologies, chances are I have not found them confirmed by the survey data.
In the setup of my questionnaire, there is no rigid theoretical framework that separates 
dependent  from independent  variables  –  although common sense  dictates  these  roles  in 
many cases. I mostly relied on Pearson Chi-Square tests as a rough indicator of statistical sig-
nificance. But since correlation does not say much about causation, I will be careful and offer 
several alternative interpretations wherever appropriate. In contrast to deductive (where an 
observed effect  is  explained by a general  rule)  and inductive reasoning (where observed 
probabilities are used to formulate a general rule), this approach is known as abductive rea-
soning (where a tentative causal explanation is found based on a limited number of observa-
tions).
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Figure 6: Assistants carrying out the survey, October 2009
What follows now is a brief description of the questionnaire’s main sections. I will use this 
opportunity for a general characterization of the sample population as well – namely, by pre-
senting simple descriptive statistics (frequencies and means) for selected questions. This will 
serve as a further introduction to the nomad territories of eastern Morocco, their inhabitants,  
and the ongoing changes that help understand what drought is and does.
The questionnaire that we printed out in a copy shop in Oujda was formulated in French, 
the dominant language of academia in Morocco, and contained an Arabic translation of all 
questions for the actual interviews. It consisted of thirteen sections and a total of 40 ques-
tions. I employed various question types and formats, ranging from simple yes/no questions 
to Likert-scale assessments, matrix tables, and open-ended questions. Each interview took 
forty minutes on average, with only a few cases requiring more than an hour (the median 
value was at 37 minutes). The sections were titled: demography (2 questions), housing and 
equipment (3),  remunerated activities (1),  livestock breeding (11),  water (1),  mobility and 
sedentarization (2), land (1), agriculture (2), income sources (2), expenses (3), social activities 
(4), perceptions and opinions (3), and finally: family, past and future (5).
Our goal was to interview household heads, a title usually associated with a family’s 
patriarch, as we assumed them to have the most complete overview over their respective 
socioeconomic situation. In cases where the family head was not available, we would try to 
interview another household member instead. This happened in 11% of the interviews.
The first set of questions concerns basic demographic information about the interviewed 
household (kanun, hearth in Moroccan Arabic – this relates to the idea of shared meals). For 
each household member, we wrote down his or her name, gender, age, marital status, educa-
tion level, and current activity or work. The average household size amounts to 7.8 persons 
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in my sample. Of these, 36% were children (below 16 years of age), 59% adults (aged 16-64), 
and 5% elderly people (aged 65 to 95). This distribution perfectly matches nationwide census 
data on nomadic households (HCP 2016, 1). There were more men than women in my sam-
ple (53 versus 47 percent), which runs counter to official statistics from the 2004 census where 
only the municipality of Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim had a male surplus. However, in theʿ  
subsequent 2014 census, Bani Mathar and Awlad Ghuzayyil were also composed of more 
men than women and the ratio in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim had even climbed (to 52 perʿ -
cent). An existing trend seems thus to have been reflected, if in a slightly exaggerated way, in 
my 2009 survey.  More  recently,  the public  statistics  authority has suggested that  52% of 
Morocco’s nomads are men, without providing an interpretation (HCP 2016, 1). This gender 
distribution is reflected in the population pyramid of my sample (Figure 7), which represents 
the ages of 3,558 individuals and shows an additional unexpected feature: there are remark-
able spikes, especially among women, for ages divisible by ten. This is explained by the fact  
that birthdays are not considered important in this society (although this is changing – see 
ch. 3.6, p. 150), and that the exact age of family members is often unknown. Many people do 
not even know their own year of birth; but anyone’s age can be well estimated in ten-year  
steps.
Figure 7: Population pyramid of the survey sample
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The population pyramid further reflects the onset of a new trend that has been observed 
across the Middle East and North Africa and also in Morocco: as both birth rates and mortal -
ity rates are on the decline, population growth slows down and the average age increases.  
The base of the pyramid is no longer its widest part; the largest group is now made up of  
working-age people. This situation has been termed ‘the demographic gift’ as it could be a 
motor of growth, supposing that all these people actually find employment opportunities 
(Elmorchid 2017).
Nine in ten household members in my sample live in the family home year-round. It is 
often younger men who partially live elsewhere, e.g. in towns and cities where they attend 
boarding schools. Two thirds of the adult population (aged 16-64) and nine in ten elderly 
people (aged 65 and above) are illiterate and have no formal education, with significant dif-
ferences between men and women (51% of adult men versus 82% of women). These findings 
also correspond well with nationwide statistics on nomads, where eight in ten individuals 
were without any formal education in 2014 (HCP 2016, 2).
Figure 8: Tent and sheep, Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, October 2009ʿ
When  asked  about  their  housing  conditions,  one  in  three  families  (31%)  in  my sample 
responded that they exclusively live in a tent. The typical tent (khayma) of this region is com-
posed of long panels, woven by the family’s female members out of sheep wool and dark 
goat  hair,  that  are sewn together and then propped up by wooden poles  (cf.  Steinmann 
2001). Industrial fabrics are also integrated into tents nowadays, with beneficial and adverse 
effects – a shifting assemblage of materials can be witnessed in this domestic space.  The 
largest percentage of households in my sample, however, reside in a solid house (42%), while 
the remaining families (27%) combine both tent and house. About half of all the tents have 
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ceased being mobile; they permanently stay at the same place, often right next to a family’s 
house. This may be due to a strong emotional attachment to the tent lifestyle. Where they 
exist next to a regular khayma, smaller tents ( ushshaʿ ) made from esparto grass are used for 
storage purposes or for receiving guests.
To get an impression of how people live their daily lives in these tents and houses, the 
questionnaire also inquired about available equipment and convenience items in each house-
hold. They range from universally available objects such as gas bottles for cooking (99% of 
households have them) and ovens for baking bread (96%) over fairly common appliances 
such as radios, TV sets, and motorcycles or mopeds (about 50% each) to much less frequent 
items: refrigerators (34%), satellite antennas (22%), automobiles (22%), trucks (20%), and trac-
tors (15%) can almost be considered luxury goods, and computers or landline telephones are 
basically unheard of (2% each). Mobile phones, in turn, are widely prevalent (87%).
Before  I  examine,  in  the  next  part,  the  nomadic  economy in  depth,  I  would  like  to 
emphasize that my questionnaire was by no means flawless. The interviewers reported that 
questions asking for an assessment of things generally did not work well. Likewise, the topic 
of health was completely absent, which is regrettable in hindsight. Coming from different 
parts of the country, my team also complained about difficulties with the local dialect. An 
erroneous  assumption  I  had  made  created  confusion,  too:  the  political  slogan  ‘Al-Islam 
huwwa al-hall’ (Islam is the solution) is used by and associated with Islamist movements such 
as  Hamas  in  the  Palestinian  territories  (Kreuer  2014).  My  idea  was  to  ask  respondents 
whether they agreed with this slogan to obtain an indication of Islamist leanings; but the sen-
tence was almost unknown in this rural Moroccan setting. One interviewee parsed the Stan-
dard Arabic phrase as  dialectal  ‘Al-Islam huwwa ll  hall’  (Islam is  that which opened) and 
responded to this meaningless statement with a counter question: ‘Ash hall?’ (What did it 
open?).
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 2 Drought and the Nomadic Economy
Drought  is  an  important  economic  actor,  deeply  (and usually  negatively)  affecting rural 
livelihoods in eastern Morocco and beyond. A look at the diverse, vibrant assemblages that 
populate  the  economic  sphere  existing  in  this  region is  therefore  an integral  part  of  my 
drought analysis.  This entire part  focuses predominantly on quantitative data analysis to 
paint a broad picture, while the subsequent one on social questions relates several qualitative 
stories for a deeper (if selective) understanding of the various connections of drought. As my 
inquiry originated in a collaborative research center on nomadic peoples, the need for a char-
acterization of the economic and livelihood strategies of the specific pastoral community I  
studied goes without saying. In this part, I will often analyze my survey data through three 
mutually exclusive categories.  These are based on the interviewees’  own identification as 
rahhala (nomads), with the basic choice in the questionnaire being whether they are rahhala or 
not. A negative answer triggered an immediate follow-up question: whether they have been 
rahhala in the past or not (i.e., have never been nomads). The survey households populate the 
resulting three categories in more or less equal proportions: 24% consider themselves to be 
nomads, 36% former nomads, and 39% non-nomads. Another 1% (four interviewees) did not 
answer the question, possibly because they felt that they were somewhere in between or that 
these categories were meaningless to them.
While the term rahhala is related to the notion of travel and migration (this is the seman-
tic field of the r-h-l root in Arabic), the etymology of nomads stresses a different aspect: that of 
livestock.
‘The Oxford English Dictionary traces the origins of the word ‘nomad’ back to the 
Greek nemein meaning ‘to pasture’, and defines a nomad as ‘a member of a people con-
tinually moving to find fresh pasture for its animals and having no permanent home’. 
One central aspect of this definition is the link between a people on the move and the  
reason behind such movement, which is to find fresh pasture.’ (Gilbert 2007, 683)
In the following discussion, mobility is an overarching theme. Many actors are on the move 
(vehicles, tents, water, fodder, fuel, money, ideas, and so on), but I want first to look at peo-
ple and animals in an ideal-type pastoral nomadic community. For them, mobility allows 
access to a range of resources; and access to resources is ‘the prerequisite for action’ (Gertel 
2007, 23). Once again, these observations can be expressed in actor-network themes by say-
ing,  for instance,  that small ruminants need to enter into reliable connections with plant 
biomass in order to survive and reproduce and make a difference to a pastoralist household’s 
economic situation. A peculiar feature of drylands is that these vital resources are usually 
dispersed over large areas,  which makes mobility indispensable to guarantee a sufficient 
nutrient intake. What is more,
‘concentrations of minerals may occur at places distant from water, and water may not 
be found in areas with the most nutritious forage. Mobility allows herbivores to obtain 
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these  non-substitutable  resources  by  selecting diets  from different  locations on the 
landscape.’ (Hobbs et al. 2008, 779)
Pastoralists  who  live  in  mountain  regions  have  often  developed  seasonal  transhumance 
strategies, moving to high altitude pastures in the summer and lower ranges in the winter. In 
landscapes that do not display much vertical diversity, such as the high plateaus of eastern 
Morocco, livestock breeders have instead resorted to large-scale ‘horizontal mobility’ (Stein-
mann 2001, 40). In addition, they have developed specific modes of cooperation. The term 
duwwar, the general Moroccan word for village or settlement, goes back to the nomad camps 
that used to consist of tents set up in a circle (basic meaning of the d-w-r root in Arabic). But 
rather than just a  morphological  description of  a temporary settlement structure,  duwwar 
refers to a more durable social assemblage of about half a dozen households that achieve 
coherence through close economic cooperation (Rachik 2002).
The method of  mobile,  extensive livestock rearing is  opposed to sedentary,  intensive 
breeding not just in terms of the mobility required to access resources. It also approaches 
drought differently: fundamentally, ‘nomadic pastoralists have a drought-evading strategy 
whilst  farmers  and ranchers  have a  drought-enduring  strategy’  (Le  Houérou 1996,  165). 
When nomads settle, their established methods of coping with drought will therefore have to 
be adjusted. This is  exactly what has happened in the Moroccan steppes, where mobility 
patterns have profoundly changed. While more and more families become settled, animal 
herds have become increasingly mobile over time, largely thanks to motorization (Bourbouze 
2003).
This brings me back to the connection between trucks and drought, as described by the 
nostalgic artist Lakhdar Hamzaoui (ch. 1.1, p. 14). Trucks started appearing in this region as 
early as 1925 (Paskoff 1957) and became omnipresent in the 1970s (Bourbouze 2006). This 
development has close parallels in other parts of the world, for example among Middle East-
ern Bedouins (Chatty 1986) or Iranian nomads (Emadi 1995). Thanks to these vehicles, water 
and feed can be brought to the animals, rather than having to move the animals to the places  
where these resources are (Bourbouze 2006). Moreover, sheep can be transported to distant 
pastures in the wink of an eye. Using a truck does require some financial resources and may 
therefore not be suitable for everyday operations of small pastoralist families, but it can serve 
as a critical lifeline when a drought strikes. Even under non-drought conditions, truck users 
enjoy a greatly increased scope of mobility. According to my 2009 survey, nomadic families 
who had recently changed camps by foot had covered a mean distance of 23 km during each 
relocation; those who had used a truck had traveled 108 km on average. Trucks are most 
prevalent among nomads in my sample, where one in three households owns one; the ratio 
is only one in five families among former nomads, and one in nine among the non-nomad 
category.
The loss of household mobility in this society is often presented as closely connected to 
drought and degradation. Many sheep producers argue that nowadays, even trucks have 
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stopped making a difference. Several of my interlocutors commented: ‘Where am I supposed 
to go with my animals? The pastures are the same everywhere.’ Among the four rural munic-
ipalities in my study area,  Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim is the one where this sentiment isʿ  
strongest. About two thirds of the tents there have indeed become permanently fixed accord-
ing to my survey data. A similar ratio is reached in Bani Mathar, whose population histori-
cally has a closer connection to the sedentary ways of the town, Ayn Bani Mathar. On theʿ  
other  hand,  more than half  of  all  residential  tents  are still  considered mobile  in the two 
remaining municipalities further west. I will analyze the differences between municipalities 
in considerably more detail in the third part below.
The largest block of questions in my survey concerns only those 388 households (83% of 
the sample) who currently raise livestock. Among those who do not, 60% were herders at a 
former time but no longer pursue this activity. Their acts of abandonment are distributed 
evenly over the years; they mainly happened for climatic (i.e., drought) and financial rea-
sons, sometimes combined with personal misfortunes.
Quite  different  species  of  animals  are  currently  being  raised  in  the  northern  high 
plateaus. Sheep (97% of livestock-keeping households) and goats (71%) are extremely wide-
spread, as are cows (60%) and donkeys (60%). Horses are less common (31%), and only one 
household in my sample still owns camels. On the small end of the animal size scale, chick-
ens are almost omnipresent (84%) compared to turkeys (10%) and rabbits (6%). Dogs, geese, 
pigeons, and bees are infrequently kept. While sheep and goats are generally bred for the 
market, the remaining animals contribute to domestic consumption, entertainment, or labor 
force. Most of the livestock are owned by each household itself, but some families take care 
of sheep that belong to someone else, either against a salary or as associates. As their counter-
part, other households in the sample have confided their own sheep to someone else, usually 
a  paid  herder.  The  imbalance  between  animal  recipients  (8%)  and  providers  (17%)  is 
explained by two facts: many paid herders come from the neighboring territories of the Bani 
Gil, are not part of local tribal structures and thus less likely to be sampled in my survey. In  
addition, a single shepherd may guard livestock for multiple owners at the same time.
I will have a more detailed look into the sheep and goat business in later chapters of this 
part. An important observation to make at this point, regarding livestock, is that drought is  
typically blamed for herd losses. But drought is not the only culprit: it interacts with numer-
ous subtle transformations in society and economy, altering the ways in which water, land, 
and markets are being used. This corresponds to the ANT concept of translation, as dis-
cussed earlier (chapter 1.2, p. 20). In combination with other actants, drought has profoundly 
transformed the region’s livestock economy, exposing people and sheep to new situations. 
To further set the stage for my account of these translations, what follows now is an explo-
ration of my survey data regarding nomadic mobility and identity.
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 2.1 Being Nomadic: Mobility and Sedentarization
No more than one in four families in my sample currently consider themselves to be nomads 
(rahhala).2 However, 31 percent of survey respondents live exclusively in tents; mathemati-
cally, not all of them can be nomads. A lack of money may prevent such families from build-
ing a house. By contrast, 27 percent of the households in my survey possess both a tent and a 
house, and the remaining 42 percent have a house only – either in the open steppe, in one of 
the villages surrounding Ayn Bani Mathar, or in the town center. There is also a number ofʿ  
multilocal households where smaller children reside in town with their mother so that they 
can attend school, while the father and his older sons live ‘outside’ ( ala barra)ʿ  in a tent, herd-
ing the sheep. This multilocal model, greatly facilitated by the existence of mobile phones 
(Vidal-González and Nahhass 2018), is often pushed through by a family’s female members 
in my study area. In the 1990s, an observer noted that ‘there is a sort of female lobby in favor 
of sedentarization and the adoption of a solid home’ (Lazarev 2008, 28, my translation).
Moreover,  there  is  a  significant  correlation  between  nomadism  and  household  size, 
which was also found in earlier studies (Mahdi, Harrami, and Ablal 2007). Nomadic house-
holds have 8.5 members on average; large families can more easily be split up when they 
need to be present at different locations. The average household size is 8.2 persons among 
former nomads and much lower, 6.9 persons, among non-nomads.
Against this backdrop, Figure 9 shows the housing conditions of these three categories: 
almost all the nomads possess a tent.  Interestingly, even among those families who have 
never been mobile, one in four lives exclusively in a tent. Drawing premature conclusions  
from a family’s type of habitat toward their type of mobility is therefore not advisable. My 
fieldwork team reported that many families would in fact like to construct solid buildings,  
but are not granted permission to do so and are thus forced to remain in their tents. At the  
same time, not all buildings are officially registered, even in the densely settled neighbor-
hoods of Ayn Bani Mathar. The former nomads occupy an intermediate position; this patʿ -
tern repeats itself in other domains, as will become evident in the course of my analysis.
It must be noted that the issue of household mobility does not seem to touch the most 
fundamental sense of identity for many people in the region. Whether people are rahhala or 
not is considered more of a technical question; the important point is that they are  a rabʿ , a 
notion that is connected to living in the steppe  ( urubiyya)ʿ  and associated with values and 
norms, certain linguistic features, and the tribe as frame of reference. In this sense, lifestyles 
may change ‘but identities remain’ (Métral 2000, 127).
2 Fragments of the following material have been published before (Kreuer 2011).
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Figure 9: Form of habitat by mobility category
An episode from our fieldwork illustrates the linguistic aspect of this identity: one of the 
interviewed a rabʿ  corrected an obvious speech defect of one of the interviewers from south-
western Morocco,  an ethnic Berber.  The latter had used the form  bi tiʿ  (‘you sold’)  when 
addressing his male interlocutor, to whom this was improper Arabic: bi tʿ  is the correct form. 
As in many Eastern Arabic dialects, the -ti suffix is reserved for the second person feminine 
in the high plateaus, whereas western Moroccan darija uses it for both genders. Clearly, local 
dialects  have  ‘preserved  their  Bedouin  character’  (Maas  and  Procházka  2012,  345).  The 
tribesman further acknowledged: ‘Our roots are in Yemen. Morocco is originally the land of 
Berbers (shilh).’ Jokingly, he added: ‘You guys could throw us out anytime.’ The Bani Gil of 
the southern high plateaus can indeed be traced back to Hilalian tribes originating from the 
south of the Arabian peninsula. Two of the tribes in my study area, on the other hand, Awlad 
Sidi Ali Bu Shanafa and Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, seem to have emerged in the 17ʿ ʿ th or 18th 
century around religious institutions (zawiya) and gained influence as mediators between 
other competing groups. The third tribe in this area, the Bani Mathar, mostly occupied their 
current territories  during the 19th century,  coming in from the region of  Oran in Algeria 
(Lazarev 2008).
The three categories of nomadism are not stable, but change over time. This is obvious 
among the former nomads where the current household head decided to abandon seasonal 
movements at some point in the past. How long ago was this? In my data set, the earliest 
incidents go back to the 1960s (11 cases of abandonment), followed by a continued increase: 
17 families permanently settled in the 1970s, 22 in the 1980s, 46 in the 1990s, and 63 during 
the 2000s. This does not necessarily mean that the phenomenon of sedentarization is spread-
ing; an increase is to be expected due to social reproduction cycles. Family heads who had 
decided to settle in the 1970s, for instance, had by 2009 often been replaced by their children  
who then might consider themselves to be non-nomads; the renewed household(s) would 
disappear from the category of former nomads. Nonetheless, the figures indicate that the 
trend continued unabated until  recently. The year in which most cases of sedentarization 
took place is 2000 (21 cases out of the 159 in my sample), when two consecutive dry years  
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coincided with the discontinuation of fodder subsidy programs (DPA Figuig 2006). Drought, 
hence, seems to play a role in this trend. Accordingly, the reasons people cite for permanent 
settlement often include drought. A recent study quotes a pastoralist from the southern high 
plateaus: ‘One of the primary reasons for sedentarization is drought, because it is important 
to be close to the highway to feed the livestock’ (Vidal-González and Nahhass 2018, 1083). 
But my interlocutors also mentioned other pushing factors: the lack or bad condition of pas-
tures, lack of capital or livestock, difficult conditions in general, and conflicts between tribes. 
More positive pulling aspects were also brought up: the wish to become ‘stable,’ find new job 
opportunities, and enable the schooling of children. A distinction between ‘sedentarization 
out of convenience’ on the one hand and ‘sedentarization out of necessity’ on the other seems 
very plausible (Mahdi, Harrami, and Ablal 2007, 74, my translation).
My 2009 survey data allow a closer look at the hypothesized correlation between the 
decision to settle down and the occurrence of drought. To do so, I compared the annual pre-
cipitation data from Ayn Bani Mathar and the number of households that abandoned pasʿ -
toral mobility per year (Figure 10). There seems to be a time lag between both curves: a year 
with little rain is often followed by a year with many instances of sedentarization. But even 
then, the correlation is not very solid and I would conclude, once more, that things are not as 
simple. Hence, the conclusion that drought ‘is not directly responsible for sedentarization; 
rather, it has accelerated a largely ongoing process’ (Skounti 2012, 287, my translation) seems 
justified. As for the choice of a specific location to settle, the usual reasoning by our respon-
dents was: ‘This land belongs to my family,’  lineage, or tribe. The proximity to resources 
(such as water, the market, homes of friends) also plays a role in this decision. Except for 
people who move into a town, a certain degree of daily mobility remains essential to access 
these resources.
Figure 10: Precipitation and sedentarization
The choice to give up large-scale pastoral mobility does not have to be permanent. A typical 
sentiment is expressed by this middle-aged family head of the former nomads category: ‘When 
60  2.1 Being Nomadic: Mobility and Sedentarization
20
02
-3
20
04
-5
20
06
-7
20
08
-9
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400 0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Precipitation
Sedentarization
P
re
ci
pi
ta
tio
n 
(m
m
)
C
as
es
 o
f s
ed
en
ta
riz
at
io
n
the conditions are right,  we will  be on the move again.’  Underlining this  possibility,  ten 
nomadic households (2% of the sample) affirm that they had become sedentary at some point 
in the past but are now mobile once more.
A further question to examine is whether the families that live a sedentary life own more 
or less animals than their fully mobile counterparts – in other words, whether household 
mobility is related to differentiated production systems or wealth statuses (cf. ch. 2.6, p. 89). 
In my survey sample, sheep ownership over the last five and ten years has evolved in quite 
different directions for the three categories. The following table and graph give average live-
stock holdings (for those households that have owned sheep).
Sheep 1999 Sheep 2004 Sheep 2009
Nomads mean 264 239 242
HH 108 110 112
Former nomads mean 187 112 105
HH 144 147 141
Non-nomads mean 150 100 112
HH 134 134 134
Table 5: Sheep ownership over the last ten years
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Figure 11: Sheep ownership over the last ten years by mobility category
Nomads have much more sheep than the other two groups on average, and they have wit-
nessed less of a decline. For all groups, the average situation was better ten years ago but has 
not changed significantly over the past five. This is not true for every single household, how-
ever: 43% of them actually report a decline over the past five years, 33% an unchanged herd 
size, and 24% an increase in sheep. As usual, the picture becomes more messy and compli-
cated when one looks at  available data from additional  angles.  Another survey question 
shows that the loss of livestock is a very common experience: to the question whether their  
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herd had suffered a substantial loss during the past twenty years, two in three household 
heads (of those who used to own sheep or still do) responded ‘yes.’ Most attribute this loss to  
drought, disease, or a critical lack of money. Such an event is rather the norm then, and there 
must be mechanisms that assist affected households in recovering. In fact, charitable ‘social 
relationships existed in the pastoral economy to assist those most devastated by drought’ 
(Steinmann 2001, 46). These were often based on patron-client relationships (Lazarev 2008) 
that had a tendency to keep impoverished families in a position of dependence vis-à-vis  
large owners, while medium-wealth pastoralists had rational motives to cooperate among 
peers. But those institutions have more or less disappeared in favor of a monetary service 
economy centered on truck ownership (Rachik 2002).
A look at the respondent households’ income sources reveals further differences between 
nomads, former nomads and sedentary families. All interviewees were asked to estimate, 
often with the help of the interviewers, what percentage each income source contributed to 
their family budget. The average percentages are listed in the following table for the three 
categories.
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Nomads 78 3 13 4 - - - 1 - - 2 -
Former nomads 63 4 2 19 2 - - 1 2 - 6 -
Non-nomads 53 6 3 26 1 6 - 2 - - 3 -
Table 6: Income sources (percent) of nomads, former nomads, and non-nomads
Economic dependence on livestock marketing is almost absolute among nomadic families 
and still dominant among all other groups. However, 26% of former nomads and 38% of 
non-nomads derive less than half their incomes from livestock-related activities (compared 
to  1% of  nomads).  Herding someone  else’s  sheep for  a  wage  is  an  activity  that  mostly  
nomads are engaged in, sustaining the age-old nexus between livestock raising and spatial 
mobility. It also becomes clear that remittances from relatives in other Moroccan regions play 
no role at all, which distinguishes the northern high plateaus from many other rural zones of 
Morocco. Income from rents is equally nonexistent in a community where private ownership 
of tents or houses is the rule as much as the common-property nature of rangeland.
Wage labor outside the livestock sector is an important pillar of sedentary livelihoods in 
this region, which clearly distinguishes them from nomadic families.  Agricultural income 
from animals, on the other hand, declines with increasing sedentariness, while the share of 
crop-generated income moderately increases. But postulating a more or less deterministic 
successive transition from nomads to sedentary post-nomads would be too simple.  Most 
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notably, families that were never nomadic are the only ones engaging in independent non-
agricultural  professions.  Recently  settled  nomads,  in  turn,  rely  on  international  migrant 
remittances more than the other two groups, but also on public support programs (albeit to a 
small extent). It seems that some of the newly settled households have successfully transi-
tioned to innovative income generation modes while others have fallen behind. The loss of 
pastoral mobility, if this is true, comes together with an increased social mobility, but this 
entails both upward and downward trajectories.
Identity construction often involves fragile assemblages of human and nonhuman actors. 
Ethnic and linguistic attributes, together with a number of lifestyle choices, strongly inform 
individual and collective identities in my study region. While the question of nomadic mobil-
ity does not seem to touch people’s deepest sense of identity, it is an important indicator of 
contrasting economic  strategies.  Mobility  patterns  have  evolved,  moreover:  many house-
holds have become sedentary, often with decreased livestock herds and added alternative 
income sources. Drought has played an important role in this transformation, as the next  
chapter on water issues will further demonstrate.
 2.2 Water: Scarcity and Abundance at Once
Drought is often defined as water shortage – a lack in one of the most fundamental sub-
stances for human, animal, and plant survival. It is important to note, however, that ‘live-
stock generally die of starvation rather than of thirst’ in severe drought settings (Blench and 
Marriage 1999, 12). Enough water for the animals’ daily needs may still be stored in tanks or 
available from wells, but the plant communities on the rangeland are no longer able to pro-
duce sufficient biomass to feed them. For this reason, nomads usually refer to a lack of water 
in the specific form of precipitation when they speak about drought. The question of ground-
water, on the other hand, is quite a different story. Surprisingly perhaps, my study area, the 
northern part of the arid high plateaus, sits atop one of the largest aquifers in North Africa, 
more than 6,500 km² in size (Bouazza et al. 2013). Several experts from outside the region 
assured me that all it would take was some investment effort to drill deep wells, and the 
steppes could be transformed into lush, blossoming landscapes!
Such development dreams always refer to settled agriculture rather than mobile pas-
toralism; watering the vast rangelands to make the vegetation grow for sheep to graze on is 
impractical and would never pay off. Similarly, ‘artificial range or pasture reseeding is usu-
ally not feasible either technically or economically’  in arid landscapes (Le Houérou 1996, 
166), another argument in favor of intensive agriculture. Ironically, while the lack of water 
from above (i.e., the ubiquitous drought) threatens and destroys the livelihoods of numerous 
pastoralist  families,  the abundance of  water from below may put additional  pressure  on 
them in the future if pieces of land are increasingly fenced off and converted to irrigated 
agricultural use. Although locals could, in principle, use this opportunity to start their own 
farms and plantations, the substantial initial investments required for this (in terms of land, 
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equipment, and skills) constitute a barrier for all but the wealthiest families. Moreover, once 
new water resources are tapped, this increased supply ‘tends to generate demand through 
positive economic and political feedbacks’ (Kallis 2008, 105), leading to questions about the 
sustainability of any such development. In the Souss plain in southern Morocco, excessive 
groundwater extraction for commercial agriculture has contributed to a continuous lowering 
of  water  tables,  which is  devastating for  poorer  farmers  who cannot afford to  drill  ever 
deeper wells (Sippel 2014).
In fact, even with current usage, the underground water reserves in the north-east seem 
to be shrinking. Research conducted in the early 1980s concluded that the aquifer was slowly 
being depleted, as groundwater discharge exceeded groundwater recharge (Jungfer 1983). A 
newer study reiterates the observation that groundwater levels are slowly, but continuously 
decreasing by several centimeters per year, but the authors cautiously add that knowledge of 
this specific aquifer ‘remains fragmentary and very insufficient’  (Bouazza et al.  2013, 53).  
Recently, the existence of this water-bearing layer was one of the reasons why the Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar area was selected for the construction of a shiny new solar power plant (ch.  3.3, p. 
129) which needs water for cooling and cleaning purposes (World Bank 2013).
Human exploitation of this deep aquifer, which consists of Jurassic dolomitic limestone, 
covered by ‘a  clay-marly impermeable  layer  of  Mio-Plio-Quaternary  age’  (Bouazza et  al. 
2013, 53), dates back further. In the mid-1930s, under the French protectorate, the tradition-
ally existing shallow water sources of the region were upgraded with hydraulic measures. 
One idea was to stabilize water supply in times of drought, and thus reduce the risks inher-
ent in livestock breeding. In the mountain chain at the northern edge of the high plateaus, 
large amounts of water were also needed for the new coal mine in Jarada which was estab-
lished in 1929 (Jungfer 1983, 588). A coal-fired power station was added in 1972 with support 
from the Soviet Union, which required additional water; in its heyday, it was responsible for 
one third of Morocco’s total domestic electricity needs. While the mine was eventually shut 
down in 2004, the power station continues to run to this day (Province de Jérada 2007).
In the steppe, the pumping stations targeting the nomads and their needs were often 
insufficiently maintained and broke down. This meant that only two pumps were still func-
tional across the high plateaus in 1980 (Jungfer 1983, 588). They were rehabilitated in the 
course of the PDPEO project (ch. 2.8, p. 98) starting in the 1990s (Daoudi 2015); however, my 
fieldwork team reported that  many pumping stations were non-functional  once again in 
2009. Back then just as today, nomads were forced to find individual solutions for their water 
supply. In assembling alternative water provision networks to bypass the broken pumps, 
they often engaged trucks. In the 1980s, for example, a nomad who obtained his or her water  
from a well 14 km away – a distance out of reach for daily marches with their herd – would 
have to pay between thirty-five and seventy dirhams for one cubic meter (1,000 liters) of  
water, depending on the season. To put this into perspective, one sheep was worth around 
500 dh at the time (Jungfer 1983, 590). By 1996, according to another source, water delivery 
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prices had multiplied to 150-200 dh per cubic meter (Lazarev 2008),  while average sheep 
prices had only reached 1,000 dh in 2009 (my survey), indicating a slower price increase com-
pared to water. If the relative scarcity of this vital resource has pushed up its price, as can be  
assumed in a market economy, the pastoralists’ preoccupation with the palpable economic 
effects of drought appears well-founded. But water prices are not the best explanation.
Today, the respondents in my survey mostly get their freshwater from so-called sondages 
(Arabized as sandajat), artificial wells equipped with pumps. It turned out, in my fieldwork, 
that the water itself is often free of charge. However, the diesel fuel has to be paid whenever 
the water is delivered to a tent by truck. This is an important cost factor. Increasing fuel 
prices are therefore likely to be the main actual reason behind rising water prices for those 
who rely on motorized delivery. But who are those households? In the following paragraphs, 
I will analyze my survey data in more detail and try to discern patterns in water provision as 
one potentially important ingredient in the assemblage called drought.
The immediate sources of drinking water for humans and animals among my sample 
households are predominantly public wells (49% of households), private wells (18%), and tap 
water (16%). A smaller proportion rely on natural springs (7%) or rivers (5%). Other sources 
(16% overall; multiple responses were possible) include reservoirs, natural lakes, and water 
shared by a neighbor who has access. The distribution of the various types of water provi-
sion  sources  is  not  strongly  differentiated  between  nomadic  and  sedentary  families  nor 
between richer  and poorer  ones;  on the  other  hand,  a  household’s  spatial-administrative 
location as expressed by municipality affiliation does play a role. I will further explore this  
link in my exploration of power sources in the four municipalities (ch. 3.3, p. 129).
There are certain patterns, however. Nomads rely on public wells more often (63%) than 
former (46%) and non-nomads (45%). In addition, nomads hardly ever have access to tap 
water (5%) compared to former nomads (16%) and non-nomads (24%). Tap water, in this 
context, does not necessarily imply that a household is connected to the public water grid;  
access may be accomplished simply through a hose or pipe that connects the house to a run-
ning water source.  When the sample households are differentiated by income generating 
activities, it becomes evident that pastoralism and tap water hardly go together: among the 
households that completely rely on livestock breeding, only 6% have access to tap water, 
compared to more than half of those without any livestock-generated income. The perma-
nent freshwater sources that feed each tap can apparently provide enough liquid for a group 
of humans and their consumption needs, but not for dozens of sheep and goats every day.
When there is no pipe and faucet, water has to be transported by different means. These 
fall into three categories: hydrogen oxide may be carried in plastic cans (17% of households, 
mostly non-pastoralists or those with small herds), transported by horse or donkey cart (28%, 
mostly those with medium herd sizes), or delivered by water truck (39%, mostly by nomads 
with large herds in remote locations). Other actants involved in water transportation (19%; 
multiple responses were possible) include tractors pulling a tank and donkeys loaded with 
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jerrycans. The most frequent variant across my 465-household sample combines a public well 
with truck delivery (112 cases), putting a focus on monetary expenses for the vehicle. Just 
four decades  ago,  trucks  were used for  water  transportation by the richest  herders  only 
(Müller-Hohenstein 1978a, 81); this situation has thoroughly changed. In my 2009 survey, the 
average price per water delivery is 40 dh, although this varies largely and is linked to the 
means of transportation. People who carry their water in plastic cans pay 2 dh on average; 
many of them do not pay any money, but invest considerable time and labor instead. Those 
who use a cart to fetch water pay 15 dh on average, and those who rely on water trucks, 
71 dh. Evidently, the type of transportation is closely related to the amount of water per  
delivery, as a donkey cart replaces many plastic cans and a truck many donkey carts. There-
fore, the different prices make sense from an economic point of view.
According to an earlier study of the high plateaus, the means of water transportation are 
linked to a household’s remoteness from the nearest water source: while a distance of 8-10 
km could be covered with a donkey cart, water trucks would usually travel 20-30 km from 
source to consumer (Lazarev 2008, 11). This observation is confirmed by my survey data, 
where the average distance to the water source amounts to 3 km among jerrycan bearers, 5 
km among cart drivers, and 14.9 km among truck users. A related finding is that mobile 
nomads most often rely on trucks. Accordingly, the figures for each of the three groups show 
a very clear pattern: nomads, on average, live 11.8 km away from their currently used drink-
ing water source. Former nomads are closer at 8.4 km, and non-nomads come into walking 
distance at  5.7  km. Please note  that  households  with tap water  access  (distance =  0)  are  
excluded from these averages.
Once arrived at the family’s home, drinking water is stored in plastic cans and cisterns. 
Two in five households, mostly non-nomads with better access and lower daily consumption 
needs, use the former, and three in five, mostly nomads, rely on the latter: metal or plastic  
tanks with greater storage capacity. Old-fashioned waterskins, in turn, are very rarely used 
these days.
More than half of the families that do not have a tap available go to fetch water or have it  
delivered on a daily basis, and most of the remaining ones do so several times per week. An 
important question is which family members are responsible for this daily chore. In many 
pastoral  communities,  water  collection has been seen as  a feminine task.  Among Iranian 
Qashqai nomads, for instance, this is exclusively so (Emadi 1995, 167), and water collection 
used to be a predominantly female duty among the Moroccan Bani Gil of the southern high 
plateaus before 1980. This pattern changed fundamentally with the shift to wells as primary 
water sources (Steinmann 2001, 106), even if there may still be seasonal variations which my 
survey as a snapshot is not able to capture. Nevertheless, the overall trend of reversed roles is 
supported by my data and it is predominantly men who are now charged with water collec-
tion in households without tap water.  In 83 percent of the interviewed families,  this has  
become a purely masculine task, compared with 11 percent where it is feminine and 6 per-
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cent where both genders participate in this effort. Women are most often charged with going 
to private wells (30% women) or rivers (29% women) with plastic cans (39% women), while 
all other water sources and means of transportation are heavily dominated by men.
To summarize, the provision of sheep and humans with water is guaranteed by the deep 
aquifer  below Ayn Bani  Mathar,  which,  together  with wells  and trucks,  forms a  stableʿ  
assemblage for the time being thanks to the daily efforts put into its functioning by men, 
women, pipes, plastic cans, and donkeys. Nomadic families tend to be more distant from the 
sources and thus rely more heavily on machines as intermediaries in their water provision 
chains. Depending on distance to the nearest well, labor and time investments may be substi-
tuted with monetary costs, which must then be recovered through income-generating activi-
ties. However, the respondents’ general satisfaction with water access is equally high among 
the  three  groups:  nomads,  settled  nomads,  and  non-nomads.  From  this  point  of  view, 
drought is not primarily a problem of water scarcity in general, but of insufficient rainfall for 
the rangeland vegetation in particular – the topic of the next chapter.
 2.3 Vegetation: Forage and Food
When drought threatens the steppe vegetation, the prospects for a successful pastoral eco-
nomic exploitation of this landscape shrink. In this chapter, I will outline some of the ways in 
which insufficient biomass on the pastures (‘insufficient’ being a human-centered definition, 
once  again)  has been replaced with other  forms of  animal  feed.  Beside  animal  feed,  the 
rangeland also offers food for humans, albeit at an unreliable level; the desert truffle is one 
example of a direct connection between human and vegetational communities.
Local pastoralists refer to the northern part of the high plateaus, my study area, as the 
dahra (upper part, backside) in contrast to the sahra (desert) further to the south. The treeless 
dahra steppe is characterized by two typical plant species. One is esparto grass (stipa tenacis-
sima; halfa in Arabic),  which has receded considerably in Morocco and is on the brink of 
extinction in neighboring Algeria. This regression appears to be caused by frequent drought 
events (Slimani, Aidoud, and Rozé 2010), even though esparto grass is considered to be more 
drought-tolerant than other plants of the region. The second characteristic species is white 
wormwood (artemisia herba-alba; shih in Arabic), a kind of sagebrush that prevails in the cen-
tral part of the high plateaus. Thanks to its pleasant aroma, locals often add it to the heavily 
sugared green tea that is Morocco’s staple drink.
A  host  of  other  plant  species  can  be  found  on  the  high  plateaus,  including  annual 
grasses, flowering, and leguminous plants, sometimes occupying particular niche conditions 
(Steinmann 2001). Certain plant communities prefer specific types of soil composition, which 
are found at variously inclined slopes (Müller-Hohenstein 1978b). The result is an intricate 
ecological landscape consisting of ‘a set of gradients created by microconditions of the envi-
ronment’ (Acherkouk, Maâtougui, and El Houmaizi 2012, 106, my translation). Most peren-
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nial plant species have developed strategies and morphological features that help them cope 
with prolonged drought periods. They are thus able to limit transpiration to a minimum and, 
moreover, to ‘make use of the plant-available water of the upper soil layers in a wide perime-
ter’ thanks to their shallow, ramified, and extensive root systems (Müller-Hohenstein 1978a, 
45–46, my translation).
Just  as  certain  plant  types  have  their  propensities  and preferred attachments,  so  do 
sheep. While esparto grass is ‘barely palatable’ to them (Slimani, Aidoud, and Rozé 2010,  
686), they thrive on the perennial sagebrush, in addition to annual grasses; the latter are, 
however, ‘not very drought tolerant’ in comparison (Steinmann 2001, 46). For this reason, 
sheep have commonly been complemented with goats which enjoy a wider range of forage 
plants, including more xerophytic (drought-resistant) ones. As the type and abundance of 
available forage ‘influences the ‘willingness’ of [animals] to stay on the pasture’ (Dwyer and 
Istomin 2008, 530), a herder needs to balance his or her own interests with theirs, which hap-
pens through continuous reevaluation of both. A mixed flock of sheep and goats requires 
additional herding skills and efforts to successfully hold the assemblage together, as herders 
now also have to reconcile the needs of different animals with one another.
Even the animals change over time, not just due to continued selection efforts by the 
breeders,  but  also  as  a  consequence  of  innovation  in  veterinary  medicine  and nutrition. 
Improved productivity may come at a price, however, as an elder herder who is part of the  
local elites explains in ideal actor-network fashion. He stresses the transformative role of var-
ious nonhuman agents:
‘The sheep were used to enduring hunger, they were used to not becoming sick. When 
you go back 15 or 20 years, the sheep would endure hunger and drought. Today, the 
injection needle has entered the sheep, chemicals and vitamins have entered it. The 
ewe has changed, it does not endure anymore. The herd has been transformed, it does 
not endure.’ (Interview with Daoudi, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 2, 2010).ʿ
Chemical agents meant to support and protect the pastoralist livelihoods have occasionally 
turned against them. During my 2009 fieldwork, a herder gave an account of a recent inci-
dent that points out some uncomfortable, unintended, but enormously powerful connections 
between  various  nonhuman  actors.  Earlier,  a  locust  invasion  had  been  threatening  the 
region’s flora, especially crops cultivated in agricultural perimeters.  A pesticide had been 
widely applied to fend off the insects, but had ended up annihilating the esparto grass vege-
tation. In addition, it had been ingested by goats and sheep and had done considerable dam-
age to the animals.
While  such cases  of  sudden vegetation destruction  are  the  exception,  a  more  slowly 
evolving phenomenon has been a key narrative around the world: the idea that overgrazing 
leads to rangeland degradation. A classical formulation by biologist William Allan from the 
1960s lays much of the blame on short-sighted management methods:
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‘Nomadic pastoralism is inherently self-destructive, since systems of management are 
based on the short-term objective of keeping as many animals as possible alive, with-
out regard to the long-term conservation of land resources.’ (Allan [1965] 2004, 321)
The same basic idea was considered general knowledge in Iran in the 1990s (Emadi 1995); 
and in eastern Morocco at the turn of the millennium, ‘chronic overgrazing’ was routinely 
diagnosed as the reason behind ‘advanced degeneration’ (Lazarev 2008, 8, my translation).  
However, things are not that simple. On a very basic level, grazing in itself can be considered 
beneficial for the vegetation, as it helps maintain a specific plant composition. Entire land-
scapes that have eventually come to be seen as ‘natural’ and worthy of protection were cre-
ated by continuous grazing (Robbins 2004). In addition, soils and plants can benefit from the 
manure left behind by grazing animals.
Climatic factors can drive degradation and are often more decisive than pasturing ani-
mals. A study carried out in the Algerian steppe found that grazing did accelerate rangeland 
degradation  under  certain  conditions,  but  a  subsequent  drought-fueled  generalization  of 
such processes largely overrode the effects of grazing. In the period between 1993 and 2006, 
soil and plant community features changed within a 12-hectare exclosure in a similar way as 
they did in continually grazed lands next to it (Slimani, Aidoud, and Rozé 2010). In range-
land areas where precipitation varies widely, ‘ecosystem dynamics are driven by abiotic fac-
tors, with livestock typically having little or no large-scale, long-term impact’ (Sayre et al. 
2017,  2).  As a specific aspect of strongly fluctuating rainfall,  drought has often been sus-
pected to contribute to degradation and to lead to its more extreme and irreversible corol-
lary, desertification (Heathcote 2013).
In pastoralist economies of past centuries, droughts could actually be seen as vital for an 
area’s vegetation. This paradox is explained by the resulting, often massive livestock and 
wildlife losses which forcibly led to a reduced grazing pressure post-drought; in turn, this 
eased pressure would allow the rangeland plant community to recover (cf. Heathcote 2013,  
67–68). Such successive cycles would contribute to maintaining a certain balance between the 
needs of plants, animals, and humans. Thanks to the increasing availability of animal feed on 
the one hand and motorized transport on the other, this balance has been thoroughly altered. 
The  direct  feedback  link  between  vegetation  and  animals  is  weakened  or  completely 
removed; external inputs allow livestock ‘to be maintained on land where they would have 
otherwise died or been removed’ (Hobbs et al. 2008, 779).
A modeling study conducted by colleagues of mine adds more detail to this argument. 
In the paper, we argue that there is a veritable ‘supplementary feeding controversy’ with 
proponents of the obvious economic benefits of unlimited supplementation counterbalanced 
by an increasing evidence of detrimental effects:
‘Maintaining the livestock number at high levels may decouple vegetation–livestock 
dynamics and lead to rangeland degradation. It may prevent the natural seeding of 
annual  pasture  species  and  minimize  the  (unintended  but  beneficial)  rest  periods 
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which usually occur directly after a drought due to a collapse in animal numbers and 
help to prevent pasture degradation’ (Müller et al. 2015, 154).
Today, around 40% of the animals’ nutritional needs are met with supplemental feed in Bani 
Mathar – mostly wheat bran and barley brought in from elsewhere (Bechchari et al. 2014b).  
These resources may stem from other regions within Morocco; on a national scale, the culti-
vation of wheat has been promoted and supported by many government initiatives since the 
mid-20th century, although wheat is more susceptible to drought than the traditionally domi-
nant barley (Schilling et al. 2012, 20). The goal was to increase production, which represents a 
continuation of older colonial policies (Swearingen 1992). This equation has worked out in 
years with good rainfall; but higher profit margins, in this case, go hand in hand with an 
increased risk of losing most of the harvest in years with adverse weather conditions. In such 
years, cereals for both human and animal consumption have been imported from other coun-
tries such as the United States, facilitated in part by free-trade agreements that include flexi-
ble quotas (see ch. 2.7, p. 94). Imported grains may have their own side effects: according to 
one herder, they often cause a rash on the animals, making the sheep harder to sell even 
though  the  condition  is  harmless  and  will  disappear  after  a  while.  Exacerbating  fodder 
dependency for many producers, formerly existing state subsidies for supplementary feed 
(namely, barley) ended in 1991 (Kamil 1993, 18) and have only been sporadically revived as a 
temporary emergency measure during drought years.
Given  this  close  link  between  drought  and  animal  feed,  many  herders  in  the  high 
plateaus blame drought for their dependency on supplementation. This conclusion is con-
firmed by scientists, too, when they explain that drought has ‘modified livestock systems 
from extensive[,] based on pasture fallow and stubble[,] to intensive[,] based on feed supple-
ment’ (Chaarani and Mahi 2008, 53). As always, drought does things and is shown to be an 
influential actor.
In my 2009 survey, participants were given four options to assess how often they prac-
ticed  supplementary  feeding.  A clear  majority  (58% of  livestock  owners)  answered with 
‘always,’  and another large faction (35%) rely on external feed inputs ‘most of the time,’ 
which leaves an almost negligible proportion of pastoralist  families who ‘usually do not’ 
(6%) or ‘never’ (1%) supplement. Given these figures, it is apparent that the vast majority of 
the area’s livestock keepers have come to depend directly on the functioning of fodder mar-
kets, while the natural vegetation cannot fulfill any buffering function in times of drought. 
The establishment of grazing reserves in the context of the PDPEO development project (ch. 
2.8, p. 98) did not fundamentally change this situation.
Apart from forage for animals, the steppe of eastern Morocco provides a range of medici-
nal plants and wild herbs suitable for human consumption. One particular species is the so-
called desert truffle, locally known as tirfas. These truffles (fungi of the Terfeziaceae family) are 
described by pastoralists as ‘similar to potatoes’ in taste and preparation, and are considered 
a local delicacy. Collecting and selling them on the market can therefore generate extra cash 
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income for families in the area. However, whether the  tirfas will  grow in any given year 
depends on humid soils and on specific parent plants for nutrients (Steinmann 2001); the 
possibility of harvesting it is thus directly threatened by drought (Norman 2015).
Among the households that took part in my survey, almost one in five had collected 
desert truffles in the previous year, a very humid one (cf. Table 2, p. 16). Most of them live in 
the Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim municipality in the east of my study region, where 40% ofʿ  
households had engaged in fungus harvesting. On the other end of the scale, the share is 
lowest in Awlad Ghuzayyil in the west (3%). Nomads, former nomads and non-nomads are 
equally  involved,  however.  The  activity  is  most  pronounced  among  those  families  that 
depend predominantly, but not exclusively on livestock breeding for their livelihoods, and 
belong to lower and middle wealth groups. Richer and permanently settled families may still 
enjoy consuming the truffles, but prefer buying them at the market rather than collecting 
them outside.  This  pattern has been observed in an adjacent region,  at  least  (Steinmann 
2001).
In some aspects, the case of tirfas resembles that of matsutake in Japan (Faier 2011; Tsing 
2015) or the caterpillar fungus in Tibet (Gruschke 2011; Linke 2017) which are both harvested 
by rural populations and have become the object of insightful academic research, not least 
through ANT-like approaches.  Anthropologist  Anna Tsing, for instance,  has followed the 
matsutake mushroom across the globe to trace ‘open-ended assemblages of entangled ways of 
life’ (Tsing 2015, viii). The caterpillar fungus, on the other hand, is closely linked to pastoral-
ist economies and ecologies in the Tibetan highlands. It is an animal-plant hybrid, a moth 
larva infested and killed by a fungus, and has become an important source of income for 
local nomads due to its high valuation in Chinese medicine. As the fungus cannot be culti-
vated, it has to be collected from the highland pastures, which have in turn become the object 
of unprecedented contestation. With prices rising, fungus harvesting has become more lucra-
tive than yak herding for most families (Gruschke 2011). On a much smaller scale, this res-
onates with the Moroccan  tirfas experience. In the truffle harvesting season, many young 
men who work as wage herders prefer going out to collect tirfas rather than herding, and it is 
difficult for herd owners to find someone who will take care of their sheep at all during this 
time.
Compared to  the  Tibetan fungus,  the  desert  truffle does  not  seem to  have a  similar 
potential to bring financial wealth to the region, although some authors claim that its status 
‘as a traditional medicine and its fine taste […] add to its high market value’ (Norman 2015, 
3). The families in my sample who did so collected an average of 126 kg in the previous year, 
with a few cases reaching up to 1,000 kg. They sold the mushrooms for a mean price of 24 dh 
per kg (ranging from 5 to 60 dh), usually at the weekly market in Ayn Bani Mathar. At best,ʿ  
the yearly extra income thus generated could amount to roughly 1,000 × 30 = 30,000 dirhams, 
the price of a low-budget used car or a major medical operation. However, much time and 
labor force need to be invested which not all households can spare. And certain other forms 
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of wage labor are clearly more attractive: families that include an emigrant, in my sample, are 
significantly less likely to go out for truffles than those that do not.
Under common climate change scenarios, the conditions for  tirfas growth may become 
worse  in  the  future,  although there  are  very  few studies  on the  subject  (Norman 2015). 
Claims that improved livestock management would slow down soil degradation and thus 
improve conditions for the truffle (Norman 2015;  DPA Figuig 2006) seem to be based on 
anecdotal evidence rather than in-depth knowledge. What remains unclear is the exact mech-
anism of interaction between fungi, air temperatures, precipitation, drought, animals, and 
the additional dynamics of human decisions that result in certain land use patterns or market 
demands. If the economic value associated with the truffles were to increase, perhaps with 
the unlocking of reliable markets beyond the regional scale, scientific knowledge generation 
on its ecology would certainly multiply as well (Faier 2011).
In summary, the vegetation of the high plateaus is intimately involved in most existing 
assemblages/notions of drought. As the actual local biomass production often fails to meet 
the demands of sheep and goats, herders have increasingly relied on supplemental fodder, 
keeping herd numbers stable and thus also maintaining high pressure on the rangeland veg-
etation. An elderly notable narrates that the newly established grazing exclosures, showcased 
during a visit by King Mohamed VI to the region, give just a glimpse of what the entire land-
scape used to look like before drought imposed itself on the region, reshuffling the function-
ing balance between plants, sheep, and humans:
‘Well, we lived in the steppe. Back when we lived in the steppe, the pastoral regions 
were not like today. The land has changed. These protected areas (mahmiyyat) you saw 
on TV, the day our ruler came here – you saw that esparto grass? It used to be even 
more than that, all natural. But since the 1990s, we can say, drought has prevailed over  
the land.’ (Interview with Daoudi, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 2, 2010)ʿ
For an additional perspective on the rangelands and their connections to drought assem-
blages, I will examine overlapping layers of past and current human land use in the next 
chapter.
 2.4 Land Use: Appropriation and Conflicts
The arid steppe of the high plateaus, at altitudes of around 1,000 meters above sea level, is  
mainly used as grazing land in extensive livestock production.3 But who owns these vast 
expanses of rangeland? Most of them are legally defined as state land; local communities are 
collectively granted the right to exploit specific areas. The legal text that still regulates these 
collective lands is an edict from 1919, which features rather vague and equivocal wording 
(Bendella 2009). The collective territories are referred to as arshiyyaʿ  (tribal) lands where eligi-
3 This chapter is based on a previously published paper (Kreuer 2011) but has been substantially 
revised and expanded.
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ble groups enjoy usage rights. On a wider regional scale, this recognition of ‘the collective 
rights of tribes’ has so far been unmatched in any other Arab country (Boutaleb and Firmian 
2014, 100). With the status of collective territories more or less firmly established while peo-
ple kept moving and communities changing, a certain dissociation between tribes and terri-
tories took place throughout the twentieth century (Bouderbala 2007). For the time being, 
there seems to be no political impetus on the part of the Moroccan government to change this  
status quo.
Within  these  configurations,  each tribe  and tribal  subgroup has  its  habitual  territory 
(walf,  related to Standard Arabic  alf,  ‘familiarity’),  the boundaries  of  which are based on 
mutual acknowledgment and regulated by customary law (Mahdi 2009a). No legally binding 
documents exist  that  would delimit  these tribal  territories.  A team of  researchers  started 
mapping them in the 1990s and encountered a highly complex ‘social mosaic’ of space occu-
pation; they abandoned the endeavor soon after (Lazarev 2008, 21, my translation). Obvious 
legal gray areas continue to exist, and agricultural techniques and activities play an impor-
tant role for those who want to stake their claim in this shifting spatial and legal assemblage.
Aside from their function as pasture, parts of the steppe have always been utilized for 
dry farming. Nomadic families would sow one or several patches of land every fall, usually 
with barley or wheat, and hope for sufficient winter rains to make it grow so they could har-
vest  a  few sacks  of  grain  for  their  own subsistence  or  to  feed the  animals.  One  herder 
explains his straightforward approach: ‘Just with the rain, that’s all. When there is rain, we 
plow; when there isn’t, we don’t’ (Interview with Abdelkader, Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim,ʿ  
June 3, 2010). Even a minor drought will usually undermine such dry farming endeavors, as 
the crop will not survive. Conversely, a good harvest can constitute a reserve for a coming 
drought, however limited it may be.
In addition to makeshift fields in the steppe, there is a place in the study area where irri-
gated farming is widely practiced thanks to abundant natural springs and a system of canals: 
the town of Ayn Bani Mathar and its surroundings. Irrigated land is private instead of colʿ -
lective property. A major crop, alongside barley and wheat, is alfalfa, which is used (or sold) 
by sedentary villagers as animal feed.
Over the past decades, the steppe has witnessed a wide-ranging creeping appropriation 
of collective rangelands. People claim large patches of land as theirs and prevent others from 
using it. This is happening from below, since there is no official encouragement, and neither is 
it an elite phenomenon. Rather, this appropriation is the result of day-to-day practices by 
most members of the community, which, in turn, acts as a reference group. The main spirit 
seems to be one of: ‘Everyone around me is doing it so I will do the same.’ It is ordinary 
tribespeople who thus take part in an ongoing negotiation and renegotiation of boundaries 
and spaces.  And there is  no basis  in law for effectively stopping this  practice:  ‘All  these 
expanses that belong to everyone, after all, belong to no one, and can thus belong to anyone,’  
as one scholar puts it (Bendella 2009, 296, my translation). More and more land-use decisions 
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are made by individual households without consulting ‘the collective tribe’ (Steinmann 2001, 
4). Attempts to stop this trend have been controversial, such as the ban on rangeland agricul-
ture that some communities decided upon. Across the municipality of Awlad Sidi Abd al-ʿ
Hakim, such a ban was in place from 2008 to 2011 and was going to be extended further. In 
my interviews, some herders were in favor of this intervention while others cited it as ‘the 
biggest negative development’ of the past 15 years.
The controversy around the ban on agriculture is explained as follows: the practice of 
dry farming usually serves to justify an individual’s claim to a piece of land. ‘Working the 
land is a means of affirming your authority over it,’ as a local herder explains. This use of  
agriculture as a vehicle for privatization is old; it was mentioned, for instance, in a 1989 FAO 
report. That report warned against ‘the encroachment of cropping land into rangeland’ in the 
high plateaus, which was ‘causing a significant reduction of the area available for grazing 
and therefore leading to more grazing pressure on the land’ (Guessous et al. 1989, 34). In fact, 
this practice is linked to a centuries-old debate that was reiterated by Locke and Rousseau, 
among others. It revolves around the ‘agricultural argument’ which claims that cultivation is 
the only ‘proper’ way to use land; consequently, ‘only agriculture can be regarded as a basis 
of a real land tenure system’ in this view (Gilbert 2007, 685). While cultivation is obviously 
not the only legitimate form of land use in a pastoralist community that relies on livestock  
grazing, it is interesting to note that there is still a hierarchy in types of land occupation: agri-
culture is seen as more valuable and worthy of protection than pasturing. This reflects the 
amount of labor, capital, and/or time that has to be regularly invested into the cultivation of 
crops, I would argue, as opposed to the extremely low human efforts thought necessary for 
the maintenance of rangelands.
While there is widespread agreement that the phenomenon of rangeland cultivation is 
growing in the high plateaus, its extent is difficult to measure. A study that analyzed satellite 
imagery found the encroachment of agricultural fields to be less dramatic than assumed in 
Ayn Bani Mathar: over twelve years, about 1% of the municipal territory had been newlyʿ  
converted to agricultural use. Nevertheless, the condition of the area’s pastures had mas-
sively declined between 1988 and 2000 (Thomas and Bounejmate 2005).
My 2009 survey includes information about 752 of these patches of land, as most families 
lay claim to several of them; the data is thus able to highlight some spatial and temporal  
dimensions of de facto privatization. When asked how long the land in question had been in 
the family’s possession,  most  respondents  answered that  this  had ‘always’  or ‘for a long 
time’ been the case. Those who gave an acquisition date sometimes traced it back to the early 
twentieth century; a constant rise in land acquisitions occurred from the 1940s to the 1970s,  
only to return gradually to lower levels in the more recent past. The number of land acquisi-
tions by the households in my sample is given for each decade in Figure 12, differentiated by 
land use category: irrigated farming, dry farming, or other uses. A peak in the 1970s is clearly 
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visible – the time most commonly associated with the narratives of decline as drought turned 
into a constant threat looming over the nomads.
Figure 12: Private pieces of land by acquisition date
Scholars have discussed a possible role for drought as a catalyst that facilitates renegotiation 
and innovation in a community. Such a crisis might offer ‘an opportunity for a redefinition of 
the range and priority of property relations and claims’ (Solway 1994, 484), including land 
ownership. In a global context of increasing commodification, the movement commonly goes 
from collective toward individual rights, just as has been observed for the Moroccan steppes. 
In this process, ‘the legitimacy of narrow rights to exchange value take[s] precedence over 
wider communal rights’ (Solway 1994, 487). Can this pattern, drought interacting with wider 
economic trends, explain the privatization tendency in my study area? Possibly; but these are 
not the only ongoing silent transformations, and some additional actors deserve considera-
tion.
Another observation emerges from my data set: not only the number, but also the aver-
age surface size of newly acquired patches of land has been shrinking. This trend started in 
the 1960s. It is possibly related to the nationalization of all communal rangeland resources in 
1963, which ‘created ambiguities about land tenure and encouraged individuals to compete 
for land’ (Steinmann 2001, 60). In that year, the arshiyyaʿ  (tribal) lands were formally placed 
under the trusteeship of the Ministry of Interior.
Both declining trends, in patch numbers and sizes, imply that the most desirable plots 
have long been claimed. On the other hand, the percentage of real estate that was purchased 
– rather than claimed by tilling the land or inherited – has steadily increased, according to 
my survey data, to reach over a tenth of all land acquisitions in the 2000s. An explanation is  
again to be found in the growing scarcity of available land, and perhaps also in a generally 
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observable monetization and commercialization of exchange relations in the region (Rachik 
2009). Strictly speaking, my data do not reveal how old this land grabbing phenomenon, or 
the discourse about it, is: they only represent a contemporary snapshot. Older acquisition 
times  may theoretically  have been  given  by  respondents  in  order  to  underscore  current 
claims. However, concerns about increasing cultivation and appropriation of rangelands in 
this area were already voiced in the 1950s (Paskoff 1957), so the timeline seems plausible.
Similar trends have been observed in other drylands of the world as well, for example 
among Syrian Bedouins. Parallels include the advent of the truck in the 1960s, changing eco-
nomic activity patterns for households as a result (including an unprecedented accumulation 
of wealth and the emergence of livestock entrepreneurs), and a widespread ‘desire to acquire 
land’ (Chatty 1986, 127) from the 1970s on.
Among the pastoral households in my sample, 85 percent lay claim to some land, with 
an average surface area held per household of 22 hectares. On average, sedentarized herders 
hold slightly  more  land than mobile  nomads,  but the data  do not suggest  a  strong link 
between sedentarization and land appropriation. Many former nomads state that they aban-
doned their mobility at some point because they ‘had nowhere to go’ any more, a symptom 
of landscape fragmentation that is found in many pastoral areas (Hobbs et al. 2008). Securing 
as much land as possible in this situation appears to be a normal reaction. Not surprisingly,  
there is a strong correlation between herd size and acreage: the more sheep you have, the 
more land you tend to own. So the notable elites enjoy an advantage in this regard.
Rangeland fragmentation is often a bad thing for pastoralists in arid regions because it 
‘can restrict access of people,  livestock and wildlife to spatial heterogeneity in resources’  
(Hobbs et al. 2008, 777). In regions where such processes have occurred on a large scale, a re-
aggregation and consolidation of fragmented lands in the hands of a few have sometimes 
emerged as a response to restore spatial heterogeneity (Hobbs et al. 2008); but this solution 
means that many small producers have to drop out,  and is therefore undesirable from a 
social security and equality point of view.
As shown in the figure above, the appropriated patches of land are mainly used for dry 
farming in the high plateaus (over 80 percent, usually barley). However, my survey data sug-
gest that agriculture is not so much an important part of the household’s income portfolio as 
it is a pretext for asserting one’s ownership of the land. Just one in twenty households that 
cultivate cereals ends up selling some of the harvest, and it hardly ever accounts for more 
than one fifth of a family’s annual revenues. So what inspires the dynamic of appropriation? 
It can partly be viewed as a ‘speculative game’ in the risk-prone steppe environment (Métral 
2000,  141),  but more than expected financial gains,  ‘envy and social competition’ (Chiche 
2003, 215, my translation) seem to be the main drivers from the human side.
In this process, neighbors delineate boundaries and mark them with small piles of stones 
that can be seen in different parts of the high plateaus. Asked whether everyone was doing 
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this, a herder affirmed: ‘Everyone. This is my daya, that is my daya, and so on’ (Interview with 
Abdelkader, Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, June 3, 2010). Locally, ʿ daya refers to a small basin or 
depression in the landscape with ‘relatively humid sandy soils’ (Steinmann 2001, 33) where 
rain-fed agriculture has reasonable chances of success and is conventionally practiced. Given 
such a setting, disputes seem hard to avoid, even when both parties belong to the same tribe. 
According to a public scrivener in Ayn Bani Mathar, conflicts over land are in fact, next toʿ  
marital conflicts, the most common occasions on which his services are solicited. People reg-
ularly  ask him to  draft  or  certify  documents  testifying  that  they or  their  ancestors  have 
worked a certain piece of land. These documents are then to be used as corroborating evi-
dence in arbitration procedures (Interview with scrivener Idris, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 5,ʿ  
2010).
In the gray area of legal pluralism that surrounds collective territories in Morocco, cer-
tain rules have been established over time. But even if they ‘permit the attribution of parcels 
of land individually to a beneficiary, nothing exists that could secure this individual appro-
priation’ (Bendella 2009, 295, my translation). Theoretically, the state can demand the return 
of the land at any moment, and most herders are aware of this fact. How secure each house-
hold’s land ownership is from a legal point of view also depends on the type of land. One in 
two irrigated fields in my sample comes with some sort of official or semi-official documen-
tation, whereas the ownership of rain-fed plots is undocumented in 92% of the cases.
The land use negotiation process becomes perhaps most visible in a conflict, when the 
mechanisms that usually regulate it fail. Whether conflicts and struggles should be seen as an 
exception or as the norm is a matter of debate; I agree with sociologist Jeanne Chiche who 
speaks, analyzing another pastoral region of Morocco, of a ‘dialectic of conflicts and agree-
ments’ that should always be studied in the larger context of social relations (Chiche 2003, 13,  
my translation).
A brief digression into the hierarchy of the municipal administration is appropriate here, 
as it will help clarify a typical conflict resolution mechanism. The local authority is headed 
by a qa idʾ  (literally: leader) or khalifa (deputy), who is appointed by the central government 
and is generally an outsider to the region. These functions are thus ‘detribalized’ (Mahdi 
2009a, 134, my translation). Below them rank a number of shaykhs (elders) and, below them, 
muqaddims (from muqaddam, supervisor), who are nominated by the local community itself 
and represent its different factions. Hence, they are in the position of mediators between the 
central state and the local population, which can be a thankless task. A muqaddim’s remuner-
ation is rather symbolic at around one thousand dirhams per month, the equivalent of four-
teen days’ wages for an unskilled construction worker, so both the prestige and the actual  
political power linked to these positions are somewhat limited. My survey data suggest that 
most  muqaddims and  shaykhs are affluent individuals and belong to traditional notable lin-
eages,  but are by no means the wealthiest in terms of animals,  equipment,  education, or 
money.
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A khalifa in one of the rural municipalities gave me the following account of a typical res-
olution scenario for land disputes where different groups of intratribal actors are involved:
‘All the land is tribal ( arshiyyaʿ ) land, but it is in fact divided among the households. 
The land is used as pasture or for agriculture. Boundaries between neighbors […] cre-
ate many disputes. For example, a herder might abandon one of his fields in a drought, 
only to come back in a better year and find someone else occupying and using that 
same piece of land. Cases of conflict about boundaries and prior claims are usually 
referred to us,  the local  authorities,  but are then not resolved judicially in a court.  
Instead, we engage the tribe’s notables (a yanʿ ). We call upon them and ask them to 
examine the situation and bring about a reconciliation. When they eventually reach an 
agreement by way of their customary law ( urfʿ ), all parties involved get together for a 
feast to demonstrate their good intentions.
‘A decision is always reached in favor of the party that can prove – through written or  
oral witness accounts – that they had worked the disputed piece of land prior to their 
adversary or, even better, that their fathers and grandfathers used to cultivate it. The 
central state, which we represent, remains neutral. We are thus not seen as unjust or 
biased, but rather as reliable, effective mediators.’ (Interview with  khalifa, Hisyan al-
Diyab, June 4, 2010)
My pastoralist interlocutors broadly confirmed this view of the state authorities’ role in land 
conflicts, while being skeptical about their performance in other areas. The tribal notables 
most  closely involved with these conflict  resolution mechanisms are those who hold the 
office of na ibʾ  (representative); they are competent in collective land matters (Mahdi 2009b).
This local policy of not intervening directly corresponds to the nationwide edict from 
1919 mentioned above and still  valid,  under which the  law-making state  similarly  shied 
away from taking up a clear position on these matters (Bendella 2009). The state does not 
give an opinion on the legitimacy of people’s land claims, but simply refers the case back to 
the tribe. This is probably wise in the sense that a hard and fast ruling on any one case would 
presumably trigger a cascade of follow-up complaints and litigation that could easily get out 
of hand and overwhelm the municipal personnel. ‘Don’t make waves’ rather seems to be the 
maxim, especially since any law enforcement by state agents would be difficult to implement 
in the vast steppes. This approach to conflict management seems to be a general feature of 
Moroccan authorities (Abaab et al. 1995).
Some conflicts over land in the eastern Moroccan high plateaus cannot be solved in the 
same elegant way: when a group’s notables are themselves implicated, who is going to medi-
ate? There are examples of such intractable conflicts around the cooperatives that were estab-
lished in the context of the PDPEO project (see ch. 2.8, p. 98). One effect of this development 
intervention has been a change in the logic of land access. Where grazing lands used to be 
freely accessible to all tribe members at all times, based on mutual recognition and agree-
ment, the newly defined grassland resting areas are now members-only pastures and have to 
be paid for (Mahdi 2007)  – currently at 4 dh per animal (Acherkouk,  Maâtougui,  and El 
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Houmaizi 2012). During their closure, moreover, they are off limits to everyone. When these 
rules are breached, there is no legal basis for sanctions by the state; despite occasional calls 
for it, a rangeland police force has never been established. The matter has to be settled within 
the cooperative, i.e., within the lineage.
During an informal group discussion with around ten local livestock producers, they 
complained about  an  unresolved  conflict  within  their  cooperative.  It  opposes  small  and 
medium livestock owners to three or four wealthy members of the same lineage, not present 
at the discussion, who blatantly disregard the resting rules. They refuse to take their sheep 
off the protected areas during closure times, and even evade the entry fees. This infuriates  
the others and they denounce the notables’ corruption and unfairness, but feel powerless 
since the same notables run the cooperative and call the shots within the lineage, relying on 
their traditional status as leaders. Put plainly, the rule in this case is that for wealthy people,  
some regulations do not apply. They are successful in reaping personal benefits from the 
new  institution,  using their  powerful  positions  to  easily  embed  new  elements  into the 
extended actor-networks which sustain this power. In turn, they accuse their accusers of jeal-
ousy (hasad). Small and medium herders are left empty-handed and frustrated, and increas-
ingly look for alternatives to the livestock business.
Are the rules of the land use game going to change in the foreseeable future? And what 
would such a change imply for the various actors and their relative positions of power? A 
possible scenario includes steps toward a formal privatization of land ownership. So far, suc-
cessive Moroccan governments have been reluctant to implement or even discuss such steps,  
but the political debate is on the agenda in North Africa: should collective lands be broken 
up and privatized? While  neoliberal  theories  predict  more  efficiency and improved land 
management, critics assume the exclusion of the weakest and inevitable processes of concen-
tration. In ecologically similar grassland regions in Tunisia, such negative outcomes of priva-
tization have been observed for a while now (Bourbouze 2003).
To capture these processes theoretically, I would like to refer to Deleuze and Guattari 
once more. In their model of nomad thinking, the open Moroccan steppe would be conceptual-
ized as an ocean-like ‘horizonless milieu that is a smooth space’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 
1987, 379). This ideal type of milieu, dominated by people who organize themselves in tribes, 
is in their model opposed to striated space, which the authors associate with sedentary prac-
tices.
‘In striated space, one closes off a surface and “allocates” it according to determinate 
intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one “distributes” oneself in an open space, 
according to frequencies and in the course of one’s crossings […].’ (Deleuze and Guat-
tari [1980] 1987, 481)
The eastern Moroccan process of land appropriation through agriculture conforms to the 
notion of allocation and closing off, and thus signals a move from smooth toward striated 
space.  This  feeling is  most strongly expressed by inhabitants  of the Awlad Sidi Abd al-ʿ
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Hakim municipality, who assured my assistants and me more than once that ‘it is one of the 
most densely populated areas in the country.’ This claim is not supported by official statis-
tics, but nicely illustrates the perception of detrimental change. A similar shift in people’s  
relations to their land has been observed across the border in Algeria, where attachment to a 
social group (i.e., the tribe) has gradually been superseded by attachment to a territory. This 
transformation was initiated as  early as the 19th century through French colonial  policies 
(Trautmann 1989).
Another actor in the competition about land use deserves a mention: the houbara bus-
tard, a native desert bird. A closely related species, MacQueen’s bustard, which migrates 
between the Arabian peninsula and central Asia, is endangered due to its being hunted there. 
In  the  highland  steppes  of  eastern  Morocco,  the  bustards  are  instead  threatened  by  an 
increased year-round presence of grazing sheep and goats in the landscape, which disturb 
the birds and drive them away (Le Cuziat et al. 2005). This is where the late ruler of the oil-
rich United Arab Emirates, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, together with ‘a handful of passion-
ate  individuals’  (ECWP 2014),  comes in:  under the banner of  wildlife  conservation,  they 
established a research center in Missour (at the western edge of the high plateaus) in 1995. 
The center portrays its mission as ‘conciliating the pursuit of human, economic and cultural 
activities  with the  preservation of  a  species’  (ECWP 2014)  and has  combined ‘ecological 
research, [population] reinforcement using captive-bred houbara individuals and hunting 
management’ to this end (Hardouin et al. 2014, 1495). The main reason why the Emiratis put 
so much effort into bringing the Moroccan landscape, a considerable technical infrastructure, 
international researchers, and thousands of bustards into a stable assemblage, however, is 
somewhat hidden behind the label of cultural activities. Rich men from the Gulf simply want 
to hunt these birds, and want to remain able to do so in the future. Their ‘traditional Arab fal-
conry’ (Hardouin et al. 2014, 1495) may be condemned as being cruel to hunting and hunted 
birds alike, but is a proud national heritage. Moreover, bustard meat is supposed to have 
aphrodisiac qualities.
Currently, the program covers an area of 74,400 km² in the high plateaus (Hardouin et al.  
2014, 1495). This area has remained open to use by pastoralists and their ruminants, and 
while hunting parties from the Gulf are not an uncommon sight in the steppes, I have not 
heard about serious conflicts between both groups. Yet, such a potential certainly exists, since 
sheep and houbara bustards have diverging needs and interests; and falconers from the Emi-
rates command far more economic power and political influence than the average local shep-
herd. In a conflict scenario,  the adverse effects drought already has on pastoral land use 
options may be aggravated by the birds and their protectors/hunters.
There are yet more players in the land use game. In a further manifestation of present-
day globalization in  eastern Morocco,  international  corporations  have  entered the  arena. 
Their impact may not yet be large, but two Spanish firms have become extremely visible in 
the northern high plateaus. One is operating a gas pipeline that runs across the steppes, con-
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necting Algerian gas fields to Southern Europe, and the other company opened what was 
then the world’s largest hybrid solar-gas power plant on the outskirts of Ayn Bani Mathar inʿ  
2010 (see ch. 3.3, p. 129). Both projects occupy tracts of land that are no longer accessible for 
local pastoralists. The globally observable phenomenon of rangeland fragmentation proceeds 
in complex ways, given that ‘there is a tangle of jurisdictions and opposing incentives and 
disincentives’ (Hobbs et al. 2008, 783). Agricultural intensification targets contradict conser-
vation-related goals, for instance:
‘When these policies meet in the same landscape, as they do in rangelands, conflicts  
arise and a patchwork of public and small landholdings appears.’ (Hobbs et al. 2008, 
783)
As my survey reveals, perceptions about the prevalence of conflict are quite different across 
the three groups of nomads, former nomads, and non-nomads. The respondents were asked 
to evaluate the statement: ‘Conflicts have become less frequent compared to the past.’ Each 
group’s answers are depicted in Figure 13. Please note that the question was about conflicts 
(niza atʿ ) in general, not specifically about those related to land use and ownership.
Figure 13: Perception of conflicts by category
It appears that mobile pastoralists experience the highest level of social tension, or alterna-
tively the least amount of positive change in this sense – if conflicts are seen as something 
negative,  that  is.  Typically,  an  outsider  asking  about  conflicts  will  first  get  this  default 
answer in rural communities across Morocco: ‘No, there are no conflicts at all!’ Stories of 
strife only tend to surface in the course of a more thorough investigation (cf. Kreuer 2012). In 
this sense, the high disagreement ratio among nomads in my survey is surprising, as they do 
not mince words. Over half of the families who have been settled for more than a generation, 
on the other end of the spectrum, rather or totally agree that the present is less conflict-rid-
den in their community than the past used to be. This may be related to a generally positive 
view of modern life in solid homes, combined with income-generating activities that are less 
dependent on commonly owned natural resources.
 2.4 Land Use: Appropriation and Conflicts 81
Nomads
Former nomads
Non-nomads
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
‘Conflicts have become less frequent compared to the past.’
Totally disagree
Rather disagree
Rather agree
Totally agree
To sum up, household heads try to secure their land claims by enrolling diverse elements 
into fragile assemblages. These include practices of their ancestors, documents drafted and 
printed out in the scrivener’s office in Ayn Bani Mathar, piles of stones placed on the groundʿ  
to  mark  the  boundaries  between  them  and  their  neighbors,  and  other  elements.  In  the 
absence of a universally accepted, enforceable, stable punctualization, i.e., an oligopticon or 
‘center of calculation’ in ANT terminology, such as a central land register, the effort of hold-
ing together these bits and pieces is openly visible. Once more, drought is often a part of 
these particular land entitlement assemblages; combining forces with other actants, it has 
contributed to a fundamental alteration of land use and mobility patterns in this community. 
If  land becomes scarce and increasingly fragmented in the future,  droughts will  possibly 
have more severe effects on those livestock breeders who cannot completely rely on supple-
mentary feed and are reliant on the steppe vegetation.
 2.5 Sheep and Markets in Eastern Morocco
After my exploration of how drought is interwoven with water, vegetation, and land in the 
Moroccan plateaus, this and the following chapter describe and analyze the region’s live-
stock-based  economy  in  the  narrow  sense.4 My  research  here  is  based  on  geographical 
approaches and assemblage thinking rather than classical economics. In this view, markets 
can be understood as a specific type of  ‘sociotechnical’  assemblage (Berndt and Boeckler 
2010, 560) that brings together various kinds of economic entities; these, in turn, are seen as 
‘never fully completed assemblages of heterogeneous elements’ (Berndt and Boeckler 2010, 
565). I will take stock of such market elements in this part of the thesis.
Pastoral nomadic peoples in drylands have almost never been completely self-sufficient; 
their survival routinely relied on exchange relations with sedentary communities. The vari-
ous sub-projects of our Collaborative Research Center SFB 586 (ch. 1.3, p. 30) assembled evi-
dence from different areas and time periods to corroborate this point. A summary statement 
by anthropologist Elliot Fratkin holds equally true for my study region:
‘Pastoralists have traded or exchanged livestock products for grains, tools,  clothing, 
and other  commodities  with agricultural  or  urban societies  since  the  beginning  of 
recorded history.’ (Fratkin 1997, 247)
As demonstrated earlier, agriculture in the high plateaus plays only a marginal role in sub-
sistence production, whereas sheep and goats have the function of a capital stock for many 
households.  An  etymological  link  between  heads  of  livestock,  ‘the  earliest  medium  of 
exchange,’  and the  word for  capital  or  money  exists  in  many of  the  world’s  languages 
(Menger [1871] 2007, 313). The size of a family’s livestock holdings is often a good proxy for 
its overall wealth. A frequently heard expression in my study region describes the idea of a  
poverty trap linked to supplementary feeding, where more and more animals have to be sold 
4 The bulk of both chapters is based on previously published material (Breuer and Kreuer 2011).
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in order to feed the remaining ones: ‘al-baha im ta kul ra sahaʾ ʾ ʾ ’ (the animals eat themselves up). 
This process is often linked to drought conditions, which necessitate the use of supplemen-
tary feed in the first place. Historically, one scholar narrates, the region’s herders ‘traded 
away livestock at the markets primarily during periods of drought’ (Steinmann 2001, 120). 
Today, it is especially poorer breeders who sell sheep out of an immediate need for money. I 
will look at different types of producers more closely in the next chapter; what follows now 
is a more top-down description of how the relevant sheep markets operate, starting at the 
national level.
The Moroccan sheep meat sector is characterized by certain spatial and temporal fluctua-
tions in supply and demand. On the supply side, most sheep originate from extensive pas-
toral systems, where production depends on factors such as the animals’ reproductive cycles, 
and regionally specific seasonal variations in precipitation. On the marketing side, national 
sheep meat remains, so far, shut off from competition by the global economy due to import  
tariffs of 304 percent on live animals and processed meat (ADA 2010).  The state restricts 
rural-urban and interurban meat transport, limiting the availability of refrigerated transport 
equipment. Throughout the meat-marketing system, animals are thus transported alive and 
are generally slaughtered in the place of consumption.
For centuries, weekly markets have been the key interface in the commerce of goods in 
rural Morocco. Roughly 850 markets, held on one or sometimes two set days of the week, are  
spread over the country. Almost all of them have a livestock section. Individual markets, 
however, differ greatly from one another in many respects, such as size, the traded animal  
species,  but  also  types  of  suppliers  and  customers  (Paulus  1994;  Troin  1975).  Morocco’s 
weekly livestock markets are characterized by a clear spatial hierarchy, where markets of 
different sizes  assume different functions in the commodity chain.  Several  attempts have 
been made to develop typologies of these markets (Khalil 2007; Paulus 1994; Breuer 2007b).  
Most often, three types are distinguished: small rural livestock markets located in remote 
community centers; middle-scale collector markets located in regional towns; and middle- 
and large-scale distributor markets located in bigger cities.
In many regions, the smallest markets play a subordinate role in interregional animal 
trade, functioning rather as food-provisioning markets for the rural population who often 
build up relations of trust with the merchants, enabling them to buy on credit when times  
are difficult. Full-time market vendors, in turn, tend to repeat the same circular itinerary, 
attending a different weekly market five or six times per week. The middle-scale markets,  
such as the one in Ayn Bani Mathar, have developed into the central interface between pasʿ -
toralists  and interregional  traders,  especially  as  they are  often located in  regional  towns 
experiencing substantial population growth.
Moroccan pastoralists’ marketing opportunities are closely linked to changes in demand 
and the country’s consumption structure. There are several dimensions to this. Generally, 
annual meat consumption per capita in Morocco has continually increased in the 21st century 
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to 35 kg in 2013, but is still below the global average of 43 kg (FAO 2017). For the poor, both 
urban and rural – but especially in the countryside – meat remains a luxury item that is con-
sumed rarely and in small quantities. However, Morocco has seen the emergence of a pre-
dominantly urban-based middle class with a higher meat demand (Chichaoui 2001). Hence, 
meat  consumption is  concentrated in the cities,  and given the high rate  of  urbanization, 
meeting urban demand with rural meat is increasingly crucial. Most importantly, consump-
tion patterns and tastes have changed. The share of mutton, goat, and bovine meat in total 
meat consumption has dramatically dropped within the last decades,  from 81 percent of 
meat weight in 1970 to 35 percent in 2013 (calculated from FAO 2017). This decline is related 
to the state-subsidized development of a modern poultry sector, and the fact that poultry  
consumer prices are considerably lower than those of red meat. Despite the decline of its rel-
ative  importance,  the  absolute  volume  of  sheep  meat  production  and  consumption  has 
increased during these last decades as a result of population growth and a greater overall 
meat intake.
There is also a social and religious dimension to Moroccan sheep meat consumption pat-
terns. Male sheep, especially, are ‘a prestige product, sold at high prices, […] reserved for  
special occasions’ (Chiche 2001, 266, my translation) such as ritual sacrifices. In the early days 
of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad ‘had sacrificed a ram, leading scholars to propose that it  
was better to sacrifice male animals than females’ (Holden 2009, 81). Accordingly, the meat of 
ewes and cows tends to achieve lower prices in Moroccan markets although they make up 
the bulk of all flocks, and herders may try to save their rams for sale before holidays when 
their prices go up even more (DPA Figuig 2006).
It is difficult to overstate the relevance of religious festivals to the entire meat-marketing 
system. The event most strongly influencing sheep demand is the Islamic festival of sacrifice 
( id al- adhaʿ ʾ ,  locally  al- id al-kabirʿ ),  where each household head who can afford to should 
slaughter a sacrificial animal. It is estimated that 50 percent of all annual sheep slaughters  
occur at the idʿ  (Brisebarre 2002). In November 2009, Moroccan newspapers reported an esti-
mated demand of 5.1 million sheep and goats nationwide for the upcoming holiday, and 
total transactions were expected to exceed 7.2 billion dirhams in the few days preceding it 
(Boukhalef 2009). About half of the demand is thus concentrated in one very short period of 
the year. Dates for id al- adhaʿ ʾ  follow the Islamic lunar calendar, in which a year has 354 days; 
consequently, the festival rotates backward through the Gregorian calendar. For example, 
while it was celebrated in mid-November in 2010, it had moved to early September in 2017. 
Its temporal position in relation to animal production cycles in different Moroccan regions 
thus differs from year to year. For many pastoralists, id al- adhaʿ ʾ  is the single most important 
marketing season, although this does not seem to be the case in parts of eastern Morocco, as I  
will argue below.
Evaluating the position of sheep meat in urban every-day meat consumption outside of 
the festivals is not trivial. In Morocco, consumer preferences for certain kinds of meat are 
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based on a great variety of societal norms which may differ according to an individual’s 
region of origin and his or her upbringing (Chiche 2001). Likewise, different sheep breeds 
may  receive  variable  ratings  for  taste  and  quality  from  distinct  consumer  groups.  As 
Mohamed Khalil (2007) points out, animals with specific traits may be preferred in certain 
cities and at certain festivals. Throughout the country, there are thus numerous local niches 
for the marketing of sheep of defined age, size, breed, and taste.
The Moroccan sheep meat market, in sum, offers considerable marketing possibilities for 
mobile  livestock  producers.  Demographic  change,  domestic  market  protection,  and  con-
sumption patterns tied to religious festivities have assured a meat demand that is, in the long 
run, relatively stable. In the short run, however, the Moroccan sheep meat sector is subject to 
considerable temporal fluctuations of supply and demand. Benefits from livestock marketing 
depend on the exploitation of price margins between different places or seasons, especially 
during Islamic festivals.
The typical sheep breed of the high plateaus, the Bani Gil, is named after the most impor-
tant tribal confederation of the area; locally, it is also referred to as  daghma (dark-colored). 
The Bani Gil breed enjoys a special  reputation for its  taste,  which is mainly owed to its  
wormwood-heavy diet (Ben Hounet, Brisebarre, and Guinand 2016), and is considered ‘one 
of the best Moroccan meat breeds’ (Brisebarre 2002, 113, my translation). Moreover, these 
hardy sheep are well-adapted to the eastern Moroccan environment, ‘can walk very long dis-
tances, have a high thirst tolerance, and fatten quickly under favorable conditions’ (Stein-
mann 2001, 46). However, the past decades have seen the large-scale introduction of a differ-
ent  breed  via  Algeria,  called  Awlad Jalal  after  another  tribal  group.  These  sheep,  bayda 
(white) in the local terminology, are less adapted to the climate of the steppe, but offer a bet-
ter reproductive performance and are preferred by certain urban meat traders due to their 
slaughter-related qualities. According to one study, the Bani Gil breed is at high risk of dis-
appearance through genetic erosion, while the Awlad Jalal breed is not considered to be 
threatened (Nefzaoui, Ben Salem, and El Mourid 2014, 43).
Unstable  supply  structure  and  fluctuating  animal  prices  –  varying  according  to  the 
enforcement of border controls – have lent a considerable dynamism to local trading activi-
ties since the mid-1990s (Khalil 2007). According to one observer, the entry of  bayda sheep 
from Algeria ‘has shaken the principles of the region’s livestock production’ (Chiche 2007, 
52). By the late 2000s, a crossbreed of daghma and bayda had become extremely widespread in 
the northern high plateaus. Its colloquial designation is bargiyya (gleaming, light-colored; not 
to be confused with the Timahdite breed from the Middle Atlas, which also goes by the name 
bargi). Moreover, local observers have noticed a partial reversal of cross-border sheep flows 
in the past couple of years, prompted by exchange rate developments between the Algerian 
and Moroccan currencies.
Although the informal sheep trade with Algeria is fairly recent, it should be noted that 
the region has a long history of transnational livestock trade. During the colonial period, 
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Bani Gil lambs were primarily produced for export. They were sought after in France for 
their high quality meat (Paskoff 1957), and were marketed there as ‘Small Oranian’ (petit  
oranais). This label was apparently invented to avoid ‘the epithet of “Moroccan” depreciating 
them on French markets’ (Célérier 1927, 465, my translation) as opposed to Oranian – the 
Algerian department of Oran was French territory. These exports, however, ceased in the 
early 1970s (Guessous et al. 1989) and it is only in the context of current liberalization efforts 
(chapter 2.7, p. 94) that they may be revived.
The recent history of the Moroccan-Algerian border is marked by three consecutive clo-
sures. Although Moroccans had fought alongside Algerian forces in the independence war – 
of which some of my older interlocutors can vividly recall episodes – against the French, the 
relations between both countries deteriorated quickly after Algeria’s 1962 independence. In 
October 1963, the so-called ‘War of the Sands’ (guerre des sables) erupted about the exact bor-
der demarcation after the departure of the colonizers. While it ended with dozens of casual-
ties on both sides, a closed border, and unchanged territories, it gave rise to concrete visions 
of a united Greater Maghreb for the first time (Daoudi 2015). However, the next conflict that 
led to a border closure followed in 1975,  when Morocco annexed the Spanish-controlled 
areas of the Western Sahara. This was opposed by the Algerian government, which has sup-
ported a Saharan (Sahrawi) separatist movement, the Polisario Front, ever since. The borders 
remained closed until 1988, with exceptions for citizens who wished to visit their relatives on 
the other side. The third border closure between both countries came in the wake of a terror-
ist attack in Marrakesh in 1994; this time, all terrestrial borders were closed. Only air travel 
between both countries  remained possible,  and this  border regime is  still  in place today 
(Daoudi 2015).
As in many parts of the world, political borders do not necessarily correspond to social 
segmentation.  In the Moroccan-Algerian border area,  many locals  have relatives on both 
sides of the line (Daoudi 2015). Some of the nomads I talked to even hold an Algerian citizen-
ship, others regularly visit their kin on the other side. This has to happen more or less clan-
destinely and is effectively organized through informal transportation networks. Apart from 
humans, goods are also smuggled across the border in large amounts. This business, locally 
called trabando from Spanish contrabando, ‘has only existed in its current form since the 1994 
closure’ (Daoudi 2015, 44, my translation). Once more, a strong link to drought can be found: 
according to a recent study, persons engaged in  trabando in north-eastern Morocco almost 
unanimously  cite  the  rampant  ‘unemployment  in  the  region  and  the  quasi-permanent 
drought which makes agriculture aleatory’ (Daoudi 2015, 100, my translation) as reasons for 
taking up this activity.
Political scientist Fatiha Daoudi, the author of said study, argues that smuggling is a nor-
malized everyday activity that is central to many livelihoods in the Algerian-Moroccan bor-
derlands. This status is only maintainable due to wide-ranging neglect, collusion, or even 
active participation by border officials on both sides. Her analysis identifies four categories of 
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key actors in the cross-border trade: smugglers, consumers within the populace, officials, and 
the civil society (Daoudi 2015). From an ANT perspective, I would advocate for an expansion 
of this list.  The cars used in trafficking, typically decades-old Peugeot models nicknamed 
muqatila (female fighter), certainly bring their own needs and propensities into the equation. 
So do the trafficked goods. An example is given by one of Daoudi’s informants: gasoline is  
one of the essential contraband goods and is typically transported across the border in jer-
rycans. Knowing this, members of the border patrol are reluctant to fire shots at vehicles as 
they might easily explode – which makes things easier and considerably less dangerous for 
the drivers. The gasoline’s inherent interests, i.e. to explode when ignited, overwrite the reg-
ular program of border guard versus unlawful intruder. Another example is that the driver 
of a  muqatila often consumes alcohol or psychotropic drugs before starting his journey in 
order to drive more carelessly. Why should these drugs not be considered as active partici-
pants in the smuggling business in their own right? Not least, the steppe landscape with its  
distinct, but shifting features that can hide or reveal, accelerate or slow down a vehicle, plays 
an important role in this cross-border navigation.
These  movements  mainly  take  place  at  the  border  near  Oujda,  outside  of  the  high 
plateaus.  The nomads I talked to had no problem acknowledging their use of smuggled 
materials, but did not seem to be heavily involved in trafficking themselves. One issue that  
came up in several discussions about the Algerian border, however, was the occasional theft 
of livestock through cross-border raids. In such cases, everybody on the Moroccan side dis-
plays solidarity with the victims and helps them reconstitute a herd. Moreover, the porous 
international border can be a resource for sheep traders.
The following characterization of sheep markets in the high plateaus is based on findings 
by Mohamed Khalil in the late 1990s (Khalil 2007). Sheep traded within the region originate 
from both the Moroccan high plateaus (43 percent) and, significantly, from the Algerian side 
of the border (57 percent). There is no evidence of any direct link between producers and 
consumers; one or more intermediaries are always involved in the marketing chain, although 
many of them are also livestock producers themselves. Khalil distinguishes three types of 
intermediaries (excluding local butchers who cater exclusively to markets within the study 
zone): local, regional, and external traders, who also buy and sell sheep among one another.  
This explains why the number of sheep transactions (1,481,000) in the region exceeds the 
total number of animals traded (931,000).
Main weekly markets in the high plateaus are held in Tendrara (southern part), Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar, and Tiouli (both in the northern part), and fall into the category of middle-scale 
collector markets. The livestock section of these markets is a masculine space by convention. 
Even though women may possess their own animals, they thus depend on male relatives for 
marketing them (Mahdi, Harrami, and Ablal 2007). On a larger spatial scale, the biggest hub 
linking the eastern Moroccan steppes to the rest of the country is the livestock exchange in  
Taourirt (USAID 2006). Close to two thirds of the sheep raised in the high plateaus are des-
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tined for consumption outside of the region of Eastern Morocco, while most of the remaining 
third goes to its urbanized areas – mainly the cities of Oujda, Nador, and Berkane. Due to a 
ban on meat transportation, they are trucked across the country alive. In this context, a sec-
ond distinction needs to be made between two types of actors: middlemen who buy from the 
producers  but  do  not  slaughter  themselves,  and urban meat  wholesalers  who deal  with 
slaughterhouses directly and then sell the carcass to butchers (Khalil 2007).
Figure 14: Market in Tendrara, August 2009
Local  meat  consumption  within  the  eastern  Moroccan  highlands  is  almost  insignificant: 
‘Sheep and goats are slaughtered for consumption only on special occasions, such as wed-
dings, special holidays, or when hosting important visitors’ (Steinmann 2001, 50). Accord-
ingly, urban demand shapes the provisioning chain. The four most important urban destina-
tions receive a large share of all sheep passing through the study zone. Most of this trade,  
once arrived in the city, is handled by wholesalers. Of the overall wholesaler trade originat-
ing from the study zone, 35 percent goes to Casablanca, 16 percent to Oujda, 15 percent to 
Tangier, and 12 percent to Rabat. The relative importance of this supply chain from the per-
spective of the cities is as follows: Casablanca receives a third of its sheep meat from the 
study area, Oujda two thirds, and Rabat one fourth (Khalil 2007).
In conclusion, three points stand out about regional sheep marketing structures. Firstly, 
most of the consumers are located in distant cities; secondly, this enables a complex network 
of  intermediaries  using fluctuations in demand and supply to enhance their  profits;  and 
thirdly, the high plateaus have become a major hub in trans-border livestock movements 
between Algeria and Morocco. As clear as this sounds in theory, practice is usually more 
messy, however; ‘commodity exchange does not occur through smoothly articulated chains, 
networks,  or  circuits.  Rather,  it  is  the  product  of  contingent  and  uneasy  relationships’ 
between diverse actants (Faier 2011, 1094). In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at one 
group of economic actors: the sheep and goat producers of my study area.
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 2.6 Pastoral Producers and Commercial Strategies
With these dynamics in mind, I now turn to the pastoral households at the core of this glob-
alized periphery. Drawing on data from the 2009 survey, I take up three dimensions of mar-
ket relations: the intra-Moroccan sheep commerce with its fluctuations in demand and price; 
the cross-border trade involving Algerian bayda sheep; and the question of innovation. In my 
sample, about three in four families engage in livestock breeding, with marked differences 
between  duwwars (ethnically and/or locally defined subgroups of each tribe). Other liveli-
hood strategies that can be found include seasonal labor migration to Europe, day labor in 
the region, work in the construction sector, but also trade and a few more specialized profes-
sions (ch. 3.4, p. 139).
In order to examine the pastoral society of the northern high plateaus, I propose four cat-
egories of livestock breeders in relation to the number of sheep they own. While this is,  
admittedly, a simplistic way of categorizing pastoral livelihoods, in terms of the questions 
that concern me here, it works well and allows for comparison with Khalil’s work, who uses  
similar categories of producers (Khalil 2007). If I take all 359 households from my sample 
that own sheep5 and divide them into four groups of about equal size, the results reveal 
some key characteristics of each quartile. Table 7 gives an overview of these groups, ranging 
from small herders with a maximum of 30 animals to owners of very large herds who have 
more than 150 sheep. The first thing that stands out is that animal wealth directly corre-
sponds, at least on the aggregate level, to wealth in various other resources (such as trucks 
owned, migrants in the family, owning both a tent and a solid house, or money spent at the 
weekly market). In many other respects, the picture is less clear or there are no significant 
differences between the four groups at all; but I have not included such topics in the table.  
Alternative ways of measuring wealth will be discussed further on (ch. 3.2, p. 117).
Small
≤30
Medium
31 – 67
Large
68 – 150
Very large
151+
N=101 N=81 N=93 N=84
Herd size (sheep only, averages) 19 49 101 495
Daghma share 52% 45% 49% 43%
Bayda share 2% 1% 1% 1%
Bargiyya share 37% 40% 45% 53%
Sales volume (annually, % of current herd size) 187% 139% 97% 57%
Supplementary feeding:
- always 50% 54% 65% 67%
- most of the time 35% 41% 32% 32%
5 Compared to the previously published chapter (Breuer and Kreuer 2011), I recalculated all figures 
based on the up-to-date, slightly smaller sample of 465 households.
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Small
≤30
Medium
31 – 67
Large
68 – 150
Very large
151+
N=101 N=81 N=93 N=84
Practice of fattening 56% 58% 77% 89%
Co-op membership 23% 32% 39% 43%
Migration 16% 17% 23% 29%
Both tent and house 20% 25% 41% 49%
Truck ownership 1% 11% 32% 58%
Cell phone ownership 82% 86% 91% 94%
Money  spent  at  weekly  market  (average  per 
adult household member)
123 dh 135 dh 138 dh 186 dh
Table 7: Herd size categories and their characteristics
In  the  following  paragraphs  of  my  economic  inventory  of  livestock  trade  in  the  high 
plateaus, I will first describe price formation in the sheep market in general, and then as it 
relates to the four groups. I also address speculation, cross-border trade, and several addi-
tional points that emerge from this categorization.
Trade volumes in the region’s sheep market fluctuate seasonally. In the summer, when 
pastures are exhausted and pastoralists sell animals in larger numbers, prices are expected to 
go down. During the winter, when vegetation is abundant and producers retain the maxi-
mum number of sheep, prices increase (Khalil 2007; Allali, Dalil, and Mahdi 2002). The feast 
of  sacrifice,  id  al- adhaʿ ʾ ,  has a special  role  regardless  of  season and is  accompanied by a 
‘strong  price  increase  for  live  animals’  (Khalil  2007,  108).  My  fieldwork  team  generally 
observed that sheep prices vary widely; they are normally negotiated on the spot rather than 
arranged in advance.
The survey data do not offer detailed insights into the influence of drought on price for-
mation. Historically, it  is  assumed that drought in Morocco ‘increased the price of staple 
foods,  and  urban  residents  curtailed  their  consumption  of  meat,  a  consumable  luxury’ 
(Holden 2009, 76), thus reducing the demand for livestock. I assume this pattern to be less 
valid today. On the one hand, drought has become an omnipresent phenomenon that can 
affect a region’s food production in any given year; on the other, today’s information and 
transportation infrastructure, combined with integrated world markets, makes it possible to 
compensate for drought-linked food scarcity in a given location. Nevertheless, pastoralists in 
the high plateaus speak of socio-economic drought as jafaf nta  al-suqʿ , ‘drought of the market’ 
(DPA Figuig 2006, 7, my translation).
Turning to my survey data once more, I start with seasonal trade patterns. The total of  
animals sold by all respondents amounted to 9,824 sheep during the 2008 idʿ ; 10,318 in the 
winter of 2008–9; and 15,061 during the summer of 2009. In other words, the average number 
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of sheep sold per pastoral household amounted to 27 before the idʿ ; 29 in the winter; and 42 
in the summer. These figures underline the greater number of sheep sold during the summer 
months.  By contrast,  the often assumed importance of the festival of sacrifice is  not con-
firmed by this data. For the average pastoral household in the northern plateaus, the  idʿ  is 
apparently not the single big event where most of a year’s transaction volume is realized. 
Instead, sales are distributed across the whole year. This makes sense given the frequently 
heard statement by herd owners with no significant second source of income: ‘I sell one or  
two animals whenever I need some money.’ Herd size does not seem to be an influencing 
factor: small and large flock owners exhibit basically the same marketing patterns across the 
seasons.
Are these fluctuations in trade volume reflected in prices? Calculated from my sample, 
the mean prices obtained for daghma sheep and the bargiyya crossbreed at different times of 
the year are given in the table below. For the upcoming 2009 idʿ , the expected prices were 
higher than those of the previous year. Generally, the peaking demand at the  idʿ  is clearly 
reflected in prices, and bargiyya are slightly more lucrative than daghma sheep in general. My 
low case numbers for bayda (Awlad Jalal) sheep prices do not allow a comparison. Interest-
ingly, despite the larger sales volume in the summertime, prices in the summer are some-
what higher than in the winter, which runs counter to a simple supply-demand equation and 
received wisdom. Some other factors that determine animal prices must be at work. The 
annual influx of Moroccan emigrants who return home during the summer months and are 
comparatively wealthy certainly plays a role, as does the fact that marriages and the like are 
usually celebrated in the summer.
Last idʿ Last winter Last summer Upcoming idʿ
Daghma 1,397 954 1,004 1,453
Bargiyya 1,444 1,034 1,064 1,517
Table 8: Average sheep sales price (dh per animal)
Other elements that have an influence on sheep prices include a pastoralist’s membership in 
a cooperative; and this, in turn, is related to their herd size, as Table 7 above demonstrates. 
While 43 percent of the large herd owning households have one or more co-op members, 
only 23 percent of the very small livestock keepers do. In terms of sheep sales, those who 
state being in a cooperative tend to obtain slightly higher prices in summer and winter, but  
not during the idʿ . Mobile nomads achieve lower prices than sedentary people (former and 
non-nomads). Those who hold a public office are paid far better prices than those who do 
not, except for the idʿ  – although case numbers are low, so care needs to be taken in extrapo-
lating.
The  general  impression is  that  people  who command higher  levels  of  social  capital, 
expressed in access to networks and formal institutions, employ it to accumulate financial 
gains. They are less dependent on individual intermediary traders and thus have a stronger 
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position in bargaining. In the days before the idʿ , these systematic differences disappear and 
everybody seems to enjoy equal economic opportunities.
When addressing the issue of cross-border sheep trade, I should first note that reliable 
information is almost impossible to obtain,  as these activities are illegal due to the long-
standing closure of the Moroccan-Algerian border. Yet, two indicators give hints as to who 
may be involved in this business: the percentage of Awlad Jalal sheep someone possesses, 
since they were originally brought from Algeria; and the proportion of animals sold each 
year in relation to the current herd size. Starting with the latter, it turns out that 39 percent of 
those who own sheep have, throughout the past year, sold at least as many animals as they 
owned at the time of the interview. This phenomenon is most distinctly found among the 
very small owners (see Table 7 above) whose turnover is almost twice their entire stock, and 
decreases with growing herd size. Khalil, in his study, found essentially the same pattern 
and concluded that the smallest herd owners were the most active in sheep speculation and 
smuggling (Khalil 2007). There are other possible explanations, however. Natural growth of 
the flock can lead to a surplus; or the majority of herds could simply have shrunk during the 
past year (since 2008–9 was a year with abundant rainfall, this is unlikely). It is quite com-
mon among the region’s pastoralists to purchase a number of sheep, fatten them for a few 
weeks, and then re-sell them for a profit. Others buy and sell livestock within a single market 
day, trying to take advantage of intra-day price variations, and thereby become part of the 
intermediary network described above. One large herder told me that he preferred selling a 
large number of sheep once a year (in spring) rather than a few every week. There seem to be 
different marketing strategies that complement one another.
If taken with a grain of salt, trade volume numbers can serve as an indicator of cross-bor-
der trade activities, and the same is true for the share of bayda sheep in a household’s animal 
stock since they are brought directly from Algeria. The survey suggests, surprisingly, that  
almost  none of  the interviewed pastoralists  claim to own animals  of  the Algerian breed; 
bargiyya sheep, on the other hand, are very popular. Across the interviewed livestock-owning 
households, the average herd size is 159 sheep, including 71 of the local daghma and 82 of the 
bargiyya crossbreed. A few other breeds can be found as well. Herd compositions are very 
heterogeneous, but the essential finding is that, in the northern high plateaus, the Algerian 
breed is not present in large numbers, whereas the mixed breed has become even more pop-
ular than the local one.
The larger the herd, the higher the proportion of  bargiyya sheep tends to be (Table  7 
above). This observation is somewhat at odds with the non-linear distribution of sheep types 
reported by Khalil (2007), and if taken as an indicator of involvement in smuggling activities, 
plainly  contradicts  what  I  just  concluded about  sales  volumes,  namely  that  the  smallest 
herders are most active in cross-border trade. My interpretation is that, in the past 20 years 
and at least in the northern plateaus, the Algerian breed has become much less relevant than 
suggested by previous studies, while its cross-bred bargiyya offspring is now so common that 
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its breeding can no longer be seen as an indicator of specific economic strategies. The Awlad 
Jalal and subsequent bargiyya introduction can, if this is true, be understood as a typical inno-
vation process where the early adopters were to be found among medium and large herd 
owners. Once the viability of the new crossbreed was proven, large owners entered into the 
business and massively increased their bargiyya stocks in order to maximize profits.
Innovation is a hallmark of pastoral economies (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013), whose 
protagonists often need to adapt their methods to subtle changes in environmental condi-
tions. One example mentioned earlier is the growing reliance on supplementary fodder. As 
Table  7 above demonstrates, two thirds of the medium and large herds today completely 
depend on feed supplementation; the remaining ones do so most of the time. The minuscule 
number of pastoralists who rely only on the natural pastures without using any extra fodder 
tend to be small herd owners. In this respect, the situation appears more uniform than in the 
1990s (Khalil 2007). This could be due to extended drought and pasture degradation, which 
are cited by most pastoralists of the region as the main reasons for recurring to supplemen-
tary fodder. Another reason for the use of external inputs is the fattening of sheep before they 
are sold. This value generation method is now practiced by nine out of ten large owners, but  
by only about half of the very small and small ones. Even the rate of mobile telephone own-
ership is highest among the sheep-rich (see Table  7 above). Adoption of new technologies 
and accumulation of wealth tend to go hand in hand.
Such rather recent innovations are indicated linguistically by loanwords. Fattening, for 
instance, is locally known as girasa or tigras (from French engraissement), and fodder troughs 
as mijwar, pl.  majawir (from French mangeoire). These words have been twisted beyond easy 
recognition to conform to dialectal Arabic morphological patterns, which goes to show the 
extent to which things of foreign origin have been appropriated. This is a common process in 
Moroccan Arabic in general, with many examples of borrowings from French and other lan-
guages – but these two examples seem to be specific to the high plateaus. In actor-network 
terms, as new actants are being integrated into existing networks, alignments are forged (Li 
2007, 286). There is usually suspicion toward the innovation at first, followed by experimen-
tation, which may lead to firm establishment and routinization in the end. Bruno Latour has 
identified  four  phases  of  this  process  that  should  be  followed  whenever  a  new  actor 
demands to become part of a collective:  perplexity—consultation—hierarchization—institution 
(Latour 2004).  Repeating the new names frequently enough eventually leads to them not 
sounding strange any more.  Majawir and  tigras have become elements of daily life. In this 
process, they have changed not just the collective’s setup, but also their own identities by 
assuming hybrid linguistic forms.
To round off my account of the region’s sheep economy, I will now address the ways in 
which globally observable tendencies of neoliberalization have expressed themselves in the 
Moroccan steppe over the past few decades.
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 2.7 Neoliberal Policies: Free Trade and Green Morocco
One of the assumptions underlying my approach to drought in eastern Morocco is that the 
globally dominant neoliberal agenda has not been able to deliver on its promises of universal 
progress, growth, and liberation. In 2016, one of the institutions that has been perpetuating 
this ideology, the International Monetary Fund, even started questioning some of its basic 
assumptions in a paper (Ostry,  Loungani,  and Furceri  2016).  Its  authors characterize the 
neoliberal agenda as resting on two key premises: ‘increased competition—achieved through 
deregulation and the opening up of  domestic  markets,’  and ‘a smaller role  for the state,  
achieved through privatization and limits on the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits 
and accumulate debt’ (Ostry, Loungani, and Furceri 2016, 38). The element of competition is 
expressed in Morocco’s numerous free trade agreements, while elements of the push for pri-
vatization become evident in the government’s current plan for agricultural development.
In this chapter, I will address the effects neoliberal practices have had on the nomadic 
community in the eastern Moroccan steppes, focusing particularly on the livestock economy. 
By discussing free trade and the Green Morocco development plan, I hope to contribute to a 
better understanding of current and future developments of the political-economic setting 
these livestock producers operate in. In view of my research question, such knowledge may 
be helpful for an analysis of what drought can do when it is added to this mix. It has repeat -
edly  been  observed  that  ‘economic  globalization  and  neoliberal  reforms  combine  with 
drought stresses to mount pressure on small farmers,’ first and foremost (Kallis 2008, 101). 
One aspect of this mechanism is that policies of so-called structural adjustment, which were 
implemented in many countries including Morocco starting in the 1980s (Pfeifer 1999), sys-
tematically  scale  back public  safety nets  and subsidies  for  health or  educational  services 
(Kallis 2008). This leaves citizens loaded with higher risk burdens that can easily overwhelm 
resource-poor families in case of crisis (such as drought).
For rural environments in particular, three broad manifestations of neoliberal policymak-
ing have been identified: first, the removal of subsidies for agriculture, combined with trade 
reforms  that  affect  marketing  mechanisms;  second,  a  growing  commodification  of  rural 
ecosystems; and third, new ‘technologies of rule’ that promote certain forms of market disci-
pline and auditing processes (Higgins et al. 2014, 386). In assemblage theory, this last point 
corresponds to the process of ‘rendering technical’ (Li 2007, 286) mentioned earlier. Reflect-
ing these global concerns, the pastoral livestock breeders of eastern Morocco face several spe-
cific implications of free trade for their own livelihood security.
The  Moroccan sheep meat  sector  is  currently  almost  completely  sealed  off  from the 
world market.6 High tariffs protect domestic producers from foreign competition, so there 
are no official imports or exports of sheep meat or live sheep of any noteworthy volume. For 
about a decade, however, Morocco has witnessed a rush of bilateral and regional free trade 
6 Parts of the following discussion have been published before (Breuer and Kreuer 2011).
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agreements. Increasingly, these agreements encompass all economic realms, including agri-
culture, which had long been considered a ‘sensitive’ sector.
While negotiations with the European Union have progressed only slowly, the agree-
ment signed with the United States in 2004 concerns all sectors; all trade barriers are to be 
removed by 2031. For agricultural products, a complete liberalization is to take place signifi-
cantly before that date. The agreements include only two exceptions to this rule where quo-
tas will be established: namely, for red meat and wheat imports into Morocco. The wheat 
quota is indexed and will vary according to domestic production, whereas red meat imports 
will only be liberalized for high-quality products (so-called Hilton meat) that do not bear on 
Moroccan producers.  For standard meat,  the existing protections will  remain intact apart 
from a negligible quota. The EU is not likely to obtain more favorable conditions due to a 
clause in the US agreement that would automatically adjust its terms accordingly (Akesbi 
2009 and pers. comm.).
Paralleling these free trade agreements, the Green Morocco Plan (Mukhattat al-Maghrib al-
akhdar in Arabic, Plan Maroc Vert in French) was launched in 2008. The plan’s authors, consul-
tants  with  the  McKinsey  &  Co.  firm,  do  not  elaborate  on  its  theoretical  underpinning, 
although market-oriented neoliberal assumptions have evidently informed it. It is seen as a 
political instrument that aims to make Moroccan agriculture competitive on the world mar-
ket. Although the plan has not been made available in any detail, it officially consists of two 
pillars: the quick development of modern agriculture through ‘poles of growth’ to become 
competitive, with high value added production, adapted to market rules, on the one hand; 
and the ‘upgrading of vulnerable actors’ and the fight against rural poverty by improving 
farm incomes through trickle-down effects on the other (ADA 2010). Green Morocco is thus 
supposed to attract massive investments into the country’s agriculture, to improve both pro-
ductivity and rural incomes, to increase exports, and to create numerous additional jobs in 
the long run (Koné 2010). However, budgetary provisions reveal that the first pillar is given 
absolute  priority  by  planners,  while  the  livelihoods  of  small  scale  producers  are  largely 
neglected (Akesbi 2009).
In the livestock sector, the plan aims to improve domestic supply in terms of meat qual-
ity and price, namely by increasing production; and within the second pillar, it strives to 
upgrade the sheep meat commodity chain to ‘make it a social driving force’ (what precisely 
this means remains unclear), and to double or triple the livestock producers’ income (Ben-
lekhal 2009; ADA 2010). This is to be achieved through an ‘integrated approach’ following 
the model of the National Association of Sheep and Goat Breeders (ANOC) where small 
breeders’ resources are pooled into larger productive units. Another axis of development is 
the opening up of export opportunities for niche products; moreover, a modernization of 
slaughtering facilities and distribution networks is aimed for, notably the installation of cool-
ing systems. In terms of export facilitation, the plans stipulate the gradual removal of tariff 
barriers (Benlekhal 2009).
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While it has been pointed out that the policies laid out in the Green Morocco Plan will 
likely have negative impacts for the rural poor in general (Akesbi 2012), the implications for 
pastoral production are mixed. Most producers already depend on supplemental feeding to 
some  degree.  When  imported  barley  becomes  available  at  low,  but  at  times  fluctuating 
prices, an even stronger conversion to feed-dependent production systems might be a first 
consequence,  with increased profits  for livestock breeders.  On the downside,  this  depen-
dence on the world market would expose them to price fluctuations and thus create new vul-
nerabilities, in addition to severe long-term effects from undermining domestic grain pro-
duction and forgoing a promotion of food sovereignty.
The Green Morocco Plan is only one in a series of modernization projects targeted at 
Moroccan agriculture in the past few decades. Until now, these have not caused major dis-
ruption to pastoral systems. However, the new plan raises two main concerns: the prospect 
of increasing rangeland fragmentation and conversion to more intensive agricultural use, 
and the danger of growing economic inequality.
Through public-private partnerships, 80,000 ha of farmland throughout the country had 
been leased to investors by 2010, with more acreage poised to follow (Koné 2010). This has so 
far only lightly affected pastoral areas, but a large-scale plantation project, 243 hectares in 
size, has sprung up in the midst of the eastern Moroccan steppe near Murayja. This planta-
tion of 38,000 olive trees was originally established in 2005-6 as a development experiment by 
an institution from the United Arab Emirates and subsequently handed over to the Moroccan 
state which started looking for a lessee. The bidding process was eventually won by a live-
stock functionary and businessman, Abderrahmane Mejdoubi, whom I quoted earlier as an 
adherent of the view that nomadism will change rather than disappear (ch. 1.1, p. 14). If he 
manages the plantation well for 18 years, he will have the right to acquire it for a ‘derisory 
price,’ in his own words. The installation of a drip irrigation system was heavily subsidized 
by the state at 80% of the costs, and the purchase of a tractor at 40% (with funds from the  
Green Morocco Plan). A tribal leader (na ibʾ ) had granted the land concession to the Emirati 
project back in the day. The rent Mejdoubi pays is collected by a government agency and dis-
bursed to the collective of local stakeholders in the nebulous form of ‘social projects and the 
like,’ according to the investor.
Should the example of the olive plantation be copied more widely in the context of the 
expansion of Green Morocco Plan policies, an increasing fragmentation and territorial dis-
ruption of the available rangelands can be expected. This would likely have adverse effects  
on soils and sheep, plants and people (see the discussion in ch. 2.4, p. 72). In addition, impor-
tant  questions  have  to  be  asked about  the  sustainability  of  agricultural  intensification.  I  
touched upon these issues in my earlier discussion of the aquifer (ch. 2.2, p. 63).
While modernist or neoliberal ideas may be an almost hegemonic form of thinking in 
political institutions around the world’s metropolises, resonances of such notions can also be 
found in the Moroccan highlands. The qa idʾ  of the Bani Mathar tribe, an educated outsider 
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posted to the region for a couple of years, presented this view of the aquifer-fed crop cultiva-
tion  in  the  oasis:  ‘The  region  is  underexploited.  These  people  are  herders,  not  farmers. 
Instead of alfalfa, which yields perhaps 100 bales (at 40-50 dh each) per hectare, they could 
grow vegetables.’ The typical marketing price of one bale of alfalfa is indeed 40 dh, according 
to my survey data. In addition, the fodder plant demands a lot of water to grow: ‘It requires 
700 to 1000 kg of water to produce 1 kg of dry fodder, while other fodder crops may use only 
25 to 30% of that for the same yield’ (Le Houérou 1996, 167). More efficient water use by the  
area’s  farmers  might  lead to  substantial  production increases,  not  just  in  terms of  crops 
grown, but also by utilizing water-saving techniques. The open half-tube irrigation canals 
that run across the fields of Ayn Bani Mathar had in fact surprised me on my very first visitʿ  
to the town, as they seemed liable to produce massive amounts of evaporation in the daily 
heat.
The Green Morocco Plan’s emphasis on upgrading, modernization, and quality improve-
ment poses the question which kind of livestock producers will be able to keep up with the  
envisaged intensification efforts and who will benefit from them. Previous experience shows 
that, in the eastern Moroccan highlands at least, each wave of modernization and innovation 
has exacerbated social polarization among sheep breeders. The advent of motorized trans-
portation, for instance, was accompanied by the emergence of a small group of large-scale, 
highly mobile producers, while the majority of small-scale immobile producers were gradu-
ally pushed out of pastoral livestock production (Bourbouze 2006).
The Plan suggests that the sheep meat sector develop export products with high added 
value, and concentrate on primary markets like the European union – mainly butcheries that 
cater to Muslim populations – as well as African and Arab countries (ADA 2010). In a related 
move, the breeders’ association ANOC is trying to establish its own label for the Bani Gil  
breed and get into certification by creating Protected Geographical Indications according to 
EU regulations (Fagouri 2009). Such efforts tie in with emerging global discourses on the pro-
motion  and  protection  of  agrobiodiversity,  local  knowledge,  and  heritage  (Ben  Hounet, 
Brisebarre, and Guinand 2016). Again, it is safe to assume that ‘modernized,’ well-equipped 
producers would obtain privileged access to such opportunities, while the majority of small-
scale producers would be excluded, particularly in view of the required standards for export 
markets. At the same time, the Green Morocco Plan also includes the rubric of ‘sanitary secu-
rity of livestock and meat quality’ under which it pledges to fight informal structures and 
smuggling  –  both  important  resources  for  the  poorest  herders’  livelihoods.  Pastoralism 
expert Alain Bourbouze predicts that we will soon see, in the region,
‘a class of very large herd owners (600 to 3,000 sheep or more) occupy most of these  
steppe spaces: well-equipped, strongly motorized, highly adapted to the context, culti-
vating vast fields of cereals in aleatory production, living in town with their entire fam-
ilies,  leaving their flocks under the supervision of hired herders who live in tents.’ 
(Bourbouze 2006, 34–35, my translation)
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There would be no business left for medium and small producers in this scenario.
In the age-old debate about whether the market or the state is best suited to provide 
equal development opportunities and livelihood security for an entire population, the Green 
Morocco Plan marks a further movement away from state agencies and toward private enter-
prises.  Since  these  policies  tend to  be  implemented as  a  continued silent  transformation 
rather than an abrupt shift, it is difficult to fathom their concrete impacts on drought assem-
blages. Evidence from similar settings hints at the danger that the poorest members of local 
communities face increased drought vulnerability in the future.
The political drift toward favoring private enterprises over the efforts of public institu-
tions is relatively recent in this part of Morocco. In the past, publicly funded initiatives have 
been dominant, often in the form of development projects. The next chapter portrays the 
most important one at the time of my research.
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Precursors of contemporary development discourses date back at least to the French colo-
nization of North Africa, which officially started with the invasion of Ottoman-controlled 
Algiers in 1830. The environmental narrative that emerged in the following years holds as a 
key tenet that the Maghreb used to be a fertile and productive agricultural region at the time 
of the Romans. By the 1870s, it had become general knowledge that this formerly prosperous 
landscape had in principle been degraded and deforested by ‘indigenous peoples, especially 
herders’ (Davis 2007, 2) since the influx of Hilalian tribes from the Arabian peninsula started 
in  the  eleventh century,  through ‘a  combination of  overgrazing,  itinerant  slash-and-burn 
farming, and a general “native improvidence”’ (Guerin 2016, 361). While this declensionist 
narrative has in the meantime been discredited as an ‘[e]nvironmental myth’ (Guerin 2016, 
361),  it  remains powerful  today in modified forms (cf.  my discussion of  desiccation and 
desertification in ch. 1.4, p. 38).
The key figure in France’s occupation of Moroccan territory was general Louis Hubert 
Lyautey, based in Algeria (see ch. 3.5, p. 144). His tribal policies in the high plateaus during 
the build-up to the occupation, while driven by geostrategical interests, also included devel-
opmental aspects, if only as a cheap and cynical way to buy support. As Lyautey wrote in  
November 1904, his strategy was to select a tribal group strong enough not to be attacked by 
others. This group would then ‘simply serve as a fulcrum for an intensive political action,  
enhanced by material and tangible pieces of bait,  subsidies, farming implements, medical 
assistance,  schools’  (Lyautey 1937,  130,  my translation).  Beyond such superficial  use,  the 
steppes remained untouched by development efforts in this early phase.
The subsequent French colonization of Morocco in the early 20th century did not so much 
affect the steppe regions in the form of occupation either, but was rather a colonization of  
‘supervision’  (Bourbouze 2006,  32,  my translation).  In the dominant  view,  non-sedentary 
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populations were an ‘anti-modern element that worked actively against material and cultural 
development’  (Guerin  2016,  334).  Unlike  sedentary  farmers,  nomads  did  therefore  not 
become  ‘targets  of  the  so-called  civilizing  mission’  (Guerin  2016,  334)  and  were  largely 
neglected in development schemes. Nevertheless, profound transformations of the eastern 
Moroccan economy started unfolding during the protectorate with an increased market inte-
gration, new income opportunities, and reduced mobility of humans and livestock (Bour-
bouze 2006).
One innovation concerned the rangeland vegetation directly: the extraction of esparto 
grass from the Moroccan high plateaus, which started in the late 1920s. The fibrous plants 
were sold by the French to Great Britain as raw material for the production of paper. In the  
process, the steppe vegetation was gradually degraded because annual grasses depended on 
the shade provided by esparto tufts (Steinmann 2001). For locals, working with the esparto 
companies provided a little side income that ‘became essential during big droughts’ (Paskoff 
1957, 54, my translation). While I will not provide a detailed ANT-style account here, this 
episode indicates yet another complex assemblage that drought was somehow an integral 
part  of,  together  with  unlikely  actors  such as  the  shade needed by  grass  species  or  the 
increasing demand for paper in Great Britain.
Regarding the region’s pastoralist  production, French administrators saw ‘the biggest 
obstacle to developing the livestock industry’ in the widely fluctuating animal numbers in 
the aftermath of droughts (Steinmann 2001, 57). In an effort to stabilize these numbers, they 
introduced veterinary services, first in Ayn Bani Mathar – which was then called Berguent –ʿ  
in the late 1920s. The drilling of wells and installation of water pumps in the 1930s (see ch. 
2.2, p. 63) was another attempt to achieve this goal. Yet overall, the negative colonial view of 
nomadic production remained intact. Writing at the time of Morocco’s independence and the 
end of the protectorate, a French academic described the treeless high plateaus as ‘desper-
ately monotonous’ (Paskoff 1957, 38, my translation) and lamented: ‘The livestock husbandry 
methods are, according to specialists, very defective’ (Paskoff 1957, 46, my translation). He 
piled further blame on the local population by concluding: ‘Modernization efforts risk being 
futile if the traditional mentality does not evolve’ (Paskoff 1957, 64, my translation). Besides 
such stereotypical expressions of an arrogant colonial mindset, more nuanced positions can 
be found as well. Some protectorate officials, at least, were perfectly aware of the disastrous 
effects expropriation policies were having, for instance on transhumance-based pastoral sys-
tems in western Morocco, but felt that they were not in a position to reverse these policies  
(Guerin 2016).
After the achievement of independence, not everything was turned upside down. The 
newly independent Kingdom perpetuated some of the French ideas and politics of agricul-
tural development for a long time. But the myth of the lost ‘granary of Rome’ was gradually 
replaced with the so-called California model of irrigated fruit and vegetable cultivation for 
export. This approach, by and large, has equally ‘failed to provide food security, raise rural 
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standards of living, or provide adequate foreign exchange earnings’ (Burke, III 2009, 107). 
Other development ideas have come and gone, but especially in the nomadic lands, they 
have had very limited success:
‘Many projects have tried hard, for about thirty years, to promote the development of 
these pastoral systems. All or most have failed, because they specialized too narrowly 
on strictly pastoral, ecological, and environmental aspects.’ (Bourbouze 2006, 39, my 
translation)
Another reason for this failure may be in the general logic of projects characterized by lim-
ited funding and duration, which typically precludes long-term perspectives (Abaab et al. 
1995). Partially in recognition of such difficulties, the plans for a new project, elaborated in 
the 1980s, had a slower and more multifaceted approach. This project was baptized Projet de  
développement des parcours et de l’élevage dans l’Oriental (Husbandry and Rangeland Develop-
ment Project in the Eastern region), PDPEO in short.
The PDPEO covers the entire high plateaus – not just my study area, but also the much 
bigger Bani Gil territories to the south. Its first phase was launched in 1990 by the Moroccan 
government, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the African Develop-
ment Bank; the second phase started in 2005 (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014). According to a 
quite recent publication, the main rationale behind the project was based on well-known 
degradation narratives, but now allocated part of the blame on climate change rather than 
exclusively holding local land users responsible:
‘Human activity, specifically overgrazing and cropping, and climate change are driv-
ing Moroccan rangelands in  the Eastern Highlands to degradation and inability  to 
maintain livestock anymore. This dreadful condition is becoming permanent and irre-
versible.’ (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 94)
This reflects not only an increased awareness and knowledge about the extent of climate 
change, but also an evolution of international development discourses which now include 
this term as an important keyword. Another characteristic of current thinking in this field is 
the insistence on improved ‘rangeland management’ in a late modern and capitalist spirit, 
which is also emphasized in various PDPEO documents. 
In  several  publications  that  compare  different  pastoral  development  initiatives,  the 
PDPEO has been presented as a positive model for other countries. One example sounds 
almost as if it were written for a glossy public relations brochure rather than a critical schol-
arly inquiry:
‘The assessment of this initiative shows how common management and restoration of 
traditional social systems may be a successful path to enhance governance and sustain-
able management of natural resources.’ (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 94)
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The PDPEO began in the early 1990s with the creation of lineage-based livestock coopera-
tives where all pastoralists were inscribed.7 Long touted as ‘a real success story’ (Tozy 2002, 
24, my translation), the project’s results on the ground have been mixed, however. Today, 
only a small proportion of herders seem to benefit from these new institutions, and some of 
the cooperatives’ headquarters in the northern high plateaus look rather decrepit. Less than 
one third of the sheep breeders in my sample acknowledged being members in a co-op, and 
some had ostensibly never heard of them, although in theory and according to public author-
ities, all pastoralists are formally enrolled. The same tendency was already observed years 
earlier: ‘In practice, local participation is marginal’ (Steinmann 2001, 22). An analysis of vil-
lage education committees established in India shows pertinent parallels, where the authors 
identify ideology, ignorance, and inertia as key factors behind the failure of many develop-
ment efforts:
‘Inspired by an ideology—people’s power is good—and designed in ignorance of what 
people  want  and how the village works,  it  was,  by  the  time we were  studying it, 
entirely  sustained by inertia.  No one had paid  any attention to it  for  many years, 
except for some bureaucrat somewhere who was making sure that all the boxes had 
been checked.’ (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 259)
When the PDPEO cooperatives were first created, they corresponded to administrative struc-
tures (about 30 sheikdoms,  mashyakhat,  in the entire project area). Subsequent sociological 
studies  found  that  solidarity  between  families  was  usually  effective  at  smaller  levels  of 
aggregation (Lazarev 2008). Despite a few shortcomings, some of the cooperatives are actu-
ally  thriving.  They have  created reserves  (mahmiyyat,  areas  protected  from grazing)  that 
strive, again in the diction of current international development jargon, to rationalize range-
land management and impede degradation. Large areas of grassland are closed off to every-
one for  a period so the vegetation can recover;  they are  then opened to co-op members 
against a small fee based on the number of sheep that are let in. In successful cases, a power-
ful institutional  actor has thus been established that  plays an important role  in land use 
negotiation. The cooperatives were superimposed on tribal structures (Mahdi 2009a) to rein-
vigorate them, unlike similar ones established earlier in Syria, which had sought to weaken 
and replace those structures – although with limited success (Chatty 2010). Political power 
struggles between leaders have, nevertheless, occurred within the PDPEO cooperatives and 
have led to several instances of fission and reorganization of these newly founded institu-
tions (Tozy 2002).
Looping back to the main topic of my thesis, I looked into the connections the PDPEO 
has built with drought. Naturally, drought has been recognized as an important topic in the 
second project phase. A 78-page evaluation report on drought risk management testifies to 
this (DPA Figuig 2006). Much like the bulk of contemporary drought literature (see ch. 1.4, p. 
38), the project puts an emphasis on measuring and taming ‘the drought hazard’ through the 
7 This and the following paragraph are adapted from an earlier publication (Kreuer 2011).
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improvement of early warning systems and the establishment of ‘mechanisms, programs, 
and procedures of drought risk management’ (DPA Figuig 2006, 5, my translation). But the 
report also contains a thoughtful analysis of drought effects and reactions which resonate 
with my own findings.
After the PDPEO was launched in 1990, a series of rainy years – combined with the mate-
rial benefits and support programs newly introduced by the project – allowed many herders,  
large and small, to increase their livestock holdings to unprecedented levels. The subsequent 
dry years of 1998-2000 threatened more animals than previous droughts had, and the author-
ities massively subsidized animal fodder to prevent livestock deaths. This policy caused pas-
toralists to keep their herd sizes high and rely completely on supplementary fodder to feed 
them, and it encouraged sedentarization and the expansion of agriculture. When the first 
project phase ended and several support programs were discontinued in the early 2000s, the 
rangelands were not able to regenerate as well as before, even under normal rain conditions, 
due to the changed system, and many impoverished pastoralists were gradually forced to 
give up their herds (DPA Figuig 2006). This analysis gives a new meaning to the expression 
of drought as a structural phenomenon: perhaps drought itself has not changed at all, but the 
transformed social and economic structures are no longer able to accommodate it in an ade-
quate  way.  The old  network  is  broken,  as  some actors  were  excluded and many others 
invited in, but the resulting new configuration has not yet found a stable form.
At an early stage of my fieldwork, I had a conversation with two employees of the Pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture (DPA) in Bouarfa (southern zone of the project) who had 
been involved in the implementation of the PDPEO. They gave a self-critical account by all 
means. A number of points stood out:
1. Vaccination of animals had increased since the launch of the project; supplementary 
feeding had skyrocketed. They also confirmed that a change in values was occurring: 
from collective toward individual decision-making.
2. After the first phase, the state had completely retreated. Two thirds of the coopera-
tives had collapsed. According to the two DPA men, there had been no genuine com-
mon  interest  in  keeping  them  operative  as  they  had  merely  been  imposed  from 
above. Government-decreed cooperatives, in this case under a socialist banner, had 
similarly  failed  to  achieve  the  desired  goals  in  neighboring  Algeria  in  the  1980s 
(Trautmann 1985). In PDPEO phase II, post-project plans were to be included in the 
hope of creating a more sustainable set of institutions. The top-down politics of the 
first phase, which had proved difficult to implement, were to be replaced by bottom-
up politics that came from the population.  Five groups of actors  were now to be 
specifically addressed: small, medium, and large herd owners, women, and young 
people.
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3. Three  government  agencies  were  pursuing  three  very  different  goals  in  the  high 
plateaus: nature conservation (High Commission for Waters, Forests and Desertifica-
tion Control), keeping the population in place (Ministry of the Interior), or intensify-
ing agricultural production (Ministry of Agriculture). This resulted in contradictions, 
conflicts, injustice and inefficiency on many levels. The long-awaited tripartite agree-
ment between those three agencies was not yet effective. This formal agreement had 
been initiated in 2006 ‘in order to resolve juridical conflicts over the management and 
administration of collective lands’ (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 105), but the negotia-
tions were still ‘under way’ and no evaluation could be made as of 2013 (Boutaleb 
and Firmian 2014, 106). This constellation shows that the Moroccan government often 
cannot be analyzed as a unified actor, an unproblematic punctualization, since it is 
itself  a  highly  complex  and  shifting  assemblage  of  various  entities,  ministries, 
employees,  policies, agencies, offices, press releases,  and so on. Each actor tries to 
impose its own interests and goals, in competition and sometimes complete antago-
nism with others.
4. The cooperatives established in the PDPEO project had not yet become ideal instru-
ments of collective resource management as a functional replacement for the older 
system. Of the 25 or 26 cooperatives in the southern part of the high plateaus, 40% at 
most were doing all  right,  were able to get things done (such as organizing their  
annual general meetings) without being pressed. In general, 80% of the project staff’s 
working time was being used for conflict management: there were countless disputes 
within cooperatives, between them and their neighbors, and concerning interventions 
by other state institutions (Interview with Mr Harrach and Mr El Omari, Bouarfa, 
November 6, 2008).
Based on this first glimpse into the PDPEO and some of its challenges, I formulated some 
questions for my 2009 survey. The statement that only large herders benefit from coopera-
tives was met with various degrees of agreement across the herd size categories (Figure 15).
 2.8 The PDPEO: Case Study of a Development Project 103
Figure 15: Evaluation of cooperatives by herd size
This issue had also anecdotally been recorded in a project evaluation report from 2002 in 
which one herder explained: ‘The pasture resting areas benefit large herders who have the 
means of transportation and are well-informed about their opening dates’ (FIDA 2002, 26, 
my translation). As might be expected, the largest herders tend to disagree most with this  
statement, but even among them, the majority agree or rather agree that the benefits of this  
institution do not accrue to everyone in an even way. The opinions on grazing reserves (mah-
miyyat) also diverge, but along different lines – they are related to the extent of a household’s  
dependence on livestock for income generation. The statement in the questionnaire read: ‘For 
me, the pasture reserves are very beneficial.’ This topic is quite controversial, as one half of  
the somewhat livestock-dependent households disagree and the other half agree (Figure 16). 
Non-pastoralists are overwhelmingly in favor of grazing reserves, presumably because the 
aesthetic and recreational value of a greener landscape does not come with any economic 
trade-offs for them.
Figure 16: Evaluation of reserves by income group
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I certainly do not want to give the impression that the entire PDPEO was a failure. Of course, 
the ‘innovative’ idea of community-based range management (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 
107) is not all bad and the efforts to initiate and carry out such projects are laudable. Appar-
ently, they are now ‘being replicated in Syria and Tunisia’ (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 107). 
Local cooperatives can surely be a more equitable alternative to unfettered corporate capital-
ism.  Other things  brought  to the high plateaus by the  project  have also  benefited many 
herders, such as improved veterinary services (FIDA 2002). But the many small failures and 
disappointments encountered throughout the PDPEO project seem to indicate a need for a 
more profound analysis of the actor-networks in question, and a more fine-tuned attention to 
their silently shifting connections.
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 3 Drought and the Tribal Community
There are other surprising implications of drought – more unexpected assemblages. These 
concern the tribal structure of human society in various ways, which will be the guiding line 
through this part of the thesis. One cannot really understand this society, I contend, without 
understanding drought.  As in the previous part,  identifying transformations  is  often the 
most useful starting point for my analysis. The statement by a physicist, ‘we understand the 
world by studying change, not by studying things’ (Rovelli 2018, 89), is equally valid for the 
social world. There will be a stronger emphasis on qualitative stories in this part, but I will 
also look at the survey data from new angles. My starting point is the perspective of the three 
tribes that make up the four municipalities in my study area of the northern high plateaus. 
Most of the municipalities are named after tribal groups: Awlad (the children of) Ghuzayyil, 
Awlad (the children of) Sidi Abd al-Hakim, and Bani (the sons of) Mathar refer to tribalʿ  
ancestral figures. Al-Murayja, in turn, means ‘the small pasture’ and clearly describes a land-
scape feature rather than a tribe. Importantly, Murayja and Awlad Ghuzayyil are considered 
territories of the same tribe, Awlad Sidi Ali Bu Shanafa. All municipalities ‘were defined onʿ  
the basis of tribal lands’ back in the 1980s (Boutaleb and Firmian 2014, 100). But do they still 
reflect  these divisions today? And how much socio-economic  variance  can they explain? 
Depending on the particular research topic, it may be more meaningful to identify and ana-
lyze alternative societal factions that are distinguished by education levels, capital access, 
land ownership, or other criteria. I will explore several of these possibilities in the following 
chapters, never completely forgetting the underlying question of how all these elements are 
part of various drought assemblages.
As one of the first questions, my 2009 survey questionnaire asked respondents for their 
tribal  affiliation.  The degree  of  correspondence  between self-identified tribal  groups  and 
administratively defined municipal territories varies, as Table 9 shows. It is highest in Awlad 
Sidi Abd al-Hakim with very few cases of divergence, and lowest in Bani Mathar, where cerʿ -
tain groups emphasize their lineage (Zuwayd) or village affiliation (Sahb al-Ghar) rather 
than the overarching tribal frame of reference. In Awlad Ghuzayyil, one in three interviewees 
prefers using the specific sub-group rather than the wider tribe (Awlad Sidi Ali). Such diverʿ -
gence  possibly  indicates  ongoing  processes  of  distinction,  fission,  and shifting  collective 
identities. Households affiliated with the southern federation of Bani Gil are present in three 
of the municipalities and form the largest allochthonous group overall.
It is worth noting that tribe-based units were not the only form of social organization 
even in the more distant past.  The daily  labor of  livestock management was carried out  
within voluntarily formed groups of six to ten families, the dawawir (plural form of duwwar), 
which usually brought together nomads of different lineages. These groups, however, had no 
names and did not contribute to the formation of collective identities (Rachik 2002).
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Awlad Ghuzayyil Murayja Bani Mathar Awlad  Sidi  Abdʿ  
al-Hakim
Dominant 
tribe
Awlad  Sidi  Ali  (46%)/ʿ
Awlad Ghuzayyil (34%)
Awlad  Sidi  Aliʿ  
(79%)/Murayja (4%)
Bani Mathar (50%) Awlad  Sidi  Abdʿ  
al-Hakim (91%)
Other 
tribes
Bani Gil (4%)
Awlad Bin Ya qub (4%)ʿ
Awlad Bu Ras (7%) Bani Gil (11%)
Zuwayd/Mahaya 
(10%)
Sahb al-Ghar (9%)
Awlad Sidi Ali (4%)ʿ
Bani Gil (3%)
Table 9: Tribes and municipalities in the survey
Taking  the  three  categories  of  mobility  analyzed  earlier  (nomads,  former  nomads,  non-
nomads) as a starting point, the following chart shows their distribution across the munici-
palities. It turns out that this distribution is all but uniform, even though all three categories  
can be found in each municipality.
Figure 17: Nomads per municipality
The most characteristically nomadic region of all is, clearly, that of Awlad Ghuzayyil, with 
almost half of the sample population made up of active nomads; but even here, one in four 
household heads has only ever known a sedentary lifestyle. In Bani Mathar, on the other end 
of the spectrum, more than half of today’s families have always been settled and only a small 
fraction of households are still mobile. The overall number of formerly nomadic households 
is high at 36% across the study region – one in three families has thus abandoned mobile pas-
toralism  within  the  current  generation.  On  the  national  level,  this  tendency  continues 
unabated: between 2004 and 2014 alone, Morocco’s nomadic population decreased by a stag-
gering 63% according to official census figures (HCP 2016, 1).
Processes of general sedentarization have been ‘all but completed’ in the pastoral com-
munities of neighboring Algeria and Tunisia (Bourbouze 2006, 36, my translation) and are 
observable in many other drylands of the world. In the case of Algeria, they were driven by 
French colonial  politics  after  the occupation of  1830 and accelerated by drought-induced 
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crises (Trautmann 1989, 128). While sedentarization is sometimes actively promoted or even 
enforced by government agencies and has yielded highly problematic outcomes (Blench and 
Marriage 1999), the impetus for settling down in Morocco, as in most pastoralist communi-
ties (Fratkin 1997), comes from within the population. It could thus be termed ‘voluntary 
sedentarisation’ (Emadi 1995, 25).
A conversation I witnessed between a clerk of the Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim municipalʿ -
ity and a local citizen summarized a major bone of contention in this context.  The herd-
owner, who lived in the steppe, asked for an extension of public services: ‘We need a road, 
we need electricity, we need a school and a hospital.’ The official replied: ‘Well, but we can-
not build a road and a school for every tent. If you get a bunch of families together in one  
place, we may be able to do something there.’ Whether new villages will one day be formed 
in this manner remains to be seen; it would require a profound change in lifestyles. One rea-
son that neighboring tents are usually set up at a considerable distance from one another (2-5 
km according to Lazarev 2008), apart from notions of privacy and respect, is the practical  
concern of keeping the herds clearly separated.
What follows is a further exploration of the four municipalities in order to tease out 
some key differences between them. At this point, one might be inclined to think that they all 
follow  similar  paths  of  development,  partially  driven  by  drought,  from  old-fashioned 
nomadism toward modernity and urbanization, and are merely at different stages in this 
process. I would like to caution against such over-generalizing and teleological views, as 
innovation tends to take place in different areas of a society and to follow slightly unpre-
dictable paths. And yet, linear narratives of progress influence people’s behavior and can 
turn into self-fulfilling prophecies. Crises like drought sometimes increase the pace of inno-
vation: for one, they reveal existing tensions; moreover, they may serve as a justification for 
previously unacceptable behavior, legitimizing and accelerating processes of change (Solway 
1994). This role of drought as a catalyst may be less important in a setting of ubiquitous,  
‘structural’  drought  such  as  the  high  plateaus  today  (cf.  ch.  1.1,  p.  14),  but  innovation 
remains a key indicator of change even here. One visible aspect of innovation is linked to 
new technologies penetrating into the households. A number of these are displayed in the 
following table:
Awlad Ghuzayyil Murayja Awlad Sidi Abdʿ  
al-Hakim
Bani Mathar
HH size, mean 9.2 8.0 7.6 7.0
HH with TV 28% 61% 14% 79%
HH with refrigerator 21% 36% 6% 62%
HH with cell phone 89% 96% 84% 85%
HH that own a truck 41% 13% 29% 2%
Table 10: Characteristics of the four municipalities
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Arranged by descending degrees of nomadism, Table  10 confirms an earlier observation: 
nomads tend to have larger families than sedentary residents, and this is clearly reflected on 
the level of municipalities. But a look at various items available to each household reveals 
very different  lines of  distinction.  The prevalence  of  television sets  and refrigerators,  for 
example, is highest in peri-urban Bani Mathar, as could be expected; but it is followed by 
Murayja, despite the fact that one in three families is still nomadic there. Virtually every fam-
ily in Murayja has a cell phone, too, while all remaining municipalities are at lower levels 
ranging from 84 to 89 percent. A different order emerges when one looks at the ownership of 
trucks: Awlad Ghuzayyil is in the lead here, followed by Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim resiʿ -
dents. Each municipality seems to have its own, unique mix of lifestyle characteristics and 
economic strategies.
A basic indicator in my questionnaire is a question about the respondent’s satisfaction 
with their own economic situation (with four options: very good, rather good, rather bad, or 
very bad). The distribution of responses turns out to be very similar across the municipali-
ties, with most of the respondents evaluating their situation as rather good (54%) or rather 
bad (30%). However, changes in this domain over the past five years are judged differen-
tially: residents of Awlad Ghuzayyil and Murayja view their recent economic past in a much 
more positive light than the two tribes in the east (Figure 18). No less than one in two fami-
lies here perceives an improvement, and only small groups believe they have experienced an 
economic deterioration. For people in Bani Mathar and Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, on theʿ  
other hand, the main impression is one of stagnation. Economic winners and losers, hence, 
are not spread evenly across the pastoral communities. This variegated self-evaluation is also 
reflected in other insights from my household survey.
Figure 18: Assessment of economic evolution by municipality
The next statistic offers an explanation as to why so many families in Murayja possess TV 
sets and fridges. Figure  19 displays the forms of habitat in each municipality: How many 
families live in tents, how many in houses? Once more, clear differences between the four 
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zones become visible. On the extreme ends, there are hardly any residents of Bani Mathar 
and especially Murayja without a solid house and hardly any citizens of Awlad Sidi Abd al-ʿ
Hakim without a tent. Members of the Awlad Sidi Ali tribe display the highest preferenceʿ  
for combining the best of both worlds, increasing their economic options through the posses-
sion of both a permanent home and a mobile one. Of course, this is not just a matter of wish/
desire as a driver of assemblage building, but of commanding over the right connections to 
other  actants  that  facilitate  the  construction of  a  house:  labor power,  building materials, 
acquaintances who can help out, financial means, skills, etc. Things that make a difference 
from one municipality to another certainly include the ease of access by road and the admin-
istrative stance toward new construction – while it is tolerated or even promoted in urbaniz-
ing zones like Murayja and Bani Mathar, the construction of homes in the middle of the 
steppe is discouraged or straight-out forbidden.
Figure 19: Type of residence by municipality
This topic is related to a survey question about each family’s immediate surroundings: how 
many tents and how many houses are visible from their current place of residence? The aver-
aged answers are strongly differentiated by municipality and provide an important insight 
into settlement densities (Table  11). The urban character of the villages surrounding Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar, i.e., the Bani Mathar municipality, is reflected in the high number of neighbor-
ing houses and the almost negligible number of tents nearby. Murayja exhibits similar char-
acteristics, but on a smaller scale. Residents of Awlad Ghuzayyil see about the same number 
of tents and solid houses around their homes on average, an observation that is at odds with 
the nomadic reputation of this municipality. Then again, the frequency of tents is highest 
here. Furthermore, the fact that the overall numbers for houses are much higher than for  
tents has everything to do with agglomeration, as tents are usually set up with a considerable 
distance between one another. The lowest density of visible neighbors is found in Awlad Sidi 
Abd al-Hakim, where tents are clearly dominant. Part of this comparatively low concentraʿ -
tion also has to do with topography, however: this is a more hilly terrain than the wide open 
plain to the west, which limits lines of sight.
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Awlad Ghuzayyil Murayja Bani Mathar Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ
Tents visible 11 4 2 8
Houses visible 12 22 41 2
Table 11: Tents and houses visible from current home
The built environment and the interaction with neighbors arguably contribute to an individ-
ual’s self-perception, and changes in their composition may indicate social transformations. 
But as mentioned earlier, nomadic mobility is often not at the heart of people’s identities in 
the high plateaus. Therefore, we also asked the survey respondents how many of their rela-
tives were living in the steppe ( urubiyyaʿ ). Apparently, most respondents have relatives both 
in the steppe and outside (i.e., in town). Only very few families have lost all (or never had  
any) ties to the urubiyyaʿ  lifestyle, and they are mostly found in the vicinity of the urbanizing 
center of Ayn Bani Mathar (Figure ʿ 20). Some persons in my sample might also be the last 
members of their extended families who still hold out in the steppe despite the pushing force 
of drought and the pulling force of new opportunities in town.
Figure 20: Relatives living in the steppe by municipality
In this regard, the four municipalities show a rather uniform makeup. The dryland environ-
ment dominates lifestyles to a considerable extent. I will summarize my findings on the most 
salient differences between the municipalities in the final part of this thesis. What follows 
now in my quest to multiply the perspectives and potential actants involved in drought 
assemblages in eastern Morocco is a closer look at the tribes themselves. They still seem to  
constitute an important form of collective organization.
 3.1 What is in a Tribe: Identities, Elites, Gender Issues
How can the three tribes that make up the study area be characterized?8 The usefulness of 
the concept of tribe (Arabic:  qabila  or ashiraʿ ) is the subject of much argument (Bouderbala 
8 Some of the material presented here has been published previously (Kreuer 2011).
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2007), and the wide range of definitions and perceptions of what a tribe is, or should be, add 
to its problematic nature. Moreover, the manifold, sometimes overlapping subdivisions and 
superordinate structures of actual tribes – which are always prone to processes of fission and 
fusion – preclude overly simplifying statements.  In a sense, ‘tribe is an enigma’ (Isidoros 
2018, 223) to outside observers. An eastern Moroccan informant told me: ‘In our tribe… there 
are about thirty or forty tribes, or more,’ using the word qabila both times. Given such com-
plexities, I do not consider it important here to establish a theoretical terminology that accu-
rately separates between all units; rather, the aim is to describe groups as they materialize in 
everyday situations. For the purpose of this study, therefore, I adhere to the observed con-
gruence between tribes and the denomination of rural municipalities.
In daily life, an individual’s tribal affiliation serves as an important expression of iden-
tity. I witnessed how two adolescents met and greeted an adult tribesman who did not know 
them personally. He asked them: ‘So who are you?’ One of them, who was from the same 
tribe (Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim in this case), answered: ‘I am the son of So-and-So.’ ‘Ah yes,ʿ  
I  know  him.’  The  other  boy  said:  ‘I  am  a  Gili [i.e.,  belonging  to  the  Bani  Gil],  Awlad 
Mubarak,’ giving just his tribe. ‘Welcome.’ This small conversation indicates that, in theory, 
any male adult member of the tribe knows every other family head as well as their relation in 
the tribe’s genealogy. They see themselves as linked to a common ancestor (Mahdi 2009a).
There is, in fact, an occasion where all tribe members convene in one place. This annual 
festival, held in the summer, is called wa daʿ  and usually happens at a religious shrine con-
nected to the tribal lore. Large marquees are set up for several days; there is food and danc-
ing, and equestrian performances take place. From an actor-network perspective, one can 
observe that various ‘prestige objects and goods’ (Ben Hounet and Guinand 2016, 257) are 
brought together during the festival;  this assemblage,  in turn, makes the tribe itself  hold 
together.  The  wa daʿ  is  also an occasion when political issues are discussed and decisions 
made, and serve as a ‘conflict resolution space’ (Ben Hounet and Guinand 2016, 253). Hence, 
the eastern Moroccan tribe is not only an imagined community akin to large confederations 
elsewhere (Büssow 2011), but also has a basis in face-to-face contacts between all its male 
adult members. I am not sure whether most women share a similar sense of knowing every 
family in their tribe. Recent anthropological research among Sahrawi nomads shows that 
women there constantly create, maintain, and expand tightly knit networks of affectionate 
kin relations across the landscape. Female daily interactions, from this perspective, are much 
more important in holding the community together than the somewhat erratic male ‘circula-
tion’ over longer distances and time scales (Isidoros 2018, 147). Whether similar patterns exist 
in my study area is an open question.
The most  influential  tribal  confederation in eastern Morocco are the Bani Gil,  whose 
homeland lies to the south of my study area. Ideally, the functioning of such large confedera-
cies  is  characterized  by  two  complimentary  principles:  aggregation  and  segmentation 
(Lazarev 2008). Segmentation allows an optimal use of scarce and complementary resources 
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and prevails ‘during times of peace and abundance’ (Steinmann 2001, 43). Aggregation, on 
the other hand, serves to defend tribal territories against external adversaries and is intensely 
practiced ‘during times of drought and war’ (Steinmann 2001, 43). Once again, drought is a 
key component of social dynamics.
Smaller subdivisions of the tribe more routinely function as political actors. This is even 
more the case since the PDPEO development project (ch.  2.8, p.  98) gave the newly created 
cooperatives (cf. Table 4, p. 47), which were designed to coincide with existing lineages, a cer-
tain degree of authority over the collective rangeland. A lineage, as a smaller descent group 
within a tribe, may include anything from a dozen to several hundreds of families, and the 
pitfalls related to precisely defining a tribe apply to lineages in a similar way.
On November 7, 2009, I witnessed a tribal gathering among 50 to 60 members of the 
Awlad al-Hajj Ibrahim lineage in their tribe’s zawiya (literally: corner), a place of worship and 
spirituality situated at the shrine of a pious ancestor. Much like a wa daʿ , this assembly served 
multiple purposes. The lineage bade farewell to a group of Mecca pilgrims, discussed politi-
cal issues and mobilized to oppose certain positions in the municipal administration, and 
worked on the resolution of some internal conflicts. As described earlier for land conflicts 
(ch.  2.4, p.  72), the symbolic act of reconciliation often happens under the guise of  sadaqa 
(charity) and is celebrated with a shared festive meal. This method of conflict resolution is 
the one preferred by the authorities.
According to observations by my fieldwork team, formal political functions on the tribal 
level are exclusively held by notables (a yanʿ ). Most notables in the region adhere to the cen-
ter-right Independence (Istiqlal) Party. Among my survey respondents, this is the most sig-
nificant political party, even though enrollment levels are generally low. Individuals from 
eleven households in my sample are Istiqlal members (2%, distributed across all municipali-
ties and mobility categories). Party posts are less prestigious than tribal structures; and both 
political office and tribal status are in a long-term process of being eclipsed by monetary 
wealth as a decisive factor for power and influence.
Given that  tribes  serve  as  identity anchors,  there must  be  differences  between them. 
These are subtle in my study region, with lifestyles being based on similar activities and folk-
lore drawing on similar sources. Nevertheless, differences can be recognized on many levels 
– including language. This is explained by the pharmacist who grew up in the province’s  
capital, Jarada, just outside the high plateaus, but has lived and worked in Ayn Bani Matharʿ  
for many years:
‘In Jarada, we have a way of talking that is different from over here. They say some-
thing in one way and we say it in another. When you go to someone who lives here 
you will  notice  a  certain melody,  a difference  in  pronunciation.  It  is  not  the  same 
melody.’ (Interview with pharmacist, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 1, 2010)ʿ
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He cites changed suffixes, differences in vocabulary, and a diverging pronunciation of certain 
letters as examples. Linguistic studies have indeed found countless nuances and variations 
between one tribal group and another, but no clear overriding pattern (Behnstedt and Benab-
bou 2005). In day-to-day practice, however, internal differentiation within each group is key 
to understanding tribal politics. Especially in the context of a society that is undergoing con-
tinual changes, it is crucial to understand processes of socioeconomic distinction and polar-
ization that may create new elites, but may at the same time adversely affect parts of the pop-
ulation,  exposing  them  to  higher  risks  and  practically  narrowing  down  their  livelihood 
choices. This runs counter to basic ideas of development being gauged by the expansion of 
people’s freedoms (Sen 2000).
Not everybody sees the notion of tribes as a helpful analytical tool at all. One scholar 
presents a quite harsh view on eastern Morocco’s pastoral communities:
‘Why does this society, marked by individualism, inequality, and competition, try so 
hard to emit this image of a pastoral society based on tribes and lineages, despite its  
obvious disconnection from reality?’ (Lazarev 2008, 3, my translation)
Lazarev  provides  his  own answer  to  this  question:  the  tribal  image  is  a  ‘useful  fiction’ 
(Lazarev 2008, 3, my translation) for everyone involved. I consider this view overly simplis-
tic, but agree with the premise that the most profound socio-economic transformations today 
have little or nothing to do with tribes. The next few paragraphs will outline the most salient 
intra-tribal differences as evidenced by my fieldwork in the steppe.
In former times, the most important factor to determine someone’s socioeconomic status 
in the nomadic societies of eastern Morocco, as in many other pastoral communities around 
the world, was the number of livestock they owned. More specifically, a large herd holds 
prestige because it  represents a high degree of  economic resilience to drought and other 
crises in the absence of other social security mechanisms (DPA Figuig 2006). Categories such 
as large (kabir), medium (mutawassit) and small (saghir) herd owners are not only dominant in 
most studies of the region, but are present in people’s minds even today and are readily used 
in everyday conversation. When one asks for a definition of what makes a large herder, how-
ever, one receives a variety of answers. ‘Four to five thousand sheep,’ one elderly informant 
told me. ‘The largest one I know has 1,200 sheep,’ said another. And according to a third 
tribesman, a herd of two to four hundred sheep can already be considered big these days. In 
fact,  my own survey data suggest that anyone with three hundred sheep or more ranks 
among the top 10 percent of herd owners.
Traditionally, a herd of either two hundred or three hundred sheep is considered an 
asahʿ  (staff), a herd that can be managed by a single shepherd. Hence, this number is related 
to herd control, a task that includes ‘ensuring the herd’s cohesion and manageability, its pro-
tection from predators and dangerous terrain, and prevention from mixing with other herds’ 
(Dwyer and Istomin 2008, 529). Ideal herding units have generally shrunk in size over the 
decades  due  to  technological  innovation.  One  example  is  the  widespread use  of  fodder 
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troughs  for  supplemental  feeding,  which  has  made  smaller  units  a  requirement  so  that 
herders can ‘maneuver animals efficiently’ (Steinmann 2001, 122). As pointed out earlier (ch. 
2.6, p. 89), a new actant, the trough or mijwar in this case, has partially imposed its own pro-
gram while being integrated into the collective.
The size of a family’s herd is correlated to many other things, although this does not nec-
essarily imply a causal link. For instance, the more sheep you own, the more likely you are to 
own a car or truck. While just 1 percent of the smallest herd owners interviewed possessed a 
truck, 58 percent of the large ones did. Trucks, as noted earlier, serve to transport livestock, 
fodder and water quickly over long distances – sometimes across half the country. Those 
who own many sheep are also twice as likely to be members of one of the pastoral coopera-
tives created under the auspices of the PDPEO project. The likelihood of holding public office 
is three times higher among the livestock-rich as among small herdsmen, so their access to 
formal institutions is much better. Finally, they are more likely to own one or several horses.  
These are not generally used as workhorses, but are trained for equestrian performances like 
those that take place on the occasion of a wa daʿ . Accordingly, horses have long been seen as a 
status symbol (USAID 1986).
Out of the 111 families in my survey who keep horses, three quarters specifically train 
them for these performances, called tburida (from barud, gunpowder). Also known as fantasia, 
the basic idea of this joint human-nonhuman endeavor is this: a race track is set up on a large  
open space. Different teams of about a dozen men each, dressed in tribal garb and armed 
with rifles, take turns in forming a line, speeding up their horses until they race toward the 
spectators’ ranks in full gallop; the horsemen then simultaneously fire their rifles into the air 
or at the ground, bringing the animals to an abrupt halt just meters in front of the stunned 
audience. The game can go on for hours or over several days. It draws part of its aesthetic 
from the  combination  of  a  display  of  unrestrained energy,  horses  thundering  along the 
steppe, the lethal danger imminent in human-weapon hybrids (even if blank cartridges are 
routinely  used  these  days),  and  the  men’s  mastery  over  this  power  by  exercising  the 
sequence with utmost precision and synchrony. According to my survey, the more livestock 
a family owns, the more likely it is to have tburida horses among them.
Taken together,  these findings suggest that  tribal elites  are very much produced and 
reproduced  by  the  traditional  livestock  economy.  They  have  at  their  disposal  material 
wealth, measured in animals, equipment, and symbolic items that exhibit their status, but 
also high social influence as expressed by their access to formal and informal institutions. 
These assets tend to reinforce one another as the various forms of resources – or, in Bour-
dieusian terms, capital – are mutually convertible under ‘certain conditions’ (Bourdieu [1984] 
1993, 73). According to a scholar, the large (kabir, pl.  kibar) herders or notable elites in the 
wider region have acquired an excessive importance:
‘Multiplying their sources of revenue (emigration of relatives, commercial acquisitions, 
official tasks), at times residing in town where their children study, they expand their  
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power over their homeland by transgressing customary rules, inflate the totals of their 
herd by recruiting hired herders, cultivate cereals in forbidden zones with the benevo-
lent complicity of the authorities,  reach agreements among themselves between one 
community and another by violating rules of hospitality, and surround themselves 
with an opaque network of multiple “clients”.’ (Bourbouze 2006, 34, my translation)
Even development projects tend to benefit the elites first and foremost, as they are able to 
invest in and adopt technological innovations. This can ‘expand the gap between different 
social groups’ (Emadi 1995, XX). Elite capture was evident in the first phase of the PDPEO as 
well: ‘In most cases, the cooperative leaders also turned out to be the largest herd owners 
and the wealthiest Beni Guil’ (Steinmann 2001, 65). An elder  kabir from my study region, 
however, insisted that he would not be able to grow his operations indefinitely, and identi-
fies drought as one of the culprits:
‘Yes, I am a large herder, but there is a limit that I cannot surpass. – Why? – Because of  
time, because of expenses, because of drought, do you know what I mean?’ (Interview 
with Daoudi, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 2, 2010)ʿ
While traditional notables still  represent the dominant model of leadership in the area,  a 
sociological study reports two new types of leaders that have emerged: entrepreneurial or 
functionary notables  who have worked their way up,  as it  were,  and are said to be less 
authoritarian than the old ones; and a younger generation of civil society leaders who have a 
high level of education and know how to run a project, but are largely disconnected from tra-
ditional political spheres (Tozy 2009). Old structures are thus being challenged and trans-
formed by emerging social strata.
The older generation does not necessarily put their trust in younger people. Household 
heads are often heavily supported in their daily workload by their sons, but a father’s typical 
assessment of his offspring is: ‘Ma ka-ydir walo’ (He does not do anything). The contributions 
of women to their families’ livelihoods are often evaluated in a similar way. Women actually 
work very hard,  while  ‘continually  renegotiating  land-use  decisions  and labor allocation 
within the household unit’ with men (Steinmann 2001, 196). However, female-headed house-
holds are rarely found (1% in my sample). This low figure may partly be due to men not  
regarding such families as full-fledged households and discounting them (Steinmann 2001), 
which would mean that my interviewers were never made aware of their existence. My inter-
actions in the field were predominantly with males; men hold most positions in the local 
administrative structures and are supposed to represent a family vis-à-vis the outside world.  
The observation that a ‘norm of female seclusion and gender segregation prevent[s] male 
researchers  from gathering  information  among women’  (Steinmann 2001,  5)  is  generally 
valid for my study area, although I have interacted with communities elsewhere that are 
much stricter in applying such norms. Being easily distinguishable as a gawri (non-Muslim 
Westerner,  from Turkish  gâvur) and the occasional company of female research assistants 
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were two facts that probably alleviated this restriction in my case. Even so, the bulk of my 
knowledge comes from men and concerns topics that tend to be seen as male domains.
Gender asymmetries are reflected in family structures. Six percent of all married men in 
my sample have a second wife, and a few even a third one. In mainstream interpretations of 
Islamic law as well as the Moroccan family code, this is permitted under certain conditions, 
whereas a woman may never have more than one husband at a time. One of the rationales 
quoted for polygyny in the high plateaus is the large amount of work women have to do – in 
this context, men suddenly have no problem acknowledging the magnitude of female chores. 
This argument is echoed by the participants of a study among the southern neighbors, the 
Bani Gil, where geographer Susanne Steinmann found even higher polygamy rates of 15% 
(Steinmann 2001, 45). In bilocal households, the older spouse typically follows the herd out 
in the steppe while the second wife stays in town and supervises the schooling of the fam-
ily’s younger children (Bourbouze 2003; Lazarev 2008).
According to a public scrivener in Ayn Bani Mathar, women are increasingly aware ofʿ  
their marital and civil rights, even those out in the steppe, and are ready to claim them in 
court (Interview with scrivener Idris, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 5, 2010). This is in part due toʿ  
the spread of television sets and satellite antennas, and to government campaigns after the 
2004  reforms  to  the  national  mudawwana (family  code).  Still,  there  seem to  be  very  few 
divorces,  which struck my fieldwork assistants  as  peculiar  compared to  other  Moroccan 
regions. Less than one percent of the adults in my sample claim to be divorced, namely one 
man and twelve women.
In summary, tribes provide building blocks for personal identities and constitute reser-
voirs for political action. The role of notable elites cannot be underestimated despite recent 
signs of new leadership modes, and women are far from an equal status but changes can be 
registered nonetheless. Drought is tied into tribal configurations in various ways: it unites 
tribal confederacies; wealthy herders feel that their drive for expansion is stifled by drought;  
and large herds are generally seen as prestigious because they represent a protective buffer 
for times of drought and scarcity. I will examine herd size as a wealth indicator in the next 
chapter, probing to what extent it can capture contemporary processes of economic polariza-
tion.
 3.2 Indicators of Wealth: The Question of Polarization
The number of sheep is a conventional, but still useful measure of a family’s wealth, and was 
a key topic in my survey. It should be noted that herd sizes were likely downplayed by the 
respondents, which tends to happen in most surveys. One motivation for this is a fear of tax-
ation,  another one the hope for  aid if  one’s  herd appears small  enough.  Moreover,  only 
reproductive female sheep are counted. While the absolute sheep numbers may not be true 
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to reality, the relative proportions should nevertheless be accurate and make a comparison 
between herd owners meaningful.
Apart from small ruminants, the most common domestic animals in the high plateaus 
are cows. A herd of cows indicates a wealthy household and provides economic diversifica-
tion. Changing a herd’s species composition may serve as a ‘long-term recovery strategy and 
insurance against the impact of future droughts’ (Blench and Marriage 1999, 21). Cows also 
provide milk for the family, a relatively new source of nutrition. Sheep and goats are milked 
only intermittently by pastoralists in the Maghreb, and even then, their milk is often trans-
formed into clarified butter (samn) for better preservability (Abaab et al.  1995). The iconic 
camels, for their part, are hardly present any more. Among my 465-household sample, one 
sole family still keeps five of them. The replacement of camels with trucks is complete in this 
region. Other domestic animals become enrolled in changing assemblages too, adding their 
own characteristics and propensities into the mix, obliging families to alter their mobility 
strategies (cows, for instance, move more slowly and prefer walking shorter daily distances 
than small ruminants), location preferences, household spending, and direction of labor and 
effort.  Animals  and  nomads  mutually  influence  their  movements  and  learn  about  each 
other’s  preferences,  as a study of reindeer herders in Siberia shows (Dwyer and Istomin 
2008). One could thus hypothesize that highly mobile households do not own cows, or at  
least significantly less than sedentary families. As a trend, this pattern is indeed reflected in 
my sample, albeit less clearly than assumed: about half of the nomadic households own one 
or several cows, compared to almost two thirds of former and non-nomads. Overall, the like-
lihood of cow ownership increases with sheep herd size and with age of household head.  
Looked at  through the lens of municipalities,  the proportion of  cow owners is  lowest in 
Awlad Ghuzayyil (52%) and highest in Murayja (71%). This is remarkable insofar as these 
two populations belong to the same tribe, Awlad Sidi Ali. In this case as in many others,ʿ  
tribal affiliation fails to explain diverging economic profiles.
Some elements in my questionnaire allow an observation of changes and divergences 
over time, despite the fact that I was only able to conduct a one-time baseline study. Based on 
the four herd size categories introduced above (ch. 2.6, p. 89), the following table presents the 
evolution of livestock numbers over the last 10 years as recalled by the respondents in 2009.
2009 Herd size
Small <= 30 Medium 31 – 67 Large 68 – 150 Very large 151+
Sheep in 2009 19 49 101 495
Sheep 5 years earlier 37 77 122 419
Sheep 10 years earlier 71 106 195 473
Table 12: Evolution of mean herd size by category
Most pastoralists have seen their herds decline. Today’s large and medium herders used to 
hold twice as many sheep ten years earlier, and the smallest category has suffered aggregate 
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losses of more than 70%. By contrast, those who presently own more than 150 sheep have 
been able, on average, to increase their herd sizes over the past decade, despite an intermit-
tent drop in numbers five years earlier. Ruling out dramatic ruptures and massive social cat-
egory shifts, of which there is no evidence, this is an indicator of polarization – a process by 
which the gap between poor and rich households becomes wider. Increasing polarization in 
pastoral societies has been identified and studied at least since the 1980s (Fratkin and Roth 
1990). There is even a sixty-year-old observation from my study region: ‘Social inequalities 
tend to become sharper’ (Paskoff 1957, 47, my translation). Crucially for my inquiry in this 
thesis, drought is routinely made responsible for such processes. As an example, ‘the 1984 
drought of northeastern Africa resulted in increased wealth differences between rich and 
poor in one community of Ariaal pastoralists of Kenya’ (Fratkin and Roth 1990, 386). And a 
recent paper on climate change in Morocco acknowledges that growing ‘social inequality can 
be another effect of more frequent and intense droughts’ (Schilling et al. 2012, 21).
A commonly used mathematical measure for variability is the Gini index, established 
over a century ago and named after its developer (Ceriani and Verme 2012). In this case, the 
question is: how is wealth distributed across the community? The value of the Gini index can 
range  from  zero  (representing  complete  equality,  where  all  households  own  the  same 
amount of wealth)  to one (total  inequality,  one household owns everything).  I  extracted, 
from my survey data, the number of sheep owned by each family at the time of the interview 
(2009),  five  years  earlier  (2004),  and ten years  earlier  (1999).  Calculating  the  Gini  index, 
specifically over the 375 households in my sample that owned sheep in the 1999-2009 period 
and quoted their figures for each of the three points in time, yields the following result:
1999 0.604 2004 0.641 2009 0.6969
Table 13: Gini index by year
The coefficient,  and thus  the  inequality  of  sheep distribution  across  the  households,  has 
markedly increased over the past ten years. And this trend has been ongoing for a long time: 
a project report from 1986 had found an income-based Gini coefficient of only 0.48 for Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar (USAID 1986, 175)! The perceived general decline of the nomadic way of life, 
which is often narratively linked to drought (as exemplified by Mr. Hamzaoui, the nostalgic 
artist), thus has a basis in material reality for many households. However, the total number 
of sheep in those same 375 households has developed unevenly: it dropped from 75,513 ani-
mals in 1999 to 55,610 in 2009. There was a massive decline by one quarter around the early 
2000s; since then, the overall sheep stock has not changed, while its distribution has contin-
ued becoming more unequal. Both trends are depicted in Figure 21.
9 I thank Birgit Müller for calculating these figures.
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Figure 21: Sheep numbers and Gini index
In the light of these numbers, the story of sheep breeding in the high plateaus is not one of  
universal decline. Some economic players have managed to maintain or increase their wealth 
in livestock. The group of very large herders, accordingly, profess the highest average satis-
faction with their own economic situation.
Looking at the development of sheep numbers by municipality reveals how the 1999-
2004 decline and the subsequent stagnation are distributed. These figures include all those 
households that have owned sheep throughout the past ten years, except for a few outliers 
who held more than 1,000 sheep at least once, as they would severely distort the averages.  
Evidently, the strong decline from 1999 to 2004 equally affected residents of all four munici-
palities. Only the herds of Awlad Ghuzayyil have recovered since then, while the decline has 
continued at a slower pace in the other territories (Table  14). Five households have owned 
more  than  1,000  sheep;  these  livestock  entrepreneurs,  all  located  in  Murayja  or  Awlad 
Ghuzayyil, have managed to multiply their herds against the general trend, thereby deepen-
ing economic inequality within their communities. These outliers contribute to the rise of the 
Gini index.
Sheep 1999 Sheep 2004 Sheep 2009
Awlad Ghuzayyil 212 140 161
Murayja 191 136 128
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ 171 119 99
Bani Mathar 118 75 63
Table 14: Evolution of mean herd size by municipality
My findings contradict a more recent study which reported that overall livestock numbers in 
the  Bani  Mathar municipality  grew considerably between 1999 and 2004 and have since 
remained largely stable (Bechchari et al. 2014b). That study is based on information available 
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from public agencies in the livestock sector. I cannot identify the origin of their contrastive 
assessment of the 1999-2004 period due to a lack of detail in said study, but this point is a 
useful reminder and warning that even subtle differences in research methodology may pro-
duce quite disparate results. Assuming that the official figures are more trustworthy than 
mine, a possible explanation is that some of my survey respondents retrospectively glorified 
their more distant economic past and overestimated their previous livestock wealth. But I 
rather suspect that a number of successful large producers, in addition to the handful fea-
tured in my survey, were behind this overall increase and simply did not make it into my 
sample.
Another remarkable difference between municipalities concerns the extent to which the 
households depend on livestock-generated income. The survey respondents were asked to 
estimate a rough percentage, often with the support of the interviewers. As shown in Figure 
22,  the  livestock-rich municipalities  in  the  west  occupy a  middle  position,  whereas  Bani 
Mathar and Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim fall into opposing extremes.ʿ
Figure 22: Proportion of livestock-generated income by municipality
Inhabitants of Bani Mathar, who have the smallest flocks of sheep on average, overwhelm-
ingly have alternative income sources available. Incidentally, they are also the least likely 
livestock producers to practice fattening (49% compared to 74-78% in the other three commu-
nities). Sheep have lost much of their commercial importance here. Families in Awlad Sidi 
Abd al-Hakim, on the other hand, combine low livestock numbers with a thorough depenʿ -
dence on pastoral income, which leaves many of them in a dire economic situation. The 
respondents’ satisfaction with their own economic situation here is lowest, and this measure 
strongly correlates with satisfaction in other areas.
Economists often look at consumption as another indicator of wealth and poverty. In my 
2009 survey, the participants were asked for the weekly sum they spend on the market. I 
divided this amount by the number of adults in each household. There is a visible difference 
between municipality averages,  ranging from 104 dh in Bani  Mathar to 170 dh in Awlad 
 3.2 Indicators of Wealth: The Question of Polarization 121
Awlad Sidi ʿAbd al-Hakim
Awlad Ghuzayyil
Murayja
Bani Mathar
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
None
Less than half
Half or more
All
Ghuzayyil. In other words, those who are nearest to the main market in Ayn Bani Matharʿ  
spend the least amount of money there. This is likely due to the fact that there is a plethora of  
grocery stores available where everything can be obtained on a daily basis. For families in 
remote Awlad Ghuzayyil, the weekly market is often the only opportunity to spend money 
and provide themselves with staple foods and goods. They have their own weekly market in 
Hisyan al-Diyab, but this settlement only comes alive on market days (Fridays in this case, 
which coincides with the day of communal jum aʿ  prayers). I would conclude that this aggre-
gate spending criterion is not very useful for comparing groups that live in very different 
spatial setups. Moreover, it is clearly related to the importance of livestock. The more you 
depend on livestock income, the more you tend to spend on the market per adult household 
member. Spending increases from 89 dh in the group without livestock-generated income 
over 122 dh in the ‘less than half’  category and 134 dh in the ‘half and more’ segment to 
156 dh in the group with no other income sources. This phenomenon is probably related to 
fodder purchase at the weekly markets, given the almost universal reliance on supplemental 
feed.
With increasing monetarization, ‘the goal of market transaction becomes the accumula-
tion of money rather than the accumulation of animals’ among pastoralists (Blench and Mar-
riage 1999, 14). The limitations of using herd sizes as the sole wealth indicator have become 
apparent. But what alternative measures of wealth are available? How can the emerging new 
elites in the region be described through my survey statistics? Inspired by an extensive study 
of Arab youth that I was involved in (Gertel and Hexel 2018), I calculated a ‘wealth index’ 
from my 2009 data. It is based on four criteria: the number of sheep mentioned above; the 
level of formal education of the household head (as a proxy for incorporated capital); the 
respondents’ satisfaction with their current economic situation; and the availability of certain 
items in the household. Each respondent household gets an individual score based on this 
information. Table 15 details how I calculated this index and how each category and wealth 
marker is distributed across the sample.
Cars or trucks alone are not necessarily a sign of prosperity. They come without insur-
ance or legal documents and are thus relatively cheap, and contraband petrol is available at 
low cost. Moreover, cars are often shared among several families. Yet, truck ownership varies 
drastically between categories. This is visible, firstly, when related to municipalities. While 
only 2% of the interviewed households in Bani Mathar and 13% in Murayja own a truck, 30% 
in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim and 41% in Awlad Ghuzayyil do. Secondly, this indicator isʿ  
significantly related to nomadism: one in three nomadic families, one in five former nomadic 
ones and only one in nine non-nomadic families have a truck. Thirdly, the proportion of live-
stock-derived income is  decisive.  None of  the  households  without  any animal-generated 
income own a truck, but one fourth of those who mostly or entirely depend on livestock do. 
The picture is much less clear for car ownership, which might be seen as an indicator of 
cross-border trade activities with Algeria, as some of my field assistants suggested. This con-
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clusion remains in the realm of speculation, however, and the bulk of smuggled goods enter 
or leave the country further to the densely populated north at any rate, in the immediate sur-
roundings of Oujda (Daoudi 2015).
Criterion Score
Sheep 0-30 (45% of households) 1
31-150 (37%) 2
More than 150 (18%) 3
Formal education None (74%) 0
Up until primary (21%) 2
Above primary (5%) 4
Economic self-assessment Very bad (11%) 1
Rather bad (30%) 2
Rather good (53%) 3
Very good (6%) 4
Items available Cell phone (87%) +1
TV (48%) +1
Motorcycle or moped (48%) +1
Refrigerator (34%) +1
Car (22%) or truck (20%) +1
Satellite receiver (22%) +1
Table 15: Wealth index calculation
In my wealth index, the possible total scores range from 2 to 17 for each household. Applied 
to the data set, it turns out that the distribution of scores resembles a normal distribution. 
There are few very resource-rich and few very resource-poor households; most families are 
somewhere in the middle.  Moreover,  there are no clearly distinguished classes with vast 
wealth differences between one another, but rather a continuum. This conforms to our obser-
vations in the field,  even though it  must be noted that  the most  destitute as  well  as  the  
wealthiest families are often missed by surveys with non-random sampling methods (Elwert, 
Evers, and Wilkens 1983). To break down the continuum into discrete categories, the follow-
ing four groups can be distinguished based on their scores:
Highest (score 11-17) 68 households
Upper middle (score 8-10) 160 households
Lower middle (score 5-7) 193 households
Lowest (score 2-4) 44 households
Table 16: Four wealth groups
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In the following paragraphs,  I  will  characterize each group according to typical features. 
Crucially, these groups or strata are not distinguishable through observations on the ground. 
Instead, they result from the artificial reduction of a multi-dimensional space into one single 
numerical criterion and from dividing a continuum into convenient slices for analytical pur-
poses. There are very different ways of carrying out this operation. The procedure is justifi-
able, however, when it yields new insights into the sample population that hold up against 
some qualitative scrutiny – and this is the case here, as I will demonstrate.
Not surprisingly,  the highest stratum is most present in the comparatively urbanized 
municipalities  of  Murayja  and Bani  Mathar,  while  the  lowest  and  lower  middle  wealth 
groups are predominantly located in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, followed by Awlad Ghuzaʿ -
yyil. Non-nomads are overrepresented in the highest-ranking group, which may be due to 
the fact that the scores are based on rather ‘sedentary’ criteria. A nomadic family may have 
little use for a satellite  dish or for formal education; yet,  this means that  they enjoy less  
opportunities and less freedom than their sedentary compatriots in many ways (on develop-
ment as freedom, see Sen 2000).
A household that is classified as very livestock-rich may only be in the lower middle 
wealth category according to this  alternative assessment – and vice versa.  The according 
matrix (Table  17) shows that the two measures are far from identical, as only one in three 
households lies on the middle diagonal. This is despite the fact that the two classifications 
are only partially independent from each other: herd size itself factors into the wealth index, 
after all.
Wealth group
Lowest 2-4 Lower middle 5-7 Upper middle 8-10 Highest 11+
H
er
d 
si
ze
Small <= 30 17 47 29 8
Medium 31-67 5 41 27 8
Large 68-150 1 45 34 13
Very large 151+ – 18 39 27
Table 17: Herd size versus wealth index (number of households)
The remaining two thirds are either wealthier than their livestock numbers alone would sug-
gest  (37%) or  have large  herds  but  not  much else (30%).  For  comparability reasons,  106 
households without livestock are missing from this table.  They are distributed across the 
four categories with very similar proportions, except for a bigger chunk of households in the 
‘lowest’ bracket.
Many questionnaire items that characterize the respondent households are clearly corre-
lated to wealth index scores. The higher its score, the more likely a family is to include emi-
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grants, have access to electricity, employ a herder to take care of their animals, have an ani-
mal stable at their disposal, own land, engage in agriculture, and be a member of a pastoral 
or agricultural cooperative. As Table 18 shows, other indicators follow the same trend. The 
poorest households rarely possess solid houses, but most of the wealthy ones do. This also 
distinguishes the lower middle and upper middle categories more clearly than other criteria. 
The consumption measure – how much money a family spends on the market every week – 
varies  with geographical  location,  as  we have seen above.  However,  it  is  also  related to 
wealth categories as defined by my index, except that the lower and upper middle group 
have the same average expenses.  Looking only at nomadic families,  the average distance 
traveled per relocation of the tent steadily increases with wealth index; members of the high-
est category travel twice as far as those of the lowest one.
Lowest Lower 
middle
Upper 
middle
Highest
Residence:
Tent only 61% 42% 21% 6%
Tent + house 16% 26% 27% 34%
House only 23% 32% 52% 60%
Mean money spent at weekly market per adult (dh) 113 130 129 159
Mean distance traveled (last two nomadic journeys, km) 110 136 184 207
Experience of herd loss due to drought (among sheep owners) 31% 36% 38% 23%
Table 18: Wealth group characteristics
How is the wealth index related to drought? Fundamentally, wealth should protect a house-
hold from negative drought consequences. I have shown early on in this thesis that drought 
does not affect all households in the same years or with the same severity. The favored possi-
ble  reactions  to  drought,  such  as  buying  extra  fodder  or  relocating  to  distant  pastures, 
require various resources; the more money, education, and equipment you can mobilize, the 
better your chances of forging a successful and resilient anti-drought assemblage around 
your livestock business are. My survey data corroborate this assumption for the wealthiest 
group, where only 23% of herd owners report major livestock losses caused by drought. The 
other three groups challenge this pattern, however: the second lowest proportion (31%) is 
found among the least wealthy group. Hence, the middle strata are most affected by this sort 
of disruptive drought shock. It would be too much of a stretch to speak of drought as a mid-
dle-class phenomenon, for sure – there is no really distinguishable middle class in the pas-
toral community of the high plateaus, and the differences between the four groups are not 
that  drastic.  But  this  indicator  conforms to  the  well-known observation  that  the  poorest  
households are not necessarily the most vulnerable (Swift 1989).
Another section in my questionnaire validates the wealth index as a meaningful way to 
uncover tendencies of divergence in this community – namely, the part where respondents 
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were asked to evaluate a number of political statements. Three of the most revealing ones are 
illustrated in Figure 23. The evaluation of today’s life conditions compared to the past rises 
consistently with increasing wealth index scores. Poorer household heads are less concerned 
about the environment than richer ones, but still on a high level. On the other hand, they 
often agree that land is being taken away from pastoralists, whereas more affluent respon-
dents do not usually share this view. This attitude is also expressed in the evaluation of the 
general state of pastures, which is seen as overwhelmingly negative by the poorest group 
and as intermediate by the others (Figure 24). Even though the wording of my questions was 
unspecific and could possibly be understood in various ways, the large number of interviews 
should even out such inconsistencies and allow a comparison. The material conditions of 
existence are mirrored in an individual’s consciousness, to a certain extent.
Figure 23: Opinions by wealth group (mean values)
One of the most pronounced differences between the four groups concerns their satisfaction 
with their current housing situation, which the lowest group rates slightly worse than ‘rather 
bad’ on average; the highest stratum, on the other hand, regards it as even slightly better 
than ‘rather good.’
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Figure 24: Satisfaction by wealth group
As an individual’s satisfaction with their own household’s economic situation was included 
in the calculation of this wealth index, it obviously correlates with the overall score. Specifi-
cally, none of the lowest stratum consider their situation as very good and none of the high-
est theirs as very bad. The proportion of ‘rather good’ and ‘good’ replies combined ranges 
from 14% in the lowest group to 88% in the highest group. But how about perceived changes 
in this situation? When the frame of reference is ‘the past five years,’ do households perceive 
a decline or rather an improvement of their economic status, and how is this related to cur-
rent wealth? It turns out that all combinations exist, but there is a strong tendency: the better 
off you are today, the more positive you evaluate the past five years. This pattern seems to 
indicate polarization, but may also be influenced by psychological mechanisms that project 
current perceptions onto the past. Overall, the assessment is rather positive: the notion of 
decline is reflected by 22% of the respondents, whereas 38% perceive stagnation and 40% 
progress in the economic realm.
Figure 25: Assessment of own economic development by wealth group
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With a further survey question, I tried to capture the ways in which social capital is related to 
material wealth. Each interviewee was asked to estimate how often he or she talks to a rela-
tive, a fellow tribesperson, an official, or a foreigner. While foreigner contacts did not play a  
particular role, the figures related to relatives are telling and show a distinct differentiation 
even between the lower and upper middle strata (Figure 26). For officials, the same pattern 
applies, albeit on much lower levels. How often you see someone may be related to physical 
distance, once again; but there are no significant differences between municipalities in this 
regard. Physical distance can be overcome thanks to transportation technologies, the use of  
which needs an effort, however – an investment of time and/or money. These technologies 
then help stabilize someone’s social ties to other human actors.
Figure 26: Frequency of seeing relatives by wealth group
To wrap up this chapter, I would like to take another look at drought and its involvement in 
producing  economic  difference.  The  households  that  were  severely  affected  by  drought 
shocks in the past constitute about one third of the sample. Across the four municipalities, 
their proportions range from 30% in Bani Mathar to 38% in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim – aʿ  
very uniform distribution over the tribes. Drought affects the entire region in similar ways 
and does not distinguish between single villages and landscape units. Nomads (38%) and 
former nomads (37%) are somewhat more often affected than non-nomads (30%). While my 
wealth index suggested that the middle layers of society were most prone to drought dam-
age, the four classes of herd size yield a very different result. Here, the ‘medium’ category 
with 31-67 sheep is actually least affected (27%)! Small (37%), large (40%), and very large 
herd owners (42%) reach higher levels. These findings seem to corroborate existing observa-
tions that large owners suffer higher proportional (and not just absolute) losses than small 
herders in a drought. At the same time, they are able to recover better thanks to the sheer size 
of their assets; poor families risk falling below a critical sustainability threshold (Fratkin and 
Roth 1990). At this point, my inquiry has not found a simple causal mechanism that turns 
households of a certain economic status into drought victims in the Moroccan high plateaus. 
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However,  the  older  a  household  head,  the  more  likely he  is  to  have been stricken by a 
drought; this is no surprise, but confirms the general plausibility of my data.
A related question in the survey questionnaire is  the open-ended Question 33 which 
asks, in general terms, about the most important negative change during the past 15 years. I 
counted all the replies that mention ‘drought,’ ‘climate change’ or similar terms – they add 
up to 123 out of the 465 interviews. Such replies are comparatively more frequent among 
large and very large herd owners. One element of an explanation is that wealthy, influential 
herders have appropriated the drought discourse more than small herders, by using neolo-
gisms like  tasahhur (desertification), even when they personally are not heavily affected. A 
similar observation was made in Japan, where rural collectors of wild plants ‘often borrowed 
from the language of science’ to frame discussions of their current difficulties (Faier 2011, 
1089), and in a farming community in Ghana where educated and influential individuals 
often  added scientific  explanations  of  drought  to  the  existing  ones  –  immoral  behavior,  
witchcraft, or the ‘natural order’ of things – that are passed on from generation to generation 
(Jarawura 2014). To claim that drought in eastern Morocco is nothing but a discursive figure 
employed for personal benefits, however, would be a glaring mistake which cannot be sus-
tained without negating all the aspects of drought that I have already presented. At this stage 
of my study, the only hope is to add even more nuance and continue multiplying agencies 
for a fuller understanding of drought. This is why I will use the next chapter to invite some 
supernatural beings into my drought assemblage.
 3.3 Sources of Power: The Solar and the Spiritual
The province of Jarada, the overarching administrative unit for the four municipalities under 
study, has been trying to inscribe itself into an assemblage of so-called energy landscapes.  
There are various initiatives to harness solar energy from the desert to supply renewable 
electricity to consumers around the Mediterranean. Morocco is considered ‘a pioneer among 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in establishing a policy and regulatory 
framework’ for this endeavor (Kousksou et al. 2015, 55). The high plateaus are part of this  
effort: in 2010, what was at the time the world’s largest hybrid solar-gas power plant was 
inaugurated on the outskirts of Ayn Bani Mathar, adjacent to a gas pipeline running fromʿ  
Algeria to Spain. Abengoa, a private Spanish company, operated the plant based on a 5-year 
contract that expired in 2015.
The plant was co-funded by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD),  Global  Environment  Facility  (GEF),  African  Development  Bank  (AfDB),  and 
Morocco’s National Electricity and Water Utility (ONEE). Construction started in January 
2008 and was completed in 34 months. But many locals are unhappy with their new neigh-
bor. When I asked them about the power plant, it transpired that the project site was widely 
considered to be cursed. Several workers had died during construction.
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Figure 27: Province billboards, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 2010ʿ
Other things had gone wrong, too, as an official project report summarizes prosaically:
‘The construction of the plant  suffered from a 6-month delay due to force majeure 
events such as severe flooding of project site, damage to collectors due to strong winds, 
total loss of one transformer and fire in one turbine filter.’ (World Bank 2013, 6)
Unexpected events  continued after the construction phase,  especially from the operator’s 
perspective. In the first few years, the plant could not run at full capacity because the eco-
nomic crisis in Spain and Portugal had reduced the demand for gas in those countries. While 
the solar fields were ready to heat up large amounts of gas, the quantities passing through 
the pipeline were insufficient to keep the electricity-generating turbines running around the 
clock in a cost-efficient way. The situation only improved in late 2011 ‘after ONEE’s signature 
of a dedicated gas-supply contract with Algeria’ (World Bank 2013, 11).
The introduction of a new technology into a collective is more often than not accompa-
nied by errors and hiccups, as numerous studies from the field of actor-network theory have 
demonstrated. Stable connections need to be forged between old and new actants  before 
updated routines can be established and a smooth operation comes to be taken for granted. 
This applies to human actors in a social environment just as well as to nonhuman ones.  
According to the World Bank report on the Ayn Bani Mathar power plant,  the project’sʿ  
scheduled ‘environmental mitigation and monitoring measures’ (World Bank 2013, 12) were 
largely ignored in the first few years. Important steps ‘such as noise and air quality monitor-
ing, proper waste management, preparation of an occupational, health, and safety plan by 
the plant operator’ (World Bank 2013, 12) were only implemented by ONEE personnel after 
they had been reminded by auditors. By contrast, the death of construction workers is not 
mentioned in the report; and the overall impact on the pastoral communities whose land was 
expropriated for the power plant is dealt with in a single sentence:
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‘Regarding social issues, all measures put forward by ONEE to be in compliance with 
Bank’s policies, e.g. compensation to landowners for loss of agricultural productivity, 
were considered satisfactory and no particular issues arose.’ (World Bank 2013, 12)
My impression during fieldwork was decidedly more nuanced, as I sensed a lot of hostility 
toward the whole project. The power plant operators had not managed, in my analysis, to 
establish a firm connection or even to enter into any relationship with most local tribespeo-
ple. Locals have stronger links to a different source of power: the junun (sg.  jinn), invisible 
beings that can be benevolent, but also malevolent and dangerous to humans. According to a 
survey conducted in 2006, 85% of Moroccans believe in their existence (El Ayadi, Rachik, and 
Tozy 2007). Junun prefer certain habitats – places associated with water, darkness, or blood, 
for example – and are best left alone. The links between humans and junun are maintained 
through stories, rituals, amulets, superstitions and the like. To give an example, a young man 
from Ayn Bani Mathar who showed me and a fellow researcher around and was by all stanʿ -
dards a cool, tough chap, advised against a visit to the old cemetery (which lies outside the 
town on a hillside) just before sunset: there would be  junun around. So we went there the 
next  day,  at  an  earlier  time;  even now,  he  felt  visibly  uneasy  around the  cemetery  and 
returned to his joking, confident self only after we had put a certain distance between our-
selves and the abode of supernatural beings.
In the solar power plant case, the junun evidently interfered in the attempt to build a con-
nection between the new power station and the local tribal society by causing the death of  
several workers. I have tried to sketch this particular network situation in Figure 28. There 
are strong links between tribe and junun on the one hand, and between the various compa-
nies involved in the project on the other, but the fragile connection between plant and people 
is broken by a string of fatal accidents. Had ONEE invested more in elaborating and enforc-
ing labor safety regulations, this would have helped strengthen the weak ties to the locals  
from the other side, but this did not happen either.
Drought plays an ambiguous role in this particular network. For one thing, it may be 
related to the world of junun, saints, and related popular beliefs, as can be seen in sacrifices 
that are offered to ask for rain. I will discuss those istisqaʾ prayers further below. Then again, 
drought is one of the forces that actually pushes local people into construction work because 
the livestock business is no longer profitable. On an indirect but related level, the high solar 
irradiation was one of the factors that made the ONEE planners think about setting up a 
solar power plant in this particular region in the first place (World Bank 2013, 23).
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Figure 28: Power plant – junun – drought network
What could a more successful integration of the project in the local tribal landscape have 
looked like? More generally, what is the right process to tap a new resource, solar energy in 
this case, and what would be the local population’s fair share in the profits it generates? The 
project staff’s answer was to establish
‘Community  projects  for  one  hundred  neighboring  families,  e.g.  construction  of 
latrines in three schools and reinforcement of irrigation system. These projects were 
financed with the funds corresponding to the expropriation of collective land for the 
project.’ (World Bank 2013, 16)
In other words, the dispossessed tribespeople were not even paid out their compensation 
money,  but  were  basically  fobbed  off  with  some  technical  implements,  just  as  General 
Lyautey had intended to do more than a century earlier (see ch. 2.8, p. 98). This critique of a 
colonial mindset can be formulated in less polemical ways, of course, but will not lose its 
validity.
Maybe Abengoa should have entered into a relationship with the junun instead, by mak-
ing a few sacrifices or otherwise acknowledging them. In this way, the company could have 
found  a  position  within  a  newly  defined  assemblage  (junun-tribes-Abengoa)  and  then 
enrolled the power plant into it as well.  In a different surrounding a few thousand miles  
away, a similar thing happens on a regular basis. When a new road or house is planned in 
Iceland, experts may be called upon to enter into communication with the ‘hidden people,’ 
elves who are known to inhabit certain places such as large rocks. These experts either man-
age  to  negotiate  a  relocation  with  these  nonhuman beings,  or  they  fail  and the  road is 
rerouted around the elf’s abode. There are many anecdotes of accidents, machines breaking, 
or workers becoming ill whenever elvish wishes were ignored (Wainwright 2015).
This does not mean, to be sure, that there will ever be universally accepted, irrefutable  
proof for the existence of junun; nor does everybody have to be converted into someone who 
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believes in them. The point is to acknowledge potential actors that are not supposed to exist 
in a modernist universe. It is a chance ‘to fathom the diversity of agencies acting at once in 
the world’ (Latour 2005, 48), but not necessarily an acknowledgment that junun are real. No 
statement on their ontological status is required in order to recognize that the  connections 
between them and the locals are very real: they are maintained by an investment of efforts  
and stabilized through the involvement of other actors (amulets, sacrificial animals, and the 
like). This unconventional perspective, one of my key lessons from assemblage thinking and 
actor-network theory, can point to innovative solutions for social and technological prob-
lems.
Likewise, I am not claiming that the death of workers could have been avoided if the 
company had taken the invisible beings more seriously by admitting them into the power 
plant assemblage. An affable young engineer from Casablanca who was staying at the Gara 
hotel in Ayn Bani Mathar for a few weeks while he worked on the plant told me, from expeʿ -
rience, that a few fatal accidents were commonplace and hard to avoid on construction sites 
of this scale. Locals were exaggerating, he said. Such a display of contempt and disconnect  
from human concerns may well reflect the emotionless cost-benefit analyses run by corporate 
economists. In fact, why should Abengoa care? They will make their profit and move on to 
the next project. This is one of the moments where the uneasy feeling that something is fun-
damentally wrong with this neoliberal world of ours becomes palpable. Had the company 
acknowledged the junun, by contrast, thus ‘managing failures […] and reassembling as the 
ground shifts’  (Li 2007,  286),  improved relations with locals would at least have enabled 
more nuanced and more constructive responses to the lethal accidents. Everyone involved 
might have benefited from a more reliable assemblage of actors in the future.
To most pastoralists of the high plateaus,  junun are just one among many visible and 
invisible  powers  in  the  world.  Among  the  visible  religious  institutions,  one  stands  out 
because it has adherents well beyond the region: the zawiya at the shrine of Sidi al-Shaykh Bu 
Amama, just two and a half miles away from the new solar power plant. It is run by a Sufiʿ  
order (tariqa),  the Shaykhi order, which occupies a central spot in the tribal history. This 
school of Islamic mysticism was founded by Sidi Shaykh (d. 1615) on what is now Algerian 
territory, and resembled more of an aristocracy at the turn of the 20 th century (Montet 1902). 
Today, the tariqa focuses on spiritual instruction. People come to the zawiya to be cured from 
ailments or simply to ease their daily stress. Courses in Qur’an education are offered, and a 
long process of initiation awaits those who want to become followers of the order. A mystical 
poem is part of the process, as are secret dhikr (invocation) formulas. Among the 465 house-
hold heads in my survey, no more than eleven affirmed being members of a zawiya, most fre-
quently at another local shrine, that of Sidi Hmida. All others may still regularly or irregu-
larly visit a shrine, but without the same level of personal and spiritual commitment.
During my fieldwork in Ayn Bani Mathar,  I  visited the shrine of Sidi  al-Shaykh Buʿ  
Amama – not to be confused with the rebellious warlord Bu Amama whose presence hadʿ ʿ  
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served as a pretext for Lyautey’s first invasion of Morocco in this exact region in 1904 (Porch 
1986) – and was welcomed, with my team, by several members of the  tariqa, all dressed in 
white.  They talked in detail  about their spiritual  approach and the order’s history in the 
region. The  zawiya owns irrigated farmlands around the shrine which provide its revenue 
basis, apart from members’ contributions and donations. With their educational programs, 
the Sufis today view themselves as a counterbalance to Salafist and Wahhabi fundamental-
ism, which has some proponents in the region but ‘causes many problems in society’ (Inter-
view at the shrine, June 5, 2010).
The shrine is an important focal point for tribal meetings, too. In 2005, the zawiya orga-
nized its first festival (mawsim) which lasted for three days, was attended by more than 5,000 
guests from the surrounding tribes (notably Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim) and beyond, andʿ  
focused on religious education. Moreover, it included festive meals and tburida horse compe-
titions (Bilharma and Hakimi 2007). The border closure, according to our interlocutors, has 
negatively affected attendance by Algerian adherents in recent years,  but the community 
remains intact across borders and includes a diaspora in Europe, too.
Outside the Sufi domain, certain elements of popular Islam are cherished by many locals. 
One instance intimately connected to drought is the prayer for rain, salat al-istisqaʾ. As men-
tioned in the introduction (ch.  1.4, p.  38),  many communities around the world resort  to 
prayer in situations of severe drought. In the Moroccan steppes, however, this practice is 
now controversial. Rabi a, forty years old, who grew up in the village of Sahb al-Ghar (Baniʿ  
Mathar municipality) but now lives with her husband and two children in the center of Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar and is no longer engaged in livestock breeding, gives her account:
‘Yes, people perform istisqaʾ prayers. They pray two raka atʿ  [sequences of movements 
during prayer]. Or they come together and carry out sadaqa [charity]. This means, they 
meet at a saint[’s shrine], slaughter [sacrifice an animal], and perform sadaqa in order to 
make it rain. But really, this is all up to God. I do not believe in these saints. Those are  
all superstitions. Do you hear me? My family, my husband, my children, we have only 
God. God is one. We do not go and visit these saints. Look, we do not visit them. But  
other people do, they visit them, they go and slaughter and do horse [performances] 
there, they put up marquees… Just recently, they did it at Sidi Ibrahim, not far from 
here. They did it there, set up tents, slaughtered, they all met… and they say it is for  
rain. And this, no, it is not right.’ (Interview with Rabi a, Ayn Bani Mathar, Novemberʿ ʿ  
2, 2011)
It  is  people  of  the  steppe  rather  than  townspeople  who are  involved  in  such  practices,  
according to her. Rabi a distances herself from rain prayers and views them as reprehensibleʿ  
superstitions, embracing a somewhat orthodox, mainstream interpretation of Islamic rules 
and values. Everything that calls the oneness of God into question is frowned upon. If this is 
a predominantly urban perspective, the remarks on religion by Deleuze and Guattari seem to 
hold some explanatory value for my case study, however general and idealizing they may 
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be. Specifically, the two thinkers observed that nomadism and orthodox, institutionalized 
religion do not easily go together:
‘The nomads have a vague, literally vagabond “monotheism,” and content themselves 
with that, and with their ambulant fires. The nomads have a sense of the absolute, but 
a singularly atheistic one.’ (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 383)
While no nomad I met in the highlands would consider him- or herself an atheist, religious 
beliefs or practices were never turned into a topic of debate either. Islam is an unproblematic 
and hence unobtrusive part of daily lives. Based on similar impressions, a french author of 
the 1950s speculated that climatic factors – specifically, cyclical droughts – were more impor-
tant than religion in shaping the purported character of the locals:
‘One can also wonder whether the climate, even more than religion, would not explain 
to a large extent the fatalism and improvidence of the nomads of the High Plains. They 
know – or at least, they think – that nothing can be done to avoid the tragic conse-
quences of years of scarcity. Is not survival the essential thing in order to fully enjoy 
the years of abundance that will  inevitably come after periods of famine?’ (Paskoff 
1957, 36–37, my translation)
Leaving aside the writer’s prejudiced and patronizing stance that is not genuinely interested 
in people’s motives, I would argue against him that a certain degree of fatalism is actually a 
sign of wisdom. Villagers in Ghana refer to this attitude as simply accepting the ‘natural 
order’ (Jarawura 2014), and private gardeners, while assembling their own small-scale ecolo-
gies, typically ‘accept contingency’ and unpredictability (Livesey 2010, 121). This approach 
resonates with the Taoist teaching that going with the flow is preferable to stubborn insis-
tence on having your own way regardless of changing circumstances; seeing and seizing the 
opportunities brought about by accumulated silent transformations is the smoothest road to 
success (cf. Jullien 2009). This is often likened to the flow of water which always finds and 
follows the ideal path. Apparently, life with an omnipresent drought risk can teach you simi-
lar lessons.
Water is a key element in the energy landscapes of the province of Jarada, to be sure. For 
livestock producers and their sheep, water access is  an utterly critical issue,  as discussed 
above (ch.  2.2, p.  63) – and it is equally vital for the wider tribal community. I will use the 
next paragraphs to review the information on water access that is available through my sur-
vey data  once  more,  this  time focusing  on differences  and similarities  between the  four 
municipalities.
The first major difference concerns the distance between each residence and the nearest 
source of potable water. In households that are connected to a water supply network, this  
distance is considered zero and they were not taken into account in calculating the average 
distances shown in Table 19, hence the diverging overall case counts. The average distance 
across the study region is 8.4 kilometers (5.2 miles), by no means an easy walking distance.  
Bani Mathar is an exception here: in line with the village character of its communities and the 
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availability of natural springs, most residents live within close proximity of a drinking water 
source. The other extreme is represented by Awlad Ghuzayyil, dominated by fully mobile 
pastoralist families, with a mean distance of 15 km (9.3 miles) between tent and water source.
Municipality Mean distance (km) N
Bani Mathar 2.2 105
Murayja 7.7 63
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ 9.0 129
Awlad Ghuzayyil 15.0 94
Total 8.4 391
Table 19: Distance to currently used water source
When asked how the water access situation had evolved for them over the past five years, 
more than half of the respondents in Bani Mathar and Murayja stated that it had improved. 
In  Awlad Sidi  Abd al-Hakim and Awlad Ghuzayyil,  the  largest  group said that  it  wasʿ  
unchanged. Only a tiny fraction of respondents reported a deterioration across all municipal-
ities, with 9% among Hakimis being the highest share. Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim is moreʿ  
generally the municipality where the highest percentage of respondents feel neglected by the 
state, whereas improvements are most clearly felt in the two central municipalities that are 
readily accessible by road.
The specific sources of drinking water are highly differentiated by municipality, as my 
survey reveals. Table 20 lists them, with the municipalities ordered geographically from west 
to east; multiple answers were possible.
Awlad Ghuzayyil Murayja Bani Mathar Awlad Sidi Abdʿ  
al-Hakim
Private well 25% 35% 14% 10%
Public well 57% 41% 31% 71%
Natural spring 2% 3% 16% 2%
River 3% 1% 6% 7%
Tap 2% 16% 37% 1%
Others 20% 11% 13% 21%
Table 20: Water sources by municipality
What stands out most from this table is the concentration of water taps in two municipalities 
(the  urbanizing,  central  ones)  and  the  high  reliance  on  public  wells  in  the  other  two 
(nomadic, peripheral ones). Natural springs as a source are only important in the surround-
ings of Ayn Bani Mathar, and the sparse rivers do not support large numbers of familiesʿ  
anywhere in the region. Overall, water provision involves quite heterogeneous socio-techni-
cal assemblages in this dryland area, and this diversity of sources provides a certain level of 
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protection – failures in one type of source can be compensated with others. Water storage 
techniques provide an additional layer of security, and the use of cisterns for this purpose is  
highly differentiated as well. Prevalence rates range from 16% of households in Bani Mathar 
to 91% in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, and from 42% of the small herd owners to 89% of veryʿ  
large ones. As stated further above, the problem with drought is usually not one of a deficit 
in drinking water, however. Precipitation remains decisive.
While every family needs water to survive, another form of energy can almost be consid-
ered a luxury item in the high plateaus: electricity. In the words of the provincial administra-
tion,
‘the Jarada province experiences a paradoxical situation: it contributes, thanks to the 
[coal-fired] power plant in Jarada, a non-negligible share to domestic electricity genera-
tion,  but  rural  electrification rates  do not  exceed 51% (they were at  10% in 2002).’  
(Province de Jérada 2007)
This paradox was exacerbated with the opening of the solar power plant, but electrification 
rates are slowly picking up in the steppe. Exactly matching the provincial statistic, one half of 
my sample households have access to electricity. Most of them (72%) have only achieved it 
within the previous six years (i.e., since 2003). The most common source is the public grid of 
national utility provider ONEE, which two thirds of electrified households are connected to. 
A quarter of the families rely on solar panels. A herder who has built a house in the steppe,  
in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, has had a solar panel for four or five years. He made a downʿ  
payment  of  900 dh and will  be  paying monthly  installments  of  65 dh for  ten years.  His 
assessment is completely positive: ‘It has saved us from the smoke of the gas bottles and can-
dles. The light we now have is clean, we have gotten rid of the dirt’ (Interview with Abdelka-
der, Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, June 3, 2010). In their old tent, this had not been a problem,ʿ  
but in the new concrete house, the smoke had not been able to escape and had bothered chil-
dren as well as adults.
The differences by municipality are drastic in this domain: electrification reaches 72% 
and 73% in Bani Mathar and Murayja, compared to 32% in Awlad Ghuzayyil and 21% in 
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim. Looking at the sources of power also provides a spatially differʿ -
entiated picture (Figure 29). Bani Mathar households almost exclusively depend on the pub-
lic network. The share goes down to about half among the western communities and one 
third  in  Awlad  Sidi  Abd  al-Hakim.  Inversely,  the  proportion  of  solar  panels  steadilyʿ  
increases and reaches 57% of electrified households in the easternmost municipality. Genera-
tors do not play a large role in this region, and tents are hardly ever equipped with electric-
ity: barely a dozen tents in the entire sample boast some form of electrical outlets.
 3.3 Sources of Power: The Solar and the Spiritual 137
Figure 29: Electricity sources by municipality
As could be expected, nearly all households with a high wealth ranking (ch. 3.2, p. 117) have 
electricity access (94%). The upper and lower middle categories reach 62 and 33%, respec-
tively, whereas only 9% of the lowest stratum are connected. To some extent, this outcome 
reflects the input, as four different electrical appliances each added one point to a family’s  
wealth score. A family’s herd size, on the other hand, has no correlation whatsoever with 
electricity access. This is another proof that no simple categorization can explain every socio-
economic phenomenon, not even within this comparatively small and homogeneous com-
munity.
Although they require electric power to run, cell phones are much more prevalent than 
electricity access in the respondents’ homes. Even people who live in areas without network 
coverage own phones (Vidal-González and Nahhass 2018). Users without electricity at home 
usually recharge their mobiles in town or during visits to friends and relatives. The role of 
phones in the livestock business cannot be overstated: they are used to access and dissemi-
nate information on markets, pasture conditions, veterinary issues, and the coordination of 
multiple herders, for instance (Vidal-González and Nahhass 2018). But they also facilitate the 
maintenance of family and romantic relationships, serve entertainment purposes, and keep 
non-pastoralists informed about job opportunities. Just as about everywhere in the world, 
smart phones have become hugely popular in recent years. In how far they will permanently 
change pastoral practices and drought responses remains to be seen.
A  final  aspect  should  be  mentioned  when  discussing  sources  of  power  in  dryland 
regions and their connections to drought. The collection of firewood as fuel is considered a  
main driver of land degradation and desertification, which is why the promotion of energy-
efficient  appliances  and  alternative  energy  sources  could  ‘increase  resilience  against 
droughts  and agricultural  productivity  of  semi-arid rangelands’  worldwide (Le Houérou 
1996). While it was a matter of concern four decades ago (Müller-Hohenstein 1978a), this 
topic seems no longer relevant in my study area today: virtually all households use butane 
gas for heating and cooking. This innovation has also removed a considerable burden from 
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women and girls who used to be responsible for firewood collection in the past (Mahdi, Har-
rami, and Ablal 2007).
Viewing the high plateaus as an energy landscape, while remaining faithful to the ANT 
perspective, provides new insights into the various agencies, human and nonhuman, that are 
active here. The religious realm includes rain prayers and a Sufi order; both are eschewed by 
adherents  of  a  more fundamentalist  Islam. Drought  is  interlinked,  in various  ways,  with 
water pipes, power cables, and invisible beings – often resulting in subtle socio-economic 
distinctions between the tribes and municipalities  that  my 2009 survey reveals.  But how 
about more visible phenomena of social stratification? Does the increasing influence of non-
pastoral labor and income lead to the emergence of clearly identifiable new groups? In the 
next chapter, I will analyze changes in education, professional occupations, and labor migra-
tion trends to tackle these questions.
 3.4 From Tribes to Professions: Education, Diversification, Migration
Given the  economic  difficulties  faced by many households  in  the  livestock  business,  the 
search for alternative revenue sources is understandable. Non-pastoral activities are on the 
rise, wage labor is an increasingly important basis of rural livelihoods (Breuer and Gertel 
2012), and considerable numbers of people migrate to earn their money outside the high 
plateaus. All these processes are routinely linked to drought by inhabitants of the region. 
Everyone seems to agree that drought is the obvious driver of this silent, but unstoppable 
overturn of an entire economic system – and of the society whose survival is based on this  
system. Relying on my survey data, I will now investigate the resulting changes in labor 
biographies and livelihoods in the high plateaus of Morocco.
There may be different reasons for families to engage in non-pastoral activities. At the 
wealthier end of the social spectrum, these activities can add an element of portfolio diversi-
fication, spreading risk and increasing the chances of profit. The poorest households, on the 
other hand, are often forced to seek their income elsewhere as it has become impossible for 
them to get by on livestock husbandry. This bifurcation of motives has been observed in 
other regions (cf. Toth 2015 investigating ‘poverty traps’ in Ethiopia) and is, as a tendency at  
least, reflected in my survey data. Figure 30 shows the role played by livestock-related cash 
income for each of the four wealth groups (as defined by my index).
The lowest wealth group contains the highest percentage of households that have no 
livestock-generated income at all. Many of them were forced out of the business by the com-
bined forces of drought and other constraints. The proportion of those who combine live-
stock with other income sources, on the other hand, increases from lower to upper middle 
and reaches the highest level with the highest stratum. In other words, economic success 
often allows adding other income sources to the flourishing livestock business; this diversifi-
cation tends to reinforce economic success in the long run.
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Figure 30: Livestock-generated income by wealth group
Looking at the same numbers from a slightly different angle, the average contribution of live-
stock to a household’s  income is  around 60% for the lowest  and highest  categories,  and 
around 70% for the middle ones. The lower middle stratum also features the highest share of 
families – two out of five – who live off nothing but livestock. All these indicators confirm 
that non-pastoral labor concerns both the neediest and the wealthiest families more than it 
does those at intermediate levels.
To  analyze  how  people’s  professional  careers  have  changed  over  the  generations,  I 
extracted personal information on all household members from my survey data. These 3,612 
individuals of all ages are represented in the following graph (Figure 31). It displays ten-year 
age cohorts and their respective main occupations in percent, separated by gender. Several 
things stand out, especially about the differences between men and women in this society.  
For one, only a handful (3%) of women have activities other than being a student, a house-
wife, or ‘none’ deemed worth mentioning by the (mostly male) respondents. Earning a liveli-
hood is almost exclusively a male endeavor in this community.
Enrollment rates in above-primary education (10-19 years of age) are higher among boys 
compared to girls, but they are identical among younger children. Girls often have to quit 
school after a few years of basic education. A teacher at the local women’s association, which 
has been active in Ayn Bani Mathar since 1998, told us about her experiences in this field.ʿ  
Her account contains important insights into the difficulties faced by girls in education and 
the underappreciated hard work they have to carry out in the steppe:
‘The proportion of girls is low, because when a girl reaches the age of 15 or 16, they 
start preparing her for marriage and they push her toward household chores. She has 
to learn domestic tasks and all those things about milking and tending to the animals,  
about feeding them… So there are pressures from the family. I cried tears for this one 
girl. I can testify that she was diligent. She studied with me for a year, and was in tears 
when she left. She did not want to leave school. She was successful, I enrolled her and 
she reached the sixth grade and attended [regular] school. When she had come to me,  
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just a year earlier, she had been almost illiterate. She went to fourth grade, I put her in 
fourth grade because she was diligent. When she started, she studied for two years 
until she grew a little older – and that was it, the family intervened. Her parents did 
not want anymore. I went to talk to them, but they said: that’s it, her uncle is against it.  
This uncle has authority over his brother’s family. He had told him: act responsibly, 
the girl has grown up. If you want to let her stay among the people, let her, but you 
bear the responsibility if you let  her continue her studies.  She was taken from our 
hands. What can you do?’ (Focus group discussion at women’s association, Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar, June 5, 2010)
Such stories showcase attitudes that are still dominant in rural Morocco. In addition, literacy 
levels are exceptionally low in the high plateaus, even among males. However, voices calling 
for change can be heard and examples of local girls succeeding in higher education or with  
their own businesses exist. Attitudes are being transformed, albeit in slow and silent ways. 
The teacher continues:
‘There still is this culture. Females have certain obligations. Even males, too: when a 
boy grows up a little, his father needs him out there in the steppe. He needs someone 
to assist his father. I had two cases where they grew older and their fathers took them 
back. I thought: if there was an opportunity for vocational training here, in the area of 
agriculture, we could maybe keep those children here for longer and they would not 
go back to illiteracy. They return to the position they wanted to get away from. So they 
go back to the steppe, back to the drudgery, their education stops.’ (Focus group dis-
cussion at women’s association, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 5, 2010)ʿ
In my survey data,  an individual’s  occupation is  not  clearly  related to their  educational 
achievements, however. The bulk of existing jobs do not require a specific degree of formal 
education.
Drought is commonly made responsible for unemployment. What does my data set have 
to  say  about  this  issue?  The large  group of  individuals  whose  occupation  was  given as 
‘none,’ it turns out, is distributed along a U-shaped curve; this is true for men as well as  
women. Understandably, children and the elderly are most likely to have no particular occu-
pation. The curve drops to almost zero for middle-aged men: they all do something rather 
than  nothing.  This  pattern  corresponds  exactly  to  statistics  compiled  by  the  provincial 
administration (Province de Jérada 2007).
Livestock tends to be most important for older men, a sign that this sector is gradually 
losing importance as a main occupation. Children and young adults who appear in this cate-
gory may simply support their father’s livestock business, as observed by the teacher. The 
combination of livestock and agriculture, in turn, is most prominent in the fifty-to-eighty 
years age bracket. Finally, ‘other’ activities are most pronounced among young and middle-
aged men (twenty-to-sixty-year-olds). They seem to be steadily on the rise. Of course, certain  
jobs are physically demanding and thus unsuited for elderly men. Those who are in their 
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prime now may fall back to herding when they become older – assuming that they possess  
the required skills. 
Figure 31: Main occupation per ten-year cohort
It is worth noting that the approach to livestock raising has changed with the rise of busi-
ness-minded large herders. The phrase l-ksiba wllat mashruʿ (livestock has turned into a busi-
ness  enterprise)  has  become a  cliché  that  is  often repeated when summarizing the main 
transformations  of  the  past  decades,  just  as  the  obligatory  reference  to  drought  and its 
effects. An elder notable puts it this way:
‘Livestock is a business. It is like setting up a factory, but according to this region and 
this  climate,  our  factory  is  the  herd  of  sheep’  (Interview with  Daoudi,  Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar, June 2, 2010).
Taken together, my findings nevertheless indicate a gradual, generational shift away from 
livestock and toward new professions. This happens in socially and spatially differentiated 
ways: individuals with ‘other’ activities, presumably representing novel occupational path-
ways,  are not distributed equally across the four municipalities.  Their proportion among 
working-age men – those aged from 16 to  64,  in my categorization – is  highest  in Bani  
Mathar (47%),  much lower in Murayja (28%) and Awlad Ghuzayyil (22%), and lowest in 
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim (14%). A similar distribution is found in the number of differentʿ  
professions or unique combinations of activities per location: there are over sixty different 
job  descriptions  in  Bani  Mathar,  including  day  laborers,  grocers,  electricians,  drivers, 
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masons, soldiers, a hairdresser, a plumber, a photographer, and a tailor. This testifies to a 
wide and diversified, tentatively urban spectrum. Interviewees from Murayja named about 
thirty different professions, and those in the more peripheral municipalities of Awlad Ghuza-
yyil and Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim listed twenty each (including drivers, functionaries, andʿ  
a niche for females in the services sector: three women work as housemaids).
Income diversification has become widespread, and pastoral production is intertwined 
with wage labor.10 Just one in three households derives all of its income from livestock, either 
as independent breeders or as paid herders – with the highest percentage among families 
who own 31–67 sheep (my ‘medium’ herd size category). Among the overall sample of 465 
households,  17 percent have no animal-generated income at all,  and no less  than half  of 
today’s families combine livestock breeding with other jobs, most frequently as agricultural 
laborers in Spain or as day laborers or construction workers in the region. This is mirrored by 
lifestyles, as the forms of residence indicate (Figure 32): the less you depend on sheep pro-
duction, the more likely you are to live in a house rather than a tent. Wage labor is most  
widespread among small livestock owners and lowest,  in this sample, among large ones. 
This latter category seems to rely on freelance non-pastoral activities more frequently. More-
over, the significance of salaried labor varies strongly across municipalities, ranging from 
41% of adult men in Bani Mathar and 24% in Murayja and Awlad Ghuzayyil down to 19% in 
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim.ʿ
Pastoralism thus continues to be the mainstay of the regional economy, but it is clearly 
losing importance: even among those who are not engaged in any livestock breeding, nine in 
ten respondents report that it was their parents’ main activity a generation ago.
Figure 32: Housing type by livestock-based income category
Labor migration is  another  remarkable aspect  of  the shift  away from pastoralism in this 
region (Mahdi 2014). When you walk through the streets of Ayn Bani Mathar, you may beʿ  
surprised  to  see  numerous  cars  with  Spanish  license  plates,  especially  in  the  summer 
10 The remainder of this chapter is, in part, based on previously published work (Breuer and Kreuer 
2011, 167).
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months. They do not belong to tourists, but to labor migrants from the high plateaus who are 
on a family visit. According to my 2009 survey, one fifth of the interviewed households have 
(or have had) at least one family member who has emigrated to another Moroccan region or 
abroad. When asked about migrants in their larger family, 55 percent of household heads 
mention at least one. This migration happens predominantly on a seasonal rather than per-
manent basis. The most popular destination by far is Spain, in particular the region of Murcia 
where emigrants from the northern high plateaus usually work in agriculture. Three quarters 
of the emigrants in my sample first left Morocco sometime between 1990 and 2004, while the 
earliest  cases date back to 1960.  Permissions to work abroad were ‘almost impossible’  to 
obtain in those early days (Müller-Hohenstein 1978a, 64, my translation).
Among the survey respondents, people in Murayja have the highest proportion of emi-
grants in their larger families (67%) and those in Bani Mathar the lowest (47%). Being related 
to a migrant strongly correlates with wealth as measured by my wealth index. The likelihood 
of having a migrant in your extended family rises from 36% in the lowest stratum to 45% in 
the lower middle group, 64% in the upper middle category, and 74% among the wealthiest 
households. Those with migration experience in their family are also more likely to own a 
house (76%) than those without (60%). Migration seems to be directly related to herd size, 
too, which can be read in two ways: either those who possess large numbers of animals can 
more easily afford to send one or two of their sons to Spain – or the migrants’ remittances are  
invested in animals and lead to considerably larger numbers of livestock. Both explanations 
are partly true according to locals: there is a certain investment threshold to be overcome 
before obtaining a Spanish contract, but once you are in the game, you can easily earn eight 
times the monthly wage that is commonly paid in the high plateaus. In contrast to other 
regions or periods of history, and in slight contradiction to local depictions of drought as a 
force driving people out of the steppe, migration has for several decades been an opportu-
nity rather than a necessity for the herders of eastern Morocco.
The inherent risks of integration into a distant labor market have been felt since 2008, 
however, when the global economic crisis hit Spain and the demand for seasonal agricultural 
labor went down. Many migrants have since stayed at home and concentrated on livestock 
breeding or other activities like house construction, slowly but surely fostering change in the 
steppes. The urbanizing tendencies that express this change most visibly are the topic of my 
next chapter, which focuses on the town of Ayn Bani Mathar.ʿ
 3.5 Ayn Bani Mathar: Urbanization in the Makingʿ
This chapter is about urbanization and consumerism, two emerging forces in eastern Moroc-
can assemblages that are intimately linked to notions of drought. During my 2011 visit to 
Ayn Bani Mathar, I noticed a new billboard on the main street. It featured designs of shinyʿ  
new town houses, a middle-class dream, marketed for 25 million frank (i.e., 250,000 dirhams) 
apiece. What is the target audience of these advertisements? What other silent transition pro-
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cesses have prepared the ground for such a business endeavor in this peripheral region? Do 
post-nomadic (and possibly post-drought)  families  strive to emulate lifestyles  they know 
from large cities or from TV series? Have such trends diffused out from the center into the 
four rural municipalities around it, and which traces do they leave in my survey data? As a 
reminder: the town itself was not included in the survey as it constitutes a municipality on its  
own.
Figure 33: Real estate advertisement, Ayn Bani Mathar, October 2011ʿ
Ayn Bani Mathar, while small in comparison to other Moroccan cities, is the undisputedʿ  
commercial and administrative hub of my study region, and has been so for a long time 
thanks to its natural springs, the weekly Monday market, and its location near the border 
which conferred to this settlement a remarkable role in the regional history of the early 20th 
century (see below). The town had a population of 13,526 in 2004 and had grown to 16,289 
inhabitants by 2014, continuing a decades-old trend of expansion (HCP 2015).
To be sure, processes that involve urbanizing lifestyles and changing consumption habits 
are unfolding in various parts of rural Morocco, but in the east, drought has been an addi-
tional driving force. The sprawling neighborhood south of the center of Ayn Bani Mathar,ʿ  
behind the marketplace and the Afriquia gas station, is called Hayy al-Ziyani. It ‘only exists 
because of drought,’ as a young policeman who lives there explained to me: the first families 
from the Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim tribe who had to give up nomadism in the ʿ urubiyyaʿ  due 
to drought settled here. More and more followed over the years. Today, Ziyani has several  
thousand inhabitants, a primary school, a number of shops and cafés, and an elegant new 
mosque. Most of the people who live here are Hakimis, unlike the town center where differ-
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ent ethnic groups have been mixing for decades, including Bani Mathar, Bani Gil, but also 
people from the Souss plain and the edge of the Sahara in Morocco’s south.
A common narrative, as I pointed out earlier, is that ‘rural exodus is one of the big conse-
quences of this extreme natural phenomenon’ named drought (Tarik 2012, 15, my transla-
tion). Massive population movements into towns and cities are expected to increase further 
due to demographic pressures and worsening climate patterns which seem to destroy any 
economic hopes for pastoralists.  Then of course,  there are also the benefits of living in a 
town, such as the existing infrastructure, doctors, schools, communications, and administra-
tive functions. Hence, some families who can afford it entertain both a house in town where 
the children can attend school and a tent in the steppe so they can continue, at the same time, 
the practice of mobile livestock breeding.
During the colonial era, Ayn Bani Mathar – called Berguent back then – was known inʿ  
the region as a ‘little Paris’ thanks to its cosmopolitan touch and green spaces. A substantial 
Jewish population (247 individuals in the 1950s), who sometimes invested their money in 
livestock via sharing agreements with pastoralists, largely took care of exporting live sheep 
to France (Paskoff 1957). Most of Morocco’s Jews (a 240,000-strong minority at independence 
in 1956) gradually emigrated to Israel and other countries over several decades; their num-
bers dwindled from 105,000 in 1963 to 35,000 in 1971 and 8,000 in 1987 (Laskier 1990), and 
there is no Jewish community left in Ayn Bani Mathar today, occasional visitors notwithʿ -
standing.
The town’s first coffeehouse, Le café du commerce, was founded around 1910 or 1920 and 
still exists today. In the 1960s, people would come here and play pool billiard or watch televi-
sion on the first TV set. The café has also served as headquarters to the local soccer club.  
Even back in the 1920s,  when French troops and administrative personnel resided in the 
town,  Ayn Bani  Mathar’s  commercial  function for  the region’s  nomads was central.  Anʿ  
observer noted at the time that ‘the chief sheep market of the Moroccan high plateaus is  
Berguent, a small center that has rapidly developed’ (Célérier 1927, 464, my translation).
The name of this little town provides an instructive story about words (which can of 
course be analyzed as actor-networks) and the assemblages they become involved in as they 
shift or persist over time. Historically, this fertile piece of land in the middle of the steppes  
was known as Ra s al- Ayn or simply Al- Ayn, which means ‘(head)spring’ and is a commonʾ ʿ ʿ  
toponym throughout the Arabic-speaking world. The attribution to the local tribe of Bani 
Mathar was later added to it (Birhab 2004).
French General Hubert Lyautey, who forayed into Morocco coming from Algeria in the 
first decade of the 20th century, decided to rename the strategically located outpost, as he had 
done with other localities before. Officially, he asked for reinforcements to contain the rebel-
lious warlord Bu Amama and protect several tribes allied to the French, among them theʿ  
Bani Mathar. In reality, Lyautey was planning a ‘stealthy penetration of Morocco’ (Lyautey 
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1937, 81, my translation). In this context, he proposed the creation of the first permanent 
French post to secure the border. Despite some severe policy disagreements (Munholland 
1968), he went ahead and established the outpost at the end of June 1904, specifically  ‘at a 
point of the Sharif valley that should diplomatically be called Berguent, but that in reality 
belongs to Ra s al- Ayn’ (Lyautey 1937, 77–78, my translation). The idea behind using a difʾ ʿ -
ferent place name was to pass the site off as Algerian territory toward the government in 
Paris (Porch 1986).  Thus,  Ayn Bani Mathar became one of the first points where Frenchʿ  
troops established a permanent presence in the sharifian sultanate, followed by a chain of  
events that would eventually lead to the establishment of a protectorate eight years later. In a 
letter to his sister, Lyautey wrote on July 6, 1904:
‘Ra s al- Ayn is, besides, a marvelous spot, — I just came from there — superb watersʾ ʿ  
— I bathed and swam — some trees, and cold nights.’ (Lyautey 1937, 77, my transla-
tion)
He further explained his strategy:
‘We are not conquering Morocco at all and I am conducting this business with the pru-
dence of a snake, but it is a leap forward of 100 kilometers, and a perfect base of opera-
tions for the day that we will decide to do something’ (Lyautey 1937, 77, my transla-
tion).
The name Lyautey chose,  Berguent,  was supposedly inspired by a Berber word meaning 
‘black’ that had referred to a nearby part of the Wadi Sharif valley. While this origin is ques-
tionable, the new name established itself in the local parlance alongside the older ones. It 
was,  however,  adapted  over  time  to  better  suit  Arabic  pronunciation  patterns  and  thus 
became Bargam. One author has suggested, contrariwise, that ‘Berguennt’ (sic!) is a corrupted 
version of the real place name ‘Berguem’ (Paskoff 1957), but this seems to be based on a mis-
understanding.
After Morocco’s independence in 1956, the name was officially reverted to Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar, like other colonial denominations around the region. Examples from Morocco are 
much less numerous than those from Algeria, but include: Port Lyautey = Kénitra; Cap Blanc 
= Lagouira; Petitjean = Sidi-Kacem; and Louis-Gentil = Youssoufia (Malherbe 2008, 70). Since 
then, the names Berguent and Bargam have disappeared from official written documents. 
Yet, the people in and around town have kept using the name. Al- Ayn is also frequentlyʿ  
heard today, whereas Ra s al- Ayn seems to have become quite rare (I only encountered itʾ ʿ  
with elderly speakers) and the official name, Ayn Bani Mathar, is only used by educatedʿ  
individuals when dealing with outsiders. This parallel existence of official and vernacular 
place names is common across the Arab world and beyond.
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Figure 34: Road sign, November 2011
Recently, the widespread use of the name Bargam (French spelling: Berguem) has led to it 
being included on direction signs in places a few hundred kilometers away, written in both 
Arabic and Latin characters. I took a picture of one such sign in Awtat al-Hajj at the western 
end of the high plateaus. As one gets closer to the town, this colloquial form disappears from 
signs and milestones and the official name is the only one visible. Yet it is conceivable that 
the vernacularized colonial name will eventually replace the official one on more street signs, 
maps, and written documents. The road sign, at any rate, contributes to ‘authorizing knowl-
edge’ (Li 2007, 286), one characteristic step in assemblage making. It has modified the assem-
blage that is the name of the town and has shown it to be less stable than expected.
Looking at the population that makes up this place, the town center has long been a 
melting pot for people of different origins, and Bani Mathar tribesmembers are a minority – 
while  representing  the  dominant  group  in  most  of  the  villages  nearby.  In  addition,  the 
weekly market of Ayn Bani Mathar has a catchment area well beyond its immediate surʿ -
roundings. Throughout history, this town has often been the gateway for innovations whose 
effects then started spreading out into the steppe. For instance, the first pharmacy in Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar opened in 1982 or 83; there had been a simple dispensary before. Today, there  
are six pharmacies in the center and another two in Hayy al-Ziyani. The tenant of the oldest 
drugstore, Saydaliyyat al-Shih (Wormwood Pharmacy), recalls the old days:
‘In the beginning, people trusted the pharmacist a lot. When they came to the phar-
macy it was like going to the doctor. When the pharmacist gave them some medicine, 
they would go home confident and relieved. Later, as things developed and the town 
became more crowded, medical specialists came.’  (Interview with pharmacist,  Aynʿ  
Bani Mathar, June 1, 2010)
Medicine plays an important economic role  for many families,  nomads and non-nomads 
alike.  In  my survey,  two fifths of  all  households  are  burdened by regular  health-related 
expenses, usually for various forms of medication. The average expenses amount to 313 dh 
per month for these families, about five daily wages for an unskilled laborer or one third of a 
sheep.
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Unlike the more distant past, money is now an integral part of most economic activities 
in the region, even for nomads in the steppe (Rachik 2009). In urban Morocco, consumerism 
has reached unprecedented levels, as private banks increasingly offer credit lines to their cus-
tomers. They try to reach more and more families, targeting specifically middle and working 
classes, with consumer loans and credit cards. Such activities have multiplied since the 1990s, 
when the banking sector was widely deregulated (Benjamaa 2015). One urban advertising 
campaign I noticed relates to the rural world of sheep producers: in the weeks leading up to 
id al- adhaʿ ʾ , the festival of sacrifice, a bank advertised on billboards in Moroccan towns. The 
slogan read in colloquial Arabic: ‘Ila bghiti hawli smin / khud lik kridi zwin’ (if you want a fat 
ram, take out a nice loan), encouraging family heads to purchase a prestigious, high-priced 
sacrificial animal even if this means getting into debt. This general approach to sacrifice is not 
new; in one incident described in 1927 by writer Jules Borély, a destitute servant ‘pawned his 
mother’s silver bracelets in order to sacrifice on Id al-Kabir’ (Holden 2009, 165). In precoloʿ -
nial times, poorer urban families had more typically pooled their resources to buy a common 
sacrificial ram (Holden 2009). While most residents of Ayn Bani Mathar either keep sheepʿ  
themselves or can easily obtain one from a relative, banks have started touting loans to them 
for other purposes.
In the rural municipalities that composed my sample, most large-scale, exceptional pri-
vate investments in the previous five years went into operations and medical expenses (55 
households out of 465), house construction (28), or the purchase of tractors (15), cars (11), or 
trucks (8). Livestock, land, the drilling of wells, and the purchase of a work contract for Spain 
are also mentioned more than once. The amounts invested range from less than 3,000 dh for 
medical  operations  to  over  300,000 dh  for  real  estate.  Naturally,  the  average  volume  of 
investments  significantly  increases  with  wealth  (as  per  my calculated  index).  Herd size, 
nomadism status, age of household head, and municipality do not display similarly evident 
correlations with this indicator.  As for the funding sources, most of these investments are 
self-financed (84%) and/or enabled by private loans (23%). Bank loans are still very uncom-
mon (4%), and no more than seven households in my sample (2%) are members in a credit 
association: the state-owned Crédit Agricole, the country’s largest microcredit provider Al 
Amana, or the regionally based Al Karama association. This rate seems low given the fact 
that Morocco has become a regional leader in the propagation of formal microfinance institu-
tions since they were first introduced in the Middle Atlas in 1993 (Allaire et al. 2009), but may 
be seen as an indicator of the political and economic marginality of the high plateaus.
In summary, the town of Ayn Bani Mathar fulfills many functions for the northern partʿ  
of the Moroccan high plateaus and for the nomadic, former nomadic, and sedentary people 
who live there. Not least, Ayn Bani Mathar is an integral part of drought assemblages – itʿ  
provides resources to mitigate the harmful effects of drought, and it accommodates those 
who have had to give up pastoralism due to drought conditions. As a social melting pot, the 
town has for a long time brought together different actants,  human and nonhuman, and 
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served as a gateway for innovation. Newly emerging forms of consumerism have become 
hallmarks of an accelerating urbanization process. In the next chapter, I will take a closer 
look at the development of taste as a form of social distinction in this context, focusing in 
particular on young people and the generational social transformations they are a part of. As 
the last element in my drought assemblage, this analysis also serves as an outlook, as an 
attempt to fathom what kind of community drought may be confronted with in the future – 
and how this may transform drought itself.
 3.6 Social Distinction and Generational Shifts
At an advanced phase of our fieldwork, my team and I were keen to find out what it was like 
growing up in the high plateaus today; a group of adolescents we met in Ayn Bani Matharʿ  
provided answers.11 Rachid, an energetic eighteen-year-old who wears a Real Madrid jersey 
and stonewashed jeans, has grown up here. In his spare time, he plays music in a band that  
he started with his friends, Abdelkrim and Youssef. Seated in the garden of a café, the three 
young men talk about their experience (the following quotes are all from our interview that 
took place in Ayn Bani Mathar on June 4, 2010).ʿ
Through their story, I would like to address phenomena of urbanization that are cur-
rently visible in this rural region close to the Algerian border, and that are partly driven by 
drought. Urbanization expresses itself, among other things, through a change in consump-
tion habits: the clothes you wear, the music you listen to, and the way you celebrate your 
wedding have all turned into opportunities to develop and display your taste.
Rachid, Abdelkrim, and Youssef’s band, which is made up of about ten high school and 
college students, was formed in 2008. Rachid had the idea to start his own musical group 
while he played in another orchestra. But the young musicians hardly care about vernacular 
music, the irfaʿ , or interpretations by the shuyukh, the local singers. Instead, they practice and 
promote  the  daqqa  murrakushiyya,  a  popular  music  style  that  originates  in  Marrakesh  in 
southern Morocco. Rachid explains: ‘We had seen it elsewhere, in Oujda, in Meknès, in the 
west of the country. I said to myself: why not introduce it here at home?’ Their inspiration,  
thus, comes from other parts of Morocco that are easily accessible to these young people. In 
addition,  there  are  practical  considerations  behind  their  choice:  to  make  raï music,  for 
instance, is expensive because it requires a lot of material, according to Abdelkrim. Raï is a 
style that evolved in Algerian cities, notably in Oran, and probably has precursors in pas-
toralist musical practices (Asensio Llamas 2002). It is very popular in northeastern Morocco, 
and CDs are readily available on the market of Ayn Bani Mathar.ʿ
In the northern high plateaus, the three young men were the first to introduce the daqqa. 
There are several groups in town, however, who perform the traditional irfaʿ  music, and one 
that specializes in Islamic anthems (nashid). This latter group is close to Islamist movements 
11 The material presented in the first part of this chapter has been published in French (Kreuer 2015).
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which the young men refer to as ikhwan (‘brothers,’ a reference to Egypt’s Muslim Brother-
hood); explaining this, Rachid signals a long beard with his hand and laughs. That group 
recruits young people in town, but ‘they rather stick to themselves.’ A certain diversification, 
maybe even competition in the local scene of leisure activities becomes evident here.
The existence as musicians is narrowly linked to weddings, which represent the ideal 
occasion to appear in public and earn some money. According to my interviewees, the open-
ing of  a  first  wedding hall  in  2007 has  spawned an entire  business  sector  in  Ayn Baniʿ  
Mathar. The hall’s owner is a former livestock producer from the region who lives in France 
and only comes home during his summer vacations; and weddings are usually celebrated in 
the summer. Female wedding planners (naggafat) can now be found in town, an unknown 
profession just a few years ago. The idea was imported, according to Rachid and his col-
leagues, from Oujda, the capital of the region, which is separated from the High Plateaus by 
a mountain range. Moreover, there are now four or five women’s hairdressers and even a 
vocational school for female hairdressers,  a caterer,  women who work as cooks,  and our 
young musicians who no longer play the traditional melodies. The youngsters have even 
printed their own business cards which they hand out during their engagements besides dis-
tributing them to retail stores in town so they do not miss a potential client.
To the question whether people like their kind of music, Youssef responds: ‘There are 
some. We have to pass on this message. The shuyukh are very popular here; we try to change 
the mentality a little bit.’ With this attitude, the youngsters inscribe themselves in a global  
dynamic  of  multiple  transformations  that  touch the  whole  community;  I  have described 
them throughout this thesis. For some of the region’s households, international migration 
offers an opportunity to gain a substantial non-pastoral income (ch.  3.4, p.  139), and many 
adolescents  dream of  a future in Europe. Currently,  Spain is the first destination for the 
young men of the steppe, given its demand in seasonal labor force in the agricultural sector. 
Rachid  notes,  nevertheless,  a  certain  disenchantment  with  emigration,  which has  spread 
notably since the financial crisis of 2008. A number of former emigrants nowadays prefer 
staying in Morocco and launching local projects. Expecting economic cycles to keep changing 
as they always have, an exiled poet who was born in Ayn Bani Mathar summarizes theʿ  
prevalent feeling: ‘Each season brings its share of hope and disillusion’ (Bessedet 2005, 1, my 
translation).
Migration is also a concern for the young musicians, because the permanent emigrants 
who come home every summer for the wedding season do not just bring along money. They 
also seem to be open to new ideas – such as the daqqa murrakushiyya. ‘We work with those 
from abroad,’ Abdelkrim narrates:
‘People here ask for irfaʿ , shuyukh, and that’s it. They are used to this thing. When we 
work, it’s in July or August, when people return home from France, from Belgium. We 
work with them, that is to say two or three months a year, that’s all.’
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The innovation that Rachid and his friends have introduced was first accepted by migrants 
and young people, who possibly see it as a means to distinguish themselves from the older 
generation.
The young musicians are integrated, from many perspectives, into globalized networks 
of consumption and identity construction. Like almost everywhere in Morocco, there is an 
internet café in every neighborhood of the small town. Even in the rural municipalities where 
I conducted my survey, outside the town itself, 87% of all households owned one or several  
cell phones in late 2009. High school students in Ayn Bani Mathar rely on Wikipedia forʿ  
doing their homework, follow the latest national debates on Facebook, and find it very natu-
ral to enjoy the daqqa which has, historically, nothing to do with the region.
This does not necessarily imply a social rupture, however. Our three young men know 
the traditions of their respective tribes well, exemplified by wedding rituals which they are 
able to describe in detail. They respect these traditions and do not behave like rebels. Never-
theless, they try persistently to establish new elements in their surroundings, to enroll new 
actors in their personal assemblages. The tribal context, for example, becomes insignificant in 
their group. Life in town brings tribes and lineages closer to one another and mixes them, 
and music unites them.
However, music can also create divisions when tastes diverge. ‘Young people are into 
raï,’ Abdelkrim states, whereas Rachid prefers rap and sha biʿ  music. Youssef, in turn, rather 
listens to Western music in addition to  raï. But there is some ambivalence:  raï is associated 
with the consumption of alcohol,  admits Abdelkrim, and is hence ‘not appropriate here.’  
Moral questions like this are inescapable when you live in a small community. This also con-
cerns the relation between genders. None of the three young men indicates having a girl-
friend. The high school is the only place where boys and girls are able to meet, according to  
Abdelkrim. He gives evidence of a gender dimension in musical habits: girls listen mostly to 
Egyptian,  Khaliji (from the Gulf states) and Lebanese singers, which boys hardly take seri-
ously. In this way, the young steppe dwellers develop their individual tastes which create 
distinctions between them. It does not seem reasonable, given the newness of such trends 
and the limited size of the community in question, to identify distinct social classes. Nor was 
I able to spot subcultures as they can be found in larger cities across the Kingdom. But they 
may well become visible in the future.
Another field of distinction that offers itself  to the young people is  fashion. Rachid’s 
stonewashed jeans are not a coincidence; he has selected them with care in order to be prop-
erly dressed. In this context, it is instructive to compare townspeople with those who live in 
the  steppe.  They are  connected by family ties,  but  live  in  very different  worlds.  Rachid 
explains: ‘My grandfather’s tent is out in the steppe and I go there on a regular basis.’ There  
are also some cousins, of the same age, over there. Their attitude with regards to fashion 
styles is quite different:
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‘And in terms of clothes… For example, you bought some neat pants and you take 
them to the steppe. He’ll ask you: how much were they? And you tell him: 20,000 frank 
[=200 dirhams]. He cannot endure it, he will tell you: I buy used pants for 2,000 frank 
and they serve me for an entire year. He doesn’t know the brand, nothing at all.’
Another time, a pair of sports shoes turned into a social actor that made a difference, thanks 
both to its  inherent distinction-marking propensity of  a capitalist  consumer good and to 
Rachid’s efforts of saving money, finding, and buying them:
‘I took some sneakers I had bought to the steppe. I had bought them for 65,000. [My 
cousin] got up and wouldn’t sit with me anymore. For 50 or 60,000, he’ll clothe himself 
for five years.’
Thus, a clear separation between town dwellers and steppe people is being drawn, at least in 
the mind of Rachid and his peers. When they muse about the reasons for change, the young 
musicians cite the motif of imitation. No matter how dramatic social change might appear 
from a distance, the transformations usually operate without producing any spectacle; they 
accumulate from day to day through mundane practices.  The emigrant who opened the 
wedding hall, according to Rachid, quite simply
‘thought: there is no hall here, and he built one. He had livestock, sheep, he was well  
off, and he loved the steppe. When he went to France, he started imitating others. Peo-
ple do nothing but imitate. Like ourselves with the band: […] there is something new, 
the daqqa, and we wanted to do that, too.’
Imitation and slight variation are rather effortless, yet powerful ways of promoting change, 
quite in the sense of Jullien’s silent transformations (Jullien 2009). Another recent change fol-
lows a similar logic:  some high school students,  ‘those who are developed’  according to 
Youssef, have started celebrating their birthdays with a party. The concept of development is 
frequently invoked in conversations, even though some older people resent the changes. A 
public scrivener concedes that ‘the young people manage to pass their time’ thanks to new 
information technologies, but ‘they do not learn anything useful anymore’ (Interview with 
scrivener Idris, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 5, 2010).ʿ
In spite of this nostalgia by some, new social categories are establishing themselves in the 
community. In former times, you basically had to count someone’s sheep in order to deduct 
their  social  status;  in  the  twenty-first  century,  you  rather  have  to  distinguish  between 
migrants and non-migrants, townspeople and inhabitants of the steppe, and even between 
the adherents of different styles of music, if you really want to understand this society in  
transformation. The desire to distinguish oneself from others may be ancient and universal, 
but the various forms this can take and the opportunities that are available to young people  
in Ayn Bani Mathar today are quite recent and keep proliferating.ʿ
The names given to newborn babies are another potential indicator of shifting trends and 
fashions over time. In the tribal community of eastern Morocco, local preferences for male 
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and female first names may have changed across generations; I produced naming charts to 
have a look at this. Since my interviewers wrote down the names of all household members, 
a list of over 3,000 persons with hundreds of different given names (which may include mul-
tiple spelling variants of the same name) is available, even though a number of men pre-
ferred not to disclose the names of their wives. The most popular female names are, overall:  
Fatima (or  Fatna),  A isha,  and Khadija –  names of  daughters  and wives of  the prophetʿ ʾ  
Muhammad. For males, the three most common names are Muhammad (as in many Muslim 
countries), Ahmad, and Abd al-Qadir. But when compared across age groups, more fine-ʿ
grained naming trends can be discerned (Table  21). While Fatima and Muhammad remain 
unchallenged at the top, other popular names come and go with the decades. However, nam-
ing fashions seem to change more quickly now than they did a generation ago, and this can 
be interpreted as another sign of increasing individualism and distinction.
Born in the 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Fatima
Zahraʾ
A ishaʿ ʾ
Fatima
Zahraʾ
A ishaʿ ʾ
Fatima
A ishaʿ ʾ
Zahraʾ
Rashida
Fatima
A ishaʿ ʾ
Karima
Miluda
Fatima
Karima
Fatiha
Samira
Fatima
Khadija
Fatiha
Bushra
Fatima
Khadija
Fatiha
Hajar
Muhammad
Milud
Ahmad
Buʿalam
ʿAli
Muhammad
Abd al-Rahmanʿ
Ahmad
Muhammad
Abdallahʿ
Ahmad
Abd al-Rahmanʿ
Jum aʿ
Muhammad
Ahmad
Abd al-Rahmanʿ
Muhammad
Ahmad
Abd al-Karimʿ
Rashid
Abd al-Qadirʿ
Muhammad
Ahmad
Abd al-Karimʿ
Muhammad
Hamza
Yusuf
Table 21: Most popular names per decade for girls and boys
To test whether there are other differences between older and younger generations, I looked 
at my survey data through another lens: namely, by grouping together those families whose 
household heads have similar ages. These cohorts obviously occupy different positions in the 
reproductive cycle, so certain differences in wealth and demographics can be expected. Some 
characteristics,  however,  may  indicate  larger  social  transformations.  I  chose  fifteen-year 
intervals in order to obtain a manageable number of categories and a reasonable number of 
cases per category. The four groups I distinguished, along with some of their characteristics, 
are displayed in Table 22.
The  expected  differences  include  the  average  number  of  household  members  which 
increases with age. A large number of wealth indicators also strictly follow the age gradient: 
the existence of migrants in the larger family; possession of an animal stable and a truck; 
land holdings, both in terms of prevalence and of surface area; and the ownership of a solid 
house. All those things tend to accumulate the older you get. In addition, they may have 
been more easily accessible in the past, when pieces of land, for instance, were more abun-
dantly available for private appropriation (see the discussion in ch. 2.4, p. 72). Membership in 
PDPEO-created rangeland cooperatives, which I earlier interpreted as a sign of influence and 
social capital, is much more widespread among the older generations of household heads,  
too.
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On the other hand, the proportion of livestock producers is similar across all four age 
cohorts, concerning four out of five families in my sample. Their average herd size fluctuates 
widely, but is actually highest among the second youngest group: household heads between 
35 and 49 years of age. At the same time, this group has the highest share of families who 
have never been nomadic (over 50% in this category). Apparently, most stories of a success-
ful transition from the old ways toward a modernized, sedentary, entrepreneurial livestock 
production model can be found among these men under 50.
The youngest age cohort, those who have just recently founded their own families, gen-
erally start out in the worst economic situation, judging from these indicators. As their par-
ents are typically still alive, inherited wealth plays no role at this stage. Strikingly, the pro-
portion of nomadic households is highest among this group (36%). Does this mean that the 
much-lamented decline of nomadism is about to stop, as more and more young people get 
ready to move again? Or will they switch to an urban lifestyle once they have saved some 
money to build a house and their children have grown old enough to go to school? The bulk  
of my observations points at the latter option as the most likely pattern – but nomadism is 
not predominantly an old people’s affair, at least for now.
Age <35
N=63
Age 35-49
N=167
Age 50-64
N=145
Age 65+
N=88
Members in HH (mean) 5.7 7.1 8.6 9.1
Migrants in family 46% 49% 59% 66%
Co-op members in family 13% 23% 38% 38%
Have sheep 78% 80% 83% 83%
Herd size (mean) 110 180 153 165
Have a stable 37% 42% 46% 60%
Practice fattening 77% 70% 69% 60%
Own a truck 10% 14% 25% 28%
Own land 64% 74% 86% 93%
Land owned (mean hectares) 8.1 20.8 21.9 32.1
Own a house 59% 65% 70% 82%
Nomads 36% 22% 22% 24%
Former nomads 21% 26% 43% 58%
Non-nomads 43% 52% 35% 18%
Children should take up same profession = yes 12% 15% 27% 43%
Table 22: Generations and their characteristics
There is one domain where the younger family heads are consistently more engaged than the 
older ones: the fattening of livestock. This practice, which did not play a large role before the 
advent of trucks, troughs, and supplementary fodder, has been adopted most willingly by 
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younger generations.  In all  likelihood, this can be taken as a gradual change in livestock 
management mentalities in the high plateaus of eastern Morocco.
The final part of my survey questionnaire dealt with the respondents’ outlook to the 
future – the future of their family in particular and pastoralism in general. Asked whether  
they would like their children to take up their parents’ profession, 43% of the oldest cohort  
answered in the affirmative. While this may already appear like a low percentage, it drops 
even more among the younger generations, down to a dismaying 12% among the youngest 
group of adults. Granted, the older you are, the more likely it is that your children have  
already chosen a profession, so the question may not be applicable any more for the oldest 
cohort. All the more so, this complete lack of perspective and esteem for their own profession 
paints a rather bleak picture for the future of pastoralism in this part of North Africa – at  
least in its current forms.
Those  who  preferred  different  occupations  for  their  children  were  asked  what  they 
would like them to become. A quite typical answer across all categories is the very modest  
statement:  ‘I  want  them to  be  at  ease’  (Interview with Abdelkader,  Awlad Sidi  Abd al-ʿ
Hakim, June 3, 2010). The pastoralist reality is often described as hard work that does not 
pay off. Overall, the largest fraction of parents in my survey would love their offspring to  
become state employees, mirroring a preference for a stable income displayed by most ‘poor 
people around the world’ (Banerjee and Duflo 2011, 226); the second favorite is a commercial  
activity. This sector does not play any role yet, as Table 23 shows: across the generations, just 
one percent of all incomes is generated by trade activities.
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Age <35 61 6 7 18 1 4 - 1 - - 2 -
Age 35-49 58 4 8 23 1 3 - - 1 - 2 -
Age 50-64 64 4 4 17 1 4 - 1 1 - 5 -
Age 65+ 70 4 - 11 1 - - 3 3 1 7 -
Table 23: Income sources (mean percentage) by age group
The 35-49 age group, the one preponderantly consisting of non-nomads, stands out as the 
generation with the lowest reliance on livestock and the highest share of wage labor as a 
source of income. Employment as a shepherd for someone else, generally considered a sign 
of poverty, is also most important among the younger household heads. The oldest genera-
tion of families, on the other hand, overwhelmingly relies on animal production, but also on 
transfer income from pensions, social assistance programs, and remittances. Newer genera-
tions increasingly unlock other income sources as salaried employees or as self-employed, 
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independent professionals outside the sphere of livestock. Rents from real estate and the like 
play no role at all in these rural municipalities, however, although the picture probably looks 
different inside the town of Ayn Bani Mathar, which was not covered by this survey.ʿ
Some items in  my questionnaire  are not  correlated to age groups at  all,  notably the 
respondents’ satisfaction in different fields and their opinions on a number of controversial 
issues.  Moreover,  the four wealth categories calculated earlier (ch.  3.2, p.  117) are spread 
across the generations in a fairly even manner. Thus, the accumulation of wealth over a life-
time, suggested by the indicators mentioned above, cannot be taken for granted for all fami-
lies.
A  direct  relation  between  drought  and  generations  emerges  from  my  survey  data, 
adding another  link  into  the  assemblage.  Responding to  an  open-ended question,  many 
interviewees identified drought as the biggest negative change that had affected them in the 
past 15 years. Their proportion climbs from 13% in the youngest age bracket over 22% and 
31% in the middle-aged groups to 36% among the most senior family heads. Those who have 
the longest experience looking back, in other words, find drought to be the most important  
agent of change. Several studies in the US found that ‘more experienced producers were 
more accurate in their expectations’ regarding drought hazards (Woudenberg, Wilhite, and 
Hayes 2008, 99), which is probably true in Morocco as well. The finding that younger genera-
tions do not consider drought as an outstanding problem confirms that drought has become 
less of a remarkable event and more of an omnipresent reality.  Their shorter horizons of 
comparison may not include a prolonged absence of drought. On the other hand, drought 
never affects every community member equally in their experience; so the young adults may 
feel better adapted and less vulnerable to the hazard individually.
Even if drought has not substantially changed over the centuries, it now meets a differ-
ent society that has developed a variety of responses and protection mechanisms, relying on 
new technologies and livestock production strategies. These changes have accumulated over 
time. They are not radical ruptures with past conditions and practices – rather, they operate 
as silent transformations and gradual shifts. To understand the contemporary meaning of 
drought, it is therefore essential to analyze the tribal community and everything that goes on 
in it. With the open-mindedness of an actor-network theorist, surprising actants, connections, 
and assemblages come to light: even the appearance of a vocational school for female hair-
dressers in Ayn Bani Mathar and the emergence of a market for feminine beauty can beʿ  
linked to drought! Not only is the shift away from nomadic pastoralism and toward urban 
lifestyles heavily driven by economic necessities imposed by drought. Wedding ceremonies 
also tend to be celebrated with much less extravagance in dry years, or they are postponed 
altogether. As Bilal, the meteorologist, puts it:
‘When  it  rains  a  lot,  there  are  many  weddings.’  (Interview  with  Bilal,  Ayn  Baniʿ  
Mathar, November 2, 2011)
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Drought phenomena, the interests of sheep and goats,  invisible beings,  and shifting con-
sumption patterns within the tribal community of the Moroccan high plateaus continue to be 
inextricably intertwined and should therefore not be studied in isolation. The tribal commu-
nity interacts with drought in countless ways, and they keep slightly – but unremittingly – 
modifying each other.
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 4 Interpretation and Reflection: The Meaning of Drought
To complete this journey through the complex and delicate drought networks of the eastern 
Moroccan steppe, I will discuss my findings and conclusions in this final part. As signaled in 
the introduction, this study’s empirical insights into the pastoral community of the Moroccan 
high plateaus constitute my most fundamental  contribution to scholarly knowledge.  Sec-
ondly,  I  have endeavored to  forge  a  new connection  between actor-network  theory  and 
assemblage thinking on the one hand and Middle East studies on the other. I will discuss,  
thirdly, several political implications of this approach. Finally, beyond the confines of a sin-
gle discipline or  geographic region,  I  will  outline a fresh epistemological  perspective  on 
highly  relevant,  but  too  easily  taken-for-granted  and  punctualized  phenomena  such  as 
drought. In this final part of my thesis, I will address these four aspects in turn, and evaluate 
the lessons learned during my pursuit.
In a time of accelerating climate change, a full understanding of drought is perhaps more 
urgently needed than ever before. But drought has accompanied humankind from the very 
beginning and may even be considered ‘an integral component in the evolution of humanity’ 
itself (Heathcote 2013, 62). My fieldwork region is a case in point, and drought ‘has been the  
leading natural hazard in Morocco since the earliest historical times’ (Swearingen 1992, 403). 
In this light, my thesis is also an attempt to answer the call made by an Australian drought  
expert:
‘The scientific study of drought cannot be left to the natural scientists alone; social sci-
entists have a similar and vitally necessary contribution to make.’ (Heathcote 2013, 264)
A specific contribution of the social sciences to global knowledge about drought makes sense 
in another regard, too. I would argue that my research helps discredit the dualistic division 
between  nature and  society,  which is  no longer justified in the Anthropocene,  the current 
period in which humanity has become a geological force. Instead, we should focus on under-
standing the one world we all are in (Latour 2017). My study can thus provide a modest con-
tribution to ‘the development of knowledge systems that better expose the range of human 
and nonhuman materialities involved in the worlds of pastoralism’ and beyond (Gertel and 
Le Heron 2011, 330).
The answer to my research question – What is drought? – cannot be summed up in two 
words or sentences. Fundamentally, this entire text is the answer. It is my own fragile assem-
blage that will need a combination of efforts by myself and others if it is to survive and  
become more stable. What I hope to have shown is that a surprising array of human and 
nonhuman actors appears once the ‘black box’ of drought is opened. These actors are all 
linked to drought in one way or another. The assemblages they try to build, stabilize, and 
hold together to further their various particular interests often involve drought as a central 
ingredient; in turn, they perpetually redefine drought itself, ever so exiguously.
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 4.1 Empirical Insights: Rural Morocco and the State of Nomadism
The transformations that are currently reconfiguring collectives in the northern high plateaus 
have parallels in other parts of rural Morocco. As part of a research team, I was able to study 
them in the High Atlas in 2009 and again in 2012 (cf. Breuer et al. 2012). Once considered an  
important livestock-producing region, the economy of the Asni municipality there has prin-
cipally switched from a combination of subsistence agriculture and transhumance to market-
based fruit production. The nearly complete disappearance of pastoralism sets that region 
apart from the high plateaus, as does the mountain tourism that benefits considerable por-
tions  of  the  village  communities  in  the  High  Atlas.  While  initiatives  to  promote  either 
tourism or irrigated farming do exist in the steppes of the east, they remain embryonic and 
will not achieve a comparable presence in the near future. Other developments are identical 
in both regions: wage labor is becoming the dominant form of income-generating activity, 
infrastructure networks (roads, electricity, communications) are being upgraded at a rapid 
pace, and local lifestyles have started gravitating toward urban modes of consumption and 
distinction. The somewhat stronger diversification within the local economy in Asni goes 
hand in hand with an increasing wealth differentiation among families and a growing expo-
sure to global market fluctuations (Breuer et al. 2012) – consequences that may be expected 
for the high plateaus if social and economic policies fail to keep such trends in check (ch. 2.7, 
p.  94). A key difference between the Atlas and the steppe concerns the role of labor migra-
tion, which is much more pronounced in the high plateaus, especially in its seasonal form. As 
shown above, the income thus generated has in part been reinvested in the livestock busi-
ness, making this sector more resilient to change in the short term.
My fieldwork in the plateaus showed, in general,  that any social reality is  extremely 
complex and dynamic, even within a small and quite homogeneous rural population. The 
individual chapters provide examples of how specific variables are able to capture aspects of 
this variation, but also make clear that there is no single criterion that explains a large num-
ber of them. In my analysis, this is due to the diversity of assemblages put together by each 
household – the multifarious connections between each family and a spate of human and 
nonhuman actants. The two main categorizations I relied on are based on nomadic mobility 
on the one hand and tribal affiliation on the other. While certainly valuable for an apprecia-
tion of this community, both have clear limitations.
Nomads, former nomads, and non-nomads often have similar lifestyles, regardless of the 
question of household mobility. Wealth statuses, moreover, cut across these categories, and 
social identities are more closely linked to tribal affiliations. Even the meaning of tribes has 
started eroding where urban consumption patterns offer new opportunities for distinction; 
but the four municipalities still exhibit some obvious differences regarding their inhabitants. 
This is a central outcome of my 2009 household survey. In the following paragraphs, I will 
briefly reiterate what stands out, statistically, about each municipality, going from west to 
east (cf. Figure 5, p. 46). On an aggregate level, these findings illustrate the different options 
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people may have when they encounter drought. Such tendencies and patterns would have 
been harder or impossible to detect if I had just collected and compared a few dozen individ-
ual histories; they also go beyond the information that has been available in the scholarly and 
administrative literature so far.
Awlad Ghuzayyil has the highest percentage of nomadic families in my sample. Cases of 
newly settled or only-ever-sedentary households are relatively infrequent, making up about 
one-fourth each. The intuitive impression that this is the most archetypal of the four commu-
nities is corroborated by the fact that its members have the highest percentage of relatives 
who still practice the steppe lifestyle. Awlad Ghuzayyil residents can view the highest num-
ber of tents from their current home. The average family size is the largest of all four munici-
palities,  conforming to  the  image  of  many family  members  living  under  the  same roof. 
Regarding other indicators such as wealth, education, or general satisfaction with their liveli-
hood circumstances, these pastoralists fall on an intermediate position. While electric house-
hold appliances are less prevalent, the rate of truck ownership is highest in Awlad Ghuza-
yyil. Trucks are essential not least because of the peculiar spatial setup of this community: 
many families  live  far  away from sources  of  drinking water,  the  average distance  being 
higher than anywhere else. While pastoral production is also dominant in the three remain-
ing municipalities, the feeling that ample empty spaces are available for grazing decreases as 
one moves eastward.
Murayja, whose residents belong to the same overarching tribe as Awlad Ghuzayyil, is 
home to the region’s largest nucleus of urbanization outside Ayn Bani Mathar. The settleʿ -
ment of Murayja has been growing consistently, as has the overall population (Table 25, p. 
163). In this municipality, the proportion of emigrants is highest; they clearly constitute a 
source of wealth. This wealth is reflected both in conventional measures (such as the live-
stock head count, where Murayja comes second after Awlad Ghuzayyil) and in more up-to-
date ones (my wealth index: ch. 3.2, p. 117). Overall, residents of Murayja profess the highest 
satisfaction with their economic situation, and they include the wealthiest households in my 
sample. They also own the highest number of cell phones per household. Individual cases of 
impoverishment  notwithstanding,  the  pastoral  economy  has  been  successfully  comple-
mented by wage labor, and living standards have consistently improved in the view of many 
survey respondents in Murayja.
Bani Mathar: In the 1950s, this tribe was described as semi-nomadic, i.e., mobile during 
part of the year only, and thus as distinct from the surrounding communities (Paskoff 1957).  
This trend has further increased in the villages and hamlets since, facilitated by the proximity 
to the urban center of Ayn Bani Mathar. Thanks to this innovation hub, Matharis also benefitʿ  
from expanding infrastructures earlier than the other rural residents. Their reliance on the 
public electricity grid is highest, and they have the highest share of tap water availability.  
Access to schools, hospitals, and markets is considerably easier. Among my sample munici-
palities,  Bani  Mathar has the highest  diversity of  professional  activities.  They are  locally 
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based, however: the proportion of emigrants is lowest here. Yet, cosmopolitan attitudes are 
developing, as illustrated by the story of the young musicians in the town center (ch. 3.6, p. 
150). The tribe as a point of reference is least important in the Bani Mathar municipality 
today (Table  9, p.  107), as other facets of individual or collective identities are emphasized 
more strongly.
The  Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ  territories are situated next to the Algerian border. A 
feeling of constriction and enclosure runs strong here. This is in stark contrast to a descrip-
tion from the mid-1990s, when this community seems to have been ‘characterized by strong 
nomadism, active speculation, encouraged by the proximity of the border, and the practice of 
fattening’  (Lazarev 2008,  14,  my translation).  A later analysis by the PDPEO project staff 
agrees with the last point, the high reliance on feed supplement, but explains this observa-
tion with the small amount of available rangeland per animal. While the livestock production 
systems of the other three municipalities are categorized as ‘semi-extensive’ in that report,  
that of Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim is therefore labeled ‘semi-intensive’ (DPA Figuig 2006, 8).ʿ  
My survey found no evidence of notable cross-border speculation or nomadic mobility here. 
In fact, indicators of mobility and wealth are comparatively low in this community, includ-
ing herd sizes. At the same time, the prevalence of wage labor and non-agricultural activities  
is lowest, which means that the interviewed families almost exclusively depend on livestock 
for income generation (91% of household incomes – compared to 82% in Awlad Ghuzayyil,  
65% in Murayja, and only 41% in Bani Mathar). While the proportion of solar panels is high-
est in Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, the overall electrification rate is lowest (ch.  ʿ 3.3, p.  129). 
Given this combination of spatial restrictions, the lack of economic alternatives, and a disad-
vantageous infrastructural setting, this community’s feeling of neglect and marginalization is 
completely understandable.
Focusing only on the differences in nomadic mobility, income diversification, and the 
resulting self-perceived well-being of households, the following table gives a crude summary 
of the four rural municipalities I studied. The ◦ sign denotes unexceptional values, while + 
and - indicate comparatively high or low levels. This is no absolute, global assessment, but 
merely an attempt to tease out internal differences. Importantly, mobility and diversification 
constitute two fundamental strategies to cope with drought. Their uneven distribution across 
the communities underline that a detailed analysis is key to a full appreciation of drought, 
even within a seemingly homogeneous landscape. A combination of high pastoral mobility 
and high diversification will, under the current circumstances, lead to the most stable assem-
blage of resources for a pastoral household and thus to the highest prosperity level. This cor-
responds to findings by my colleague Ingo Breuer: diversified households were less likely to 
be poor and vulnerable in his study area in the High Atlas (Breuer 2007a). Although the  
notion of well-being I introduced here is not synonymous with drought resilience, I would 
argue that they are related.
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Nomadic mobility Economic diversification Well-being
Awlad Ghuzayyil + ◦ ◦
Murayja ◦ + +
Bani Mathar - + ◦
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ ◦ - -
Table 24: Mobility, diversification, and well-being in the four municipalities
With this rough characterization in mind, it  is worthwhile having another look at demo-
graphic trends in the four municipalities. My 2009 survey took place exactly in the middle of 
the ten-year interval in which censuses are currently carried out in Morocco (2004 and 2014). 
In this time span, the municipality that offers the lowest level of well-being, Awlad Sidi Abdʿ  
al-Hakim, witnessed a rather drastic population decline (Table  25). By contrast,  the other 
three  have  grown substantially.  The  number  of  households  has  remained unchanged in 
Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakim, while it has grown much faster than the overall population numʿ -
bers in both municipalities of the Awlad Sidi Ali Bu Shanafa tribe. This indicates a shrinkingʿ  
average family size in all three municipalities – Bani Mathar is the exception here and has 
moved up, relatively speaking, from smallest to second largest family size.
Awlad Ghuzayyil Murayja Bani Mathar Awlad Sidi Abd al-Hakimʿ
2004 (HCP 2007) 6,488  persons  (819 
households)
 7.9 persons/HH⌀
2,841 (453)
 6.3⌀
7,089 (1,152)
 6.2⌀
2,995 (401)
 7.5⌀
2014 (HCP 2015) 7,522 (1,074)
 7.0⌀
3,359 (581)
 5.8⌀
8,870 (1,469)
 6.0⌀
2,207 (392)
 5.6⌀
Change 2004-14 +16% (+31%) +18% (+28%) +25% (+28%) -26% (-2%)
Table 25: Demographic development of the four municipalities
The developments in the four selected municipalities of the northern high plateaus also add 
some perspective to long-running debates about nomad-state relationships and the future of 
nomadism broadly speaking. Throughout history, pastoral populations have been seen as 
antagonistic to sedentary centralized states for a variety of socio-economic, political, and geo-
graphical reasons.
‘Pastoralists’ mobility give[s] them visibly less allegiance to individual national gov-
ernments, and their refusal to form stable groups with which government can treat 
makes them seem all the less trustworthy. In addition, the arid and semi-arid zones 
where they operate are remote from centres of government and both inaccessible and 
expensive to administer.’ (Blench and Marriage 1999, 8)
Imperial ideologies did their part to marginalize nomadic populations, whose mode of land 
use was seen as ineffective. Hence, nomads were often
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‘regarded as legally non-existent. They were perceived as not being ‘civilised’ enough 
to have a right to occupy their lands. [This]  ‘agricultural argument’ resulted in the 
belief that territories inhabited by nomadic peoples were empty and open to conquest  
or discovery.’ (Gilbert 2007, 688)
This view is clearly echoed in policies like the neoliberal Green Morocco Plan (ch. 2.7, p. 94) 
with its focus on increasing agricultural productivity and competitiveness. As yet, the steppe 
seems to resist overly easy conquest, but more and more infrastructures and technologies are 
enlisted to help modernize and tame it.
Over the past decades, numerous authors have wondered whether the end of nomadism 
has come (Humphrey and Sneath 1999) or have flat-out declared nomadism dead (Scholz 
1999). In one such view, mobile pastoralists ‘are on the verge of extinction as a result of 
increasing restrictions on their right to use their traditional itinerant territories’ (Gilbert 2007, 
714). While this rings true, at least in part, for the increasingly bleak situation in Awlad Sidi  
Abd al-Hakim,  my survey findings  also  provide  a  counter-argument:  young  householdʿ  
heads are nomadic more often than older ones. Even though the circumstances are changing, 
the story of nomadism continues in Morocco.
In the scholarly literature, the argument has even been made that rangelands and pas-
toralism will become more important in the coming decades, globally speaking.
‘In most of these areas, there is  insufficient rainfall  to sustain agriculture, and as a 
result grazing by large herbivores offers the only sustainable way to turn sunlight into 
food for people. Climate warming and tropical deforestation promises to expand these 
lands  and,  in  so  doing,  will  amplify  the  importance  of  grazing animals  to  human 
economies and to human well-being worldwide.’ (Hobbs et al. 2008, 776–77)
If this is true, lessons learned from eastern Morocco should play a role in preparing other  
regions and populations for a nomadic future. For what it is worth, the situation in the high 
plateaus today is less prone to societal conflicts than that in other world regions – at least,  
there are no issues with competing ethnic groups. Such a constellation would inevitably add 
complexity to drought dynamics and everything else, as the number of powerful actors and 
potential alliances would increase.
In an exploration of the ‘political field’ of land use negotiations in eastern Morocco, I  
concluded: ‘Simple nomad–sedentary or tribe–state dichotomies are useless and misleading’ 
(Kreuer 2011, 66). One way out is offered by the actor-network approach – taking a step back 
and unpacking punctualizations – which I have used as the starting point for this study. My 
empirical survey data have consistently demonstrated that societies consist of actors who can 
be positioned along all sorts of continuous gradients rather than subdivided into clear-cut, 
mutually exclusive categories. Various numerically measurable factors like sheep herd size, 
wealth ranking, age cohort, or geographical location reveal fault lines and divergent develop-
ments, but these are often subtle and unstable when taken in isolation. Actor-network theo-
rists therefore ‘claim that it is only as a result of network-building activities that any stable  
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categories emerge – these do not precede the network’ (Murdoch 1997, 331). In other words, 
continued efforts of ‘forging alignments, rendering technical, authorizing knowledge, man-
aging failures, re-posing political questions and reassembling as the ground shifts’ (Li 2007, 
286)  are required to keep categories meaningful.  My study tries  to do the same, but the 
assemblages I propose will only be able to make a difference if they are picked up, connected 
to additional actants, and thus stabilized.
In  the  next  chapter,  I  will  further  explore  how my findings  relate  to  current  global 
debates that involve drought as a central aspect.
 4.2 Drought Matters: For an ANTification of Middle East Studies
Drought is an integral part of current debates on climate change, food security, and the Arab 
uprisings of the early 2010s. Insights from my study may possibly support, contradict, or  
expand certain standpoints within these three debates. After briefly addressing each of them, 
I will use the second part of this chapter to delineate the theoretical contribution my study 
will hopefully be able to make to the field of Middle East studies.
Regarding climate change, which is a proven fact despite persisting skepticism among 
certain segments of society (Latour 2017), Morocco is considered ‘the most vulnerable state in 
a vulnerable region’ (Schilling et al. 2012, 18) due to its high exposure and sensitivity on the 
one hand and low capacities for adaptation on the other. Climate models predict increasingly 
dry conditions in North Africa caused by shifting cyclone tracks (Schilling et al. 2012, 14), but 
these models are still unreliable and need further refinement. Meanwhile, profound knowl-
edge from empirical case studies is indispensable to properly link such modeling results to 
the complex socio-economic assemblages existing in places like the high plateaus. In addi-
tion, intensifying climate change means that ‘current drought indices may no longer work 
properly in quantifying future drought’ (Dai 2011, 58). As I will argue in the next chapter, 
even the notion of drought itself may one day become obsolete, although this seems paradox 
in a situation of globally escalating drought hazards.
One of the latest attempts by the international community to address humanity’s most 
pressing challenges, after the preceding Millennium Development Goals had achieved mixed 
results, are the Sustainable Development Goals. They specifically mention drought in Goal 
15.3, which also keeps the debatable idea of desertification (ch. 1.4, p. 38) alive:
‘By  2030,  combat  desertification,  restore  degraded  land  and  soil,  including  land 
affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land degrada-
tion-neutral world.’ (UN 2015)
Drought itself is not problematized in that quote, but taken as granted. As I have shown 
throughout this study, simplified, black-boxed conceptualizations of this kind are doomed to 
falling short when dealing with complex phenomena. My case study should ideally serve as 
a reminder of this complexity for actors who formulate policies addressing Goal 15.3.
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A related, but even more urgent concern on the global development agenda is food secu-
rity. From a food crisis prevention point of view, the causes of a drought are much less inter-
esting than the response – or absence of a response – to it (Devereux 2007), shifting the focus  
to policy (cf. next chapter). During my involvement in another research project on this topic, 
I have co-authored the following lines that summarize the nexus between drought, climate 
change, and food security in pastoral regions:
‘Drought-induced economic losses are seen as a major threat to global food security, 
particularly in drylands. The extent of this problem is predicted to increase with future 
climate change. Livestock systems are of particular concern in this regard. They make 
an important contribution to total food availability in places where crops cannot be 
easily grown, which is true for most parts of the world’s drylands.’ (Müller et al. 2015, 
153)
Another team of authors points out ‘indications for a link between drought, food security 
and social instability in Morocco’ (Schilling et al.  2012, 21), making reference to the occa-
sional, usually locally confined, food riots that have accompanied the Kingdom’s history. For 
any government, ensuring its citizens ‘access to affordable food […] is particularly difficult in 
lands where drought is a constant threat’ (Holden 2009, 2), and Morocco is no exception.
Food riots, moreover, were pivotal in the build-up to the recent wave of popular protests 
in the Arab world known as the ‘Arab spring’ (Gertel 2014).  That label has been used to 
describe a related string of events that started with protests in Tunisia and rapidly spread 
across much of the Middle East and North Africa. Governments were toppled, countless peo-
ple were killed, and several protracted conflicts and wars were started in the aftermath. The 
outcomes were less drastic in Morocco, where street protests led to a number of political 
reforms, but left the monarch’s absolute power unaffected. Events in Syria took a much more 
horrifying  turn.  Although the  degree  of  importance  is  a  matter  of  debate  (Châtel  2014), 
drought  is  widely  seen  as  one  of  the  triggers  of  the  2011  unrest  –  which  subsequently 
evolved into a civil war and pushed millions out of the country. In Syria, prolonged drought 
periods in the 2000s were followed by a ‘mass migration of rural farming families to urban 
areas’ (Kelley et al. 2015, 3242). Combined with an earlier influx of refugees from war-torn 
Iraq and a  history  of  misguided government  policies,  this  drought-related movement  of 
impoverished families helps explain the Syrian uprising (Kelley et al. 2015; Châtel 2014). And 
there are further predictions that the changing world climate will create massive amounts of 
climate refugees worldwide. In part, the potential effects of climate-induced migration and 
displacement may have been overestimated, however, as most cities grow rapidly with or 
without  rural  refugees  –  this  growth  itself  being  the  more  critical  issue  (Parnell  and 
Walawege 2011).
A further aspect of the Arab spring is remarkable: more often than not, small rural towns 
were the epicenters  of  unrest.  Sidi  Bouzid in Tunisia,  where one of  the first,  now iconic  
events that sparked the uprising – the self-immolation of a desperate young man – took 
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place,  is  located  in  a  dryland  region  formerly  dominated  by  nomadic  pastoralism.  The 
regional economy had shifted toward sedentary arboriculture and cereal farming, with live-
stock relegated to a complementary role,  in the wake of  rangeland privatization policies 
(Selmi and Elloumi 2007). Similarly, the Syrian uprisings were initiated in provincial towns 
like Deraa, Hama, and Homs (Châtel 2014). These settlements and their peculiarities need to 
be better understood by researchers and the wider public, and to be more adequately consid-
ered by national and international policy-makers. Without expecting universally valid expla-
nations, Ayn Bani Mathar can nevertheless serve as a useful case study of how processesʿ  
unfolding in rural towns across the MENA region can be captured.
The  case  of  drought  in  eastern  Morocco  shows  how  unconventional  scholarly 
approaches can be employed to generate useful insights that both deepen and broaden the 
knowledge produced in the discipline of Middle East studies, and offers new opportunities 
to connect it to other evolving academic fields. At least, this is my claim. But does the ANT 
way of doing things actually produce useful new assemblages of knowledge? Or does it per-
haps merely mean telling the same stories with a slightly different focus? After all, more con-
ventional scholarly accounts would possibly include most of the elements I have: drought, 
cars, sheep, young musicians, pastoral households, and free-trade agreements. The difference 
lies in their treatment: in most theoretical perspectives, these things would be parts of the  
scenery, the backdrop in front of which the play of human actors unfolds. This perspective is 
not wrong, but neither is it complete. It misses out on stories that should be told because they 
contribute to a better understanding not just of the play on stage, but of the whole theater, so  
to speak. Disregarding nonhuman actors and silent transformations may wrongly attribute 
agency to humans, portraying them as more powerful and independent than they actually 
are. Paradoxically, this disregard may also do the opposite – by positing the dominance of 
hidden power structures that demote human beings to hapless puppets of some sinister force 
(see next chapter). Actor-network and assemblage thinking, by contrast, sets out to reexam-
ine punctualizations, discover new landscapes, and rearrange the configurations of the possi-
ble, to ‘connect […] empirically and theoretically rich arguments with new perspectives and 
insights’ (Hammond 2017, 319). Whether this is feasible remains an open question to some 
extent:
‘With luck, assemblages, sharply conceived, should open up new questions, as well as 
new forms of engagement, not merely tell us what we have known more or less all  
along. If it turns out to be the latter, then they are indeed likely to end up a passing 
intellectual fashion.’ (Allen 2011, 156)
In the discipline of human geography, where the study and problematization of space cur-
rently is a core tenet, these approaches have been met with some reservation. While I have 
not strictly avoided the idea of local and global scales in this text, ANT puts it up for debate: 
after all, the local is not an isolated point, it can always be distributed as it is connected to 
distant actors. The global, in turn, can inescapably be localized and pinned down to concrete 
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places where interactions happen. More generally, geometric scales are a problematic notion 
in assemblage thinking and ‘the idea that actors move up and down them, or ‘jump’ them 
even, is somewhat misplaced’ (Allen 2011, 156). Consequently, ‘there is no zoom going from 
macro structure to micro interactions’ in social life (Latour 1999a, 19). A possible intersection 
with the kind of geographical analysis typically practiced in Middle East studies after the 
recent ‘spatial turn’ can be created by focusing on places (which are in turn characterized by 
connections) rather than  space as ‘a grid within which and against which distances can be 
marked off’ (Hammond 2017, 320). Geographers of the Middle East could also reimagine 
space  as  consisting of  ‘routes,  nodes  and connections  rather  than surfaces  and frontiers’ 
(Buzelin 2005, 197) if they wanted to ANTify their approach. The pastoral landscape of east-
ern Morocco easily lends itself to such a description.
Apart from notions of space, actor-network theory and assemblage thinking offer com-
plementary perspectives on sociological questions, which are often inspired by the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu in contemporary academia, even though this is less prominently the case in 
Middle East  studies.  Rather than structures and practices,  ANT authors are interested in 
arrangements  and  agency  (ch.  1.3,  p.  30).  Emblematically,  Latour  completely  disregards 
social class in his analyses, ‘a variable and concept that remains central in Bourdieu’s work’ 
(Buzelin 2005, 201). The nomadic community of eastern Morocco, viewed through the lens of 
my survey data, corresponds to a society without distinct classes. Instead, there are provi-
sional groups that can only be differentiated in disparate ways along specific axes and may 
always be overridden by new, surprising acts of connection assemblage. This does not mean, 
to be sure, that Bourdieu’s insights should be ignored or rejected in the future. My analysis of 
distinction (ch.  3.6, p.  150) directly refers to his seminal study of French society (Bourdieu 
[1979] 2013) and my fieldwork methods owe much to his groundbreaking work. But knowl-
edge production can hugely benefit from the incorporation of new perspectives.
On a more practical level relating to my academic discipline, pastoral economies similar 
to the one I studied exist in various semi-arid and arid regions across the Middle East and 
North Africa. My findings and suggestions could be relevant to research on those communi-
ties – and to the people themselves – because they are confronted with similar challenges. 
Drought remains one of the biggest threats across the region. Two authors who aggregated 
data on natural disasters in the Arab world found that drought had ‘been responsible for the 
largest number of fatalities’ by far, with all other disaster events combined (including epi-
demics, earthquakes, and floods) accounting for less than seven percent of human lives lost 
between 1964 and 1990 (Al-Madhari and Elberier 1996, 28). Droughts had mainly occurred in 
North  Africa  rather  than the  Middle  East.  And yet,  my study has  also  emphasized that 
drought seldom works in isolation; it only reveals its full detrimental force when it links up 
with other agencies. Seen from a structuralist angle, environmental change in the world’s 
rangelands has chiefly been driven by ‘a political and economic system that prioritizes pri-
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vate property, sedentarism, and the generation of profit’ (Sayre et al. 2017, 8) much rather 
than weather phenomena or climate change – or cultural factors, for that matter.
Over the centuries, scholars of the Middle East have often attributed presumptive charac-
teristics  of  Muslim individuals  or societies  to their religion,  and many people across the 
world do so today. Arguing against this idea, historian Stacy Holden claims that ‘the eco-
nomic system engendered by environmental conditions explains social and political conser-
vatism in Morocco’ much better than Islam does (Holden 2009, 8).  I fully agree with this  
view. My study does not contribute anything to the question whether the nomads of the high 
plateaus would do things differently if they happened to be born into another religion. From 
my point of view, this is not a useful question at all, although other analysts may disagree. 
In conclusion, I contend that actor-network theory and assemblage thinking are utterly 
valuable research tools for Middle East studies because they encourage holistic views beyond 
narrow disciplinary traditions. ANT’s potential for crossing such boundaries and reconciling 
different approaches has been pointed out by several authors, even though it remains an 
open question  ‘whether  a  single perspective  should  attempt  to  embrace  interdisciplinary 
thinking’  (Murdoch  2001,  129).  Nonetheless,  increasing  diversity  and  multiplicity  of 
approaches is most certainly a positive thing in academic knowledge generation, as it creates 
new avenues for scholars to collect information and connect it. In fact, assemblage thinking 
and ANT enable researchers to find and follow surprising topics and actors – or to be found 
by them, in fact. As I mentioned in the opening chapters of this thesis, drought found me as 
much as I found drought – and we have both transformed each other, if ever so slightly, over 
the course of this mutual engagement.
 4.3 Policy Implications: The End of Drought?
Understanding the ways in which drought is enrolled into different assemblages will help 
formulate policies that mitigate its adverse consequences for all actors, in the high plateaus 
and elsewhere. This discussion primarily targets the policy-making institutions that are cur-
rently most relevant for the nomad lands in eastern Morocco, viz., the various hierarchical 
levels of the  makhzan, the central state, which is expected to define the legislative, judicial,  
and executive framework for all activities taking place in its territories. A few years ago, the 
FAO formulated a ‘menu’ of policy options for governments that try to protect and promote 
a sustainable livestock sector (Pica-Ciamarra, Otte, and Martini 2010), identifying domains of 
possible livestock-related interventions. While such frameworks can serve as a useful starting 
point, my approach is broader, because an exclusive focus on the livestock sector will likely 
not do justice to its entanglement with other economic and social activities. The discussion 
should, moreover,  cover the policy-making that takes place outside the state apparatus – 
within international development organizations, at academic conferences, or between non-
governmental organizations – and the ceaseless mundane interactions of humans and non-
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humans in the steppe. Ultimately, who sets and implements a policy may be less important 
than what this policy actually entails.
As noted earlier, drought in Morocco is often termed a structural phenomenon, which I 
took to be another way of saying ‘ubiquitous.’ Perhaps more precisely, drought can be con-
ceptualized as an infrastructural event that spreads through complex infrastructure networks 
involving reservoirs, water pipes, and water users; whenever their demands change, hence, 
‘the calculus  of  drought  changes’  too (Carse 2017,  905).  This  dynamic property of  water 
demand is one reason drought management is by no means a trivial task.
However, the main purpose of the renewed understanding of drought that I advocate is 
not to find techno-political solutions for better disaster management in times of catastrophic 
drought. This would perhaps be a misguided approach – similar to emergency relief mea-
sures that  treat  the symptoms,  but leave the underlying causes of  a crisis  unchanged or 
entrench them even further (Czuba, O’Neill, and Ayala 2017). The gist of this critique as it 
applies to pastoral regions is summarized in this quote on relief interventions by non-gov-
ernmental organizations:
‘Past problems with pastoralism have been perceived to be an absolute shortage of 
water, to which boreholes were deemed an answer, and disease, which was attacked 
through the provision of veterinary medicine. Pastoralism allowed NGOs to provide 
simple technical solutions to these problems. These were combined with restocking of 
animals after drought, all of which prioritised animal numbers over effective manage-
ment. Responses which concentrate solely on restoring the number of animals herded 
[…] simply set the scene for increased loss the next time around.’ (Blench and Marriage 
1999, 19)
Over many decades of disappointing long-term outcomes of such development efforts, it has 
become quite clear that ‘[t]echnology is no panacea’ (Kallis 2008, 100). Nevertheless, just as 
the pastoralists in Morocco find it natural to rely on modern communication technologies,  
such new actors will have a role in coming drought-coping assemblages. At least three policy 
strategies are frequently discussed where information technologies shield pastoralists from 
the negative effects of drought: insurance, market interventions, and restocking.
First, a number of proposed drought mitigation strategies include ‘an increased use of 
insurance’  (Woudenberg, Wilhite,  and Hayes 2008, 98).  My fieldwork team observed that 
many locals desire social security and insurance options for themselves and their animals. 
Even in the case of innovative weather insurance schemes, however, there are inherent risks 
of producing adverse effects on social and ecological collectives (Müller, Johnson, and Kreuer 
2017). Very generally, ‘to restore the status quo may not be the best solution to drought fail -
ures’ (Heathcote 1969, 194). Yet, the logic of most insurance programs consists precisely in 
encouraging a return to the pre-crisis state rather than promoting adaptation and transfor-
mation (O'Hare, White, and Connelly 2016). Moreover, many forms of drought relief come 
with a moral hazard: people may undertake risky and irresponsible behavior such as farm-
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ing marginal, drought-prone lands because they count on assistance if crops fail. This has led 
to the reconsideration of various drought relief  programs (Heathcote 2013).  Cutting-edge 
forms of index insurance seem to circumvent the issue of moral hazard, but the costs of risky 
behavior are actually merely redistributed across the entire community rather than borne by 
the insurer (Müller, Johnson, and Kreuer 2017).
Second, even under current neoliberalism and its free-market rhetoric, nation states still  
have the authority to regulate markets to a considerable extent; ‘contractual market exchange 
depends on the rule setting and sanction enforcement of states’ (Berndt and Boeckler 2009, 
537). Price-building mechanisms are one possible intervention point. Could the Moroccan 
state, for instance, design a market in a fashion that guarantees the producers more or less 
stable livestock prices, independent of drought-induced changes in the supply and demand 
balance? Until recently, prices used to be widely regulated for cereals, milk, and some other 
foodstuffs produced in the region (Abaab et al. 1995). In addition, the prices for animal feed 
can be controlled by public authorities, although this creates risks of overstocking and an 
increased dependency on fodder (ch.  2.3,  p.  67).  Given the current  state  of  international 
affairs, it may seem impossible for many countries to undo neoliberal reforms – often related 
to structural adjustment policies – that had widely phased out such subsidies (cf. Devereux 
2007). For several reasons, at any rate, pastoralists in Morocco seem to be less affected by 
price issues than nomads elsewhere. During my fieldwork years, nobody mentioned widely 
fluctuating prices, neither in livestock nor in other goods – not even in years with low precip-
itation. This may in part be due to the sealed-off domestic sheep meat market and a fairly 
stable long-term demand structure (ch. 2.7, p. 94). Moreover, the Kingdom’s diverse geogra-
phy guarantees that each drought will typically affect only parts of the country. As my study 
has shown, even the population within one locality can be differentially affected.  Hence, 
drastic local shifts in supply or demand do not easily escalate into large-scale market price 
changes. Once again, information and transportation infrastructures and technologies play 
an essential role in creating this stability.
Third, the promotion of restocking after a drought – perhaps a special case of market 
intervention – is seen with skepticism by many analysts. Without an acknowledgment that 
the number of animals could obviously not have been sustained on the available resources, 
one argument goes, the previous levels are simply restored, ‘providing more sacrifices for 
the next drought’ (Blench and Marriage 1999, 23). On the other hand, observers across differ-
ent  pastoral  systems have long identified characteristic  boom-and-bust  cycles,  and it  has 
been argued that maximizing herd sizes is, in fact, the most rational strategy under many cir-
cumstances (Fratkin and Roth 1990). In unclear situations like this, simulation modeling can 
help provide answers, making use of newly available computing technology. My colleagues 
concluded a modeling study with the following advice after having simulated different sce-
narios combining pasture resting and fodder subsidies:
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‘We recommend that drought mitigation measures by governments or NGOs should 
take into account the critical time after a drought when pasture vegetation is particu-
larly vulnerable to degradation, and support local livestock breeders by providing or 
subsidizing supplementary feed preferably both during and after droughts to let the 
pasture recover. A complementary effect could be achieved by subsidizing the sale of 
livestock  during  droughts,  and  not  subsidizing  the  restocking  immediately  after 
droughts but after one year’s rest.’ (Müller et al. 2015, 163, emphasis added)
This rangeland recovery period turned out to be a crucial factor for the long-term viability of 
any specific arrangement, both in economic and ecological terms. It provides an example of 
the benefits to knowledge production induced by a multiplication of research methods – and 
of potential actors, keeping in line with the ANT spirit. More inclusive analyses have also 
been called for in the drought literature in order to set a ‘preventive agenda, rather than one 
focused on predicting and conquering nature’ (Hewitt 2013, 12). If drought can come to be 
understood as something that is always looming, that is the rule rather than the exception, 
then the responses to it may become more sensible in a long-term perspective. Human soci-
eties should perhaps best accept this continuous presence of threats and ‘find ways of living 
in uncertainty’ (Law 2004, 15).
Uncertainty is a fundamental ingredient of our world; most of our knowledge can be cat-
egorized as true, but not certain. We expect countless things to happen every day and they 
mostly do, but there is no mathematical certainty that they invariably will (Popper 1990).  
However, uncertainty ‘is not evenly distributed across time and space’ (Calkins 2016, 2) and 
new sources  of  uncertainty  emerge all  the  time.  In  relation to  phenomena like  drought, 
uncertainty seems to be increasing with climate change, and time-tested methods of identify-
ing the onset of a drought are no longer dependable (Jarawura 2014). Much like crop farmers 
in the United States who have tried to pull together various socio-technical assemblages ‘to 
better  mitigate  and  prepare  for  drought’  (Woudenberg,  Wilhite,  and  Hayes  2008,  101), 
Moroccan shepherds will keep looking for improved forecasting, marketing, or communica-
tion tools and platforms to help them hedge against existing uncertainties.
Anthropologist  Konstantina  Isidoros,  who  carried  out  fieldwork  among  Sahrawi 
nomads, reports a fundamental difference in how these desert dwellers approach uncertainty 
and insecurity as opposed to most Westerners. In European thinking, she argues, security 
and stability are seen as the norm – environmentally, politically, economically, and socially. 
Conscious efforts have to be made in order to avert situations of insecurity, which appear 
threatening and scary. In the view of dryland pastoralists, by contrast, insecurity is the nor-
mal state of things, and humans must constantly work toward constructing security (Isidoros 
2018, 74). Security can here be understood as an assemblage in the sense that I have used the 
term: a complex configuration that is fragile, keeps shifting, and is always at risk of breaking 
apart. Creatively combining customary knowledge from people who are used to drought 
and similar sources of incertitude, such as the pastoralists of Morocco, with newly invented 
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technologies actually promises solutions to a variety of current global challenges, not just 
environmental ones (Scoones and Nori 2018).
I  have  argued  that  drought  does  not  mean  the  same  thing  for  everyone  in  eastern 
Morocco’s pastoral communities. One family may suffer huge losses in a given year because 
of drought, while another household in the same village considers the year a good one and 
makes economic gains. This may be a fundamentally new situation. It is assumed, in the lit-
erature, that ‘all herders were equally exposed to drought hazards’ (Steinmann 2001, 47) in 
the past and that policies could therefore be oriented along distinct phases of a ‘drought  
cycle’ (Toulmin 1995, 96). A meaningful challenge for drought relief policies, today, would 
hence be to address this increasingly uneven distribution and make the effects of drought be 
felt – or rather, be not felt! – more equally throughout the population once again. Vulnerable, 
resource-poor families, whose ‘responses are mediated by social and economic inequality’ 
(Watts 1983, 255), should not be exposed to more suffering than wealthier ones. Setting up 
policies to reverse such trends, thus, ‘depends upon a much greater focus on people, places,  
and livelihoods most at risk’ (Hewitt 2013, 3). Actions that target existing inequalities within 
a community promise to be the best way of dealing with drought. In generic ANT terms, 
drought’s place in the collective could be renegotiated and stabilized by investing concerted 
efforts into the weakening or even destruction of the deleterious links that it tries to establish 
with other actors. Some ideas to this end have been suggested and tested in various poverty-
alleviation settings across the world (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).
In times when inequalities are consolidated (Joseph 2012) and even ‘increased’ (Ostry, 
Loungani, and Furceri 2016, 39) as a corollary of neoliberal policies, it remains utterly impor-
tant to keep proposing and promoting ideas to counter that tendency – in North Africa and 
elsewhere. However, a revolutionary abolition of all neoliberal ideas at once is not the only 
conceivable way forward and may not even be possible, since ‘neoliberalism is neither hege-
monic nor universal, and exists in different forms across specific geographical and institu-
tional contexts’ (Higgins et al. 2014, 388). It has also proven remarkably flexible, adaptive, 
and thus durable despite  recurring crises  (Peck and Tickell  2002),  akin to other  complex 
assemblages that are sustained by a plethora of actors. In response, political actors should try 
to ‘differentiate, fine-tune and adapt’ rather than imposing one-size-fits-all, blueprint solu-
tions (Scoones 1995, 29). Imagining better alternatives is a permanent task for humanity.
Actor-network pioneer Bruno Latour has taken the quest for equality one step further: 
not just different groups of people should equally benefit from opportunities to be involved 
in decision-making processes, but nonhuman entities as well. The elaboration of the collec-
tive could thus become a more profoundly democratic exercise.  Political ecology is the key-
word Latour proposes for this process; the initial question is: ‘What are the assemblies of those 
assemblages?’ (Latour 2005, 260). He then suggests possible institutional setups and proce-
dural guidelines for allowing the representation of more actors in a  Parliament of Things. A 
real-life example of such representation can be found for a drought-related substance: water. 
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In the Netherlands, this element has long been represented in political decision-making pro-
cesses by the National Water Authority. Conversely, Californian almond farmers in the Cen-
tral Valley have repeatedly suffered from drought damage; their aquifer is not represented in 
political bodies in a similar way, resulting in depletion. Latour remarks on this tragedy-of-
the-commons situation:
‘It is odd that Californians are still ignoring the procedures of the ancient commons, 
which over millennia had invented clever arrangements for distributing water to all 
interested parties, taking droughts in their stride.’ (Latour 2017, 273)
A re-thinking of political processes has also been advocated by Jane Bennett, who shares a 
similar vision with her notion of  vital materialism.  Its ‘political goal […] is not the perfect 
equality of actants, but a polity with more channels of communication between members’ 
(Bennett 2010,  104).  A more inclusive collective seems especially  desirable  in the current 
atmosphere of right-wing populism, xenophobia, and ‘alternative facts’ preoccupying minds 
around the globe – partly as a backlash against liberal and cosmopolitan attitudes having 
become the mainstream ideology in many places (Koppetsch 2019). To achieve this, political 
actors should acknowledge that there may be multiple alternative ontologies of any given 
thing, simply due to the emphasis of certain connections and the negligence of others. In the 
case of my research topic, this results in plural notions of drought. Crucially, these are still 
notions of one and the same thing, however. Bruno Latour insists ‘on the continuity estab-
lished among agents’  in  what  he calls  ‘a  metamorphic zone’  (Latour 2017,  274);  he  thus 
rejects the idea that there are multiple levels of reality that can be analytically separated and 
dealt with in isolation by different disciplines or institutions.
The renegotiation of the collective’s composition, the opening up of the parliament to 
nonhuman  actors,  corresponds  to  Murray  Li’s  assemblage-making  element  of  ‘re-posing 
political questions’ (Li 2007, 286). It requires a shift of focus away from ‘individual humans 
to their alignment with the rest of the actants in the network and the constraints and oppor-
tunities’ that emerge from this alignment (Dwiartama and Rosin 2014). One concrete exam-
ple could be an increased engagement with spiritual dimensions, leading to the admission of 
invisible beings into formal politics (as I suggested in ch. 3.3, p.  129). At the very least, ‘the 
spiritual notions of drought could be exploited to promote environmentally sustainable prac-
tices which can act to reduce drought vulnerability at the local level’ (Jarawura 2014, 116); 
but a consistent application of actor-network principles could achieve much more. New Zea-
land took an important step in this direction when its parliament granted legal personhood 
to the Whanganui River in 2017,  based on Māori worldviews. Proposals for homologous 
legal re-definitions have also been debated in other parts of the world (Gordon 2018).
An intriguing way of looking at drought would be to identify  what it wants in a given 
setting (although this anthropomorphic expression may seem inapt): what are that specific 
drought’s inherent interests,  propensities,  desires? Once these are identified and listed, it  
may become easier to counteract them. The resulting interventions would have to address 
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wider aspects of the complex networks that drought is entangled in, such as entitlement fail-
ures and other social injustices. Ideally, these interventions would then be able to ‘prevent 
the drought […] event from evolving into a food crisis’ (Devereux 2007, 47) or, in fact, any 
crisis at all.
Could sustained political efforts in this sense even lead to  the end of drought one day? 
Some authors have recently announced ‘the end of desertification’ (Behnke and Mortimore 
2016b), after all… On the one hand, the end of  drought as a meaningful analytical concept 
could be brought about by its extremely broad network of associations with other actors. If 
drought can explain anything, as seems to be increasingly the case in eastern Morocco, it 
ends up explaining nothing; the notion is no longer useful and other questions should be 
asked instead. On the other hand, political interventions could be made so good and reliable 
that drought, while still existent, stopped being a matter of concern for anyone. In an opti-
mistic scenario formulated recently for pastoralists in the Horn of Africa but transferable to 
other regions, ‘the normal occurrence of drought would no longer result in widespread food 
shortages and hunger’ (Little 2013, 248) after the establishment of more robust political and 
market-economic assemblages.
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In this final chapter, I will wrap up my thesis and end on a personal and slightly philosophi-
cal note. What kind of world do we live in? What can we know about it? How can we trans-
form it – and what can we learn specifically from drought in eastern Morocco? I will outline 
elements of answers that emerge from my study of drought in a nomadic community. They 
will remain sketchy by necessity, yet they permit an outlook on possible wider implications 
of my findings.
Some people tend to become impassioned and indignant because they feel that things 
are going awry in this world. This is not my message, however, neither regarding global pol-
itics nor concerning the state of nomads, drought, and social change in Morocco. Most of the 
pastoralists I met, in fact, displayed a very serene approach to daily life, which is mirrored in  
my own attitude. Rather than being upset at existing problems, I am interested in the surpris-
ing ways actors find to adapt to new situations, in the marvelous ingenuity of individuals or 
assemblages, and in the interesting stories than can be told about the world from their per-
spective. If anything, radical viewpoints should be counterbalanced and put into perspective. 
Such impulses are quite relevant given the global rise of right-wing populism during the 
2010s. But public as well as academic debates often seem to be more interested in the scan-
dalous, the negative, and the extreme.
Two distinguished geographers, Katherine Gibson and Julie Graham, express such con-
siderations in a 2008 article. Across much of the anglophone critical social sciences in general  
and human geography in particular, they observe, the prevalent ‘academic stance means that 
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most theorizing is tinged with skepticism and negativity’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 618). Struc-
tural  similarities  to  conspiracy  theories  debase  the  argumentation  of  otherwise  brilliant 
thinkers – an impression that I have felt uncomfortable with over the years, too. ‘Everything 
comes to mean the same thing, usually something large and threatening (like neoliberalism, 
or globalization, or capitalism, or empire)’ in these paranoid accounts (Gibson-Graham 2008, 
618). Ironically, at the end of the day, this sort of analysis actually ‘reinforces what is per-
ceived as dominant’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 618) by disregarding any alternatives that might 
exist. After having engaged in such ways of doing research for decades, Gibson-Graham’s 
eventual reconsideration led them to questions that I hope can inspire the work of my own 
generation:
‘What if we were to accept that the goal of theory is not to extend knowledge by con-
firming what we already know, that the world is a place of domination and oppres-
sion? What if we asked theory instead to help us see openings, to provide a space of 
freedom and possibility?’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 619)
Gibson-Graham argue in favor of weak theory that ‘welcomes surprise, tolerates coexistence, 
and cares for the new’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 619), exactly those points that contribute to the 
appeal of ANT and assemblage thinking. Such varieties of theory ‘could draw on the plea-
sures of friendliness, trust, and companionable connection. There could be a greater scope 
for invention and playfulness’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 619). Incidentally, these positive prop-
erties can typically be found among pastoralists, who ‘are resourceful, entrepreneurial and 
innovative peoples by necessity’ (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013, 2). Based on my experience 
in the field and the findings of my survey, I can fully confirm this observation. The high 
plateaus of eastern Morocco, much like comparable regions, are characterized by ‘continuous 
innovation,  adaptive  practices,  complex  governance  arrangements  and  entrepreneurial 
dynamism’ (Catley, Lind, and Scoones 2013, 20). Acknowledging this dynamism should also 
guard any analyst against overly romanticizing notions of  past  forms of  nomadism. Evi-
dently, nobody must be compelled
‘to undertake an essentially spurious enterprise, the restoration of a lost system; pas-
toralists take a risk like any entrepreneur in an inherently unstable environment. If 
they lose their herds and have to switch occupations they follow the route of many 
preceding generations.’ (Blench and Marriage 1999, 27)
Does this recognition imply that the ongoing transformations of society and economy should 
be uncritically accepted? In fact, one critique that has been directed at actor-network theory 
is that its radical flattening of hierarchies and eradication of differences resembles the very 
idea of capitalism which turns everything into a commodity (Fuller 2000). Against this argu-
ment, I would point out that ANT scholarship does not try to attach price tags to actors or 
numerically quantify the links between them. Equality is not the same as enforced conform-
ity. Oppressive current forms of capitalism should certainly be transformed into alternative 
economies that are more equitable for all entities involved. Supposed that a revolution is not 
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the only way to achieve this, ancient Taoist ideals of wise leadership could become a source 
of inspiration here. In contrast to Hellenic traditions where human action tends to be inten-
tional, goal-oriented, and involve heroic efforts, a Chinese strategist would ‘transform the 
relation of powers in a way that would make them silently shift to his favor over time’ (Jul-
lien 2009, 15, my translation). An efficient transformation should be induced by quietly start-
ing a process,
‘from a distance, but in such a way that it is likely to develop on its own; and that it 
manages, by infiltrating the situation, little by little and without even being noticed, to 
silently transform it.’ (Jullien 2009, 146, my translation)
This art of maturation presupposes a precise observation of the situation in all its complexity. 
Policymakers should analyze and listen carefully, and resist the convenient shortcuts of ‘lazy 
thinking’  (Banerjee  and Duflo 2011,  16).  Assemblage and actor-network approaches  offer 
important perspectives for such a patient and comprehensive appreciation, as I have tried to 
demonstrate with this study. Applying them means to harness the propensities of humans 
and nonhumans and channel them into successful new assemblages.
A policy style that seeks to induce silent transformations in this way is promising even 
when it is driven by a long-term vision of doing things in radically different ways. This is not 
a new idea – some PDPEO texts and those of an earlier pastoral development project in the  
region have suggested, for instance, that ‘sets of small interventions could lead to significant 
improvements’  (USAID  1986,  187).  Yet,  this  principle  bears  repeating  once  again  three 
decades later, for eastern Morocco and beyond. Related to a policy approach that eschews 
heroic acts in favor of silent transformations, a broader scope and more careful execution of 
analysis in formulating drought policies remains the core desideratum that emerges from my 
research. While such observation and analysis will take time and effort, it is especially appo-
site in the case of drought. More time is available in a drought than during other crises, as 
‘the drawn-out escalation of drought impacts […] provides opportunities for varied and geo-
graphically extensive human responses to modify risk while damage is in progress’ (Hewitt 
1997, 87). Adaptive learning is possible (Scoones 1995).
Given the recurrent character of drought, drought-experienced communities across the 
globe should be encouraged to learn together and from one another. International exchange 
could thus be a promising avenue to build more robust knowledge networks. A large herder 
(kabir) from my study area once took part in a pastoralist workshop:
‘I told you I went to Tunisia. We had a meeting with 26 countries, including 16 Euro-
pean countries and others, and there were Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and Senegal 
and other non-European countries. The topic was the pastoralist, everyone, like our-
selves, i.e. the goals of profit and productivity. Their rangelands are like ours. Every-
one  brought  their  data  tables,  photographs  from their  rangelands.  All  herders  are 
herders with the same goals, whether European, arabiʿ , or from the Gulf states.’ (Inter-
view with Daoudi, Ayn Bani Mathar, June 2, 2010)ʿ
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While it is not trivial to organize this exchange and to create insights that go beyond superfi-
cialities,  building  stronger  links  between  pastoralist  groups  seems  imperative  in  today’s 
globalized world. This leads me to the following point about broader trends in the social sci-
ences as they pertain to Middle East studies. I remember vividly how at the beginning of my 
studies, in the early 2000s, globalization was becoming a mainstream topic. Researchers were 
excited to find out and discuss how things happening far away affected the most local liveli-
hood conditions, even in remote places such as the Moroccan countryside. In economic geog-
raphy, too, neoliberal globalization – viewed extremely critically – has been ‘the dominant 
topic of research’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 619), but usually without imagining or promoting 
economic alternatives. That is why I chose to engage with a different set of approaches in this 
study.
Contemporary  modernity  is  characterized  by  more  than  just  increasing  connectivity 
across space: simultaneously, the entanglement of humans and nonhumans is growing more 
and more intimate. The new material-semiotic focus of ANT and related lines of thinking 
helps us, as analysts of our world, move beyond the finding that everything is connected to 
far away objects, and shifts the attention to the nature of these connections. Regardless of the 
topographical distance between different elements, humans and nonhumans interact all the 
time to assemble something new. This conceptualization makes a re-thinking of action possi-
ble.
Action often consists in ‘testing and experimenting’ (Calkins 2016, 5); just as humans, 
nonhuman organisms incessantly try to make their surroundings more inhabitable and put 
themselves at ease as much as possible by modifying their environments. As these interests 
often clash with those of others, a messy, vibrant, chaotic, pulsating, unpredictable muddle 
emerges – our world (Latour 2017, 98–100). Seen in this light, transportation costs to physi-
cally carry items around the globe are just a small part of the efforts that are incurred to keep 
up all these fragile, mutable connections. Nevertheless, tracing the expenditure of physical  
energy in all its forms might be a way to document this universal link-making activity. Is this 
the cement of  things,  as  it  were,  that  fundamentally holds the universe together? In her 
attempt to construct a scientific realist metaphysics, philosopher Claudine Tiercelin comes to 
the following conclusion: ‘The entire distribution of fundamental physical properties is what 
constitutes the cement of things throughout space-time’ (Tiercelin 2011, 297, my translation). 
This cement,  she emphasizes, is  fragile – just as what I  have referred to as the countless 
assemblages we all try to surround ourselves with.
Various comparable and compatible conceptualizations of the world have been debated 
by philosophers. They include an object-oriented ontology, according to which ‘everything 
that  exists  has  the  status  of  an  independent  object’  (Maeder  2017,  71,  my translation)  – 
regardless of whether they are human or nonhuman, physically existing or imaginary enti-
ties. A so-called metaphysics of relations has also been proposed, based on insights from the 
study of quantum mechanics. In this view, ‘we can in principle know all there is at the basic  
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level of the world; for what there is at the basic level of the world are relations of quantum 
entanglement’ (Esfeld 2004, 616). Knowledge of its relations is sufficient to give a description 
of any object in the world, because all we will ever be able to know about it is related to us 
via such links. This view ties in beautifully with actor-network theory as I understand it, and 
provides a possible ontology of drought: drought is the sum of its connections to other enti-
ties.
Probably the first attempt to study drought through the lens of actor-network theory and 
assemblage thinking, this dissertation demonstrates a redefined potential role for the social 
sciences in the age of the Anthropocene. Essentially,  the social sciences can contribute to 
humankind’s continuous task of opening up, unpacking, and reinspecting the antiquated 
punctualizations that surround us, then carefully reassembling them in useful ways, incorpo-
rating  new  actants  and  discarding  outdated  ones.  These  updated  assemblages  can  then 
accompany the pastoralists of eastern Morocco – and the rest of us – toward a more equitable  
future.
A further lesson can be taken away from the incremental and accumulative nature of 
drought.  Analysts,  to my mind,  should study gradual  transformations much rather  than 
focusing on dramatic singular events connected to notions of rupture, shock, or revolution – 
even if those may seem more decisive and interesting at first, and no matter how ‘dear’ (Jul-
lien 2009, 122, my translation) those figures may be to European thinking. My argument is 
that we should increasingly direct our analytical focus to the cumulative effects of small, but 
surprising innovations by humans and nonhumans alike.  The silent  transformations  that 
their assemblages are involved in shape our world at least as profoundly as breaking-news 
catastrophes or highly symbolic political gestures. The fashion tastes of young people in a 
rural Moroccan town, the slight malfunction of pastoral cooperatives, the conflicts involving 
solar panels and olive plantations, or the complex negotiations around free trade agreements 
reveal not just essential insights into a changing pastoral community;  they also uniquely 
facilitate a glimpse into the future of drought.
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